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HAIL TO THE CHIEF:  
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR  
SCIENTIFIC ADVICE 
James Wilsdon and Robert Doubleday
It’s all change at the top of UK science policy. On 1 April 2013, Sir Mark 
Walport took over as the government’s chief scientific adviser (GCSA), 
the 11th occupant of that post - all of them men - since it was created by 
Harold Wilson in 1964 (see Table 1).1 In a seamless transition worthy of 
Doctor Who (another early-60s institution which has survived through 11 
incarnations), those who follow @uksciencechief on Twitter saw Sir John 
Beddington’s trademark beard shimmer and then vanish, to be replaced by 
Sir Mark Walport’s freshly-trimmed moustache. A new era was underway.
Sir Mark Walport arrives in Whitehall following a highly successful decade 
as director of the Wellcome Trust. He is a seasoned political operator who 
knows how to forge alliances and navigate the corridors of power. On 
his appointment, Sir Paul Nurse, president of the Royal Society, echoed 
the views of many in the scientific community when he said “we have 
absolutely the right person for the job.”2
Table 1: UK government chief scientific advisers 1964 to the  
 present day 
Sir Mark Walport 2013 -
Sir John Beddington 2008 - 2013
Sir David King 2000 - 2008
Sir Robert May (now Lord May of Oxford) 1995 - 2000
Sir William Stewart 1990 - 1995
Sir John Fairclough 1986 - 1990
Sir Robin Nicholson 1982 - 1985
Sir John Ashworth 1976 - 1981
Dr Robert Press 1974 - 1976
Sir Alan Cottrell 1971 - 1974
Sir Solly Zuckerman 1964 - 1971
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Advice to academic politicians
Not long after Sir Mark Walport was confirmed as the next GCSA, we 
spent a day with him at an event for biology students in Cambridge. In 
an engaging talk to his audience of young researchers, Walport began by 
warmly recommending Microcosmographica Academica3 as his preferred 
guide to the politics of science and academic life. 
Written in 1908 by Frances Cornford, a Cambridge academic, 
Microcosmographica Academica is a biting satire on universities, with 
relevance to many other institutions. It opens with a warning to a ‘young 
academic politician’ and goes on to describe two blocking tactics that will 
be wearily familiar to anyone who has worked in academia or Whitehall. 
First, the principle of the dangerous precedent: that ‘every public action 
which is not customary, either is wrong, or, if it is right, is a dangerous 
precedent. It follows that nothing should be done for the first time.’ Second, 
the principle of the wedge: that ‘you should not act justly now for fear of 
raising expectations that you may act still more justly in the future.’
In essence, Microcosmographica Academica is a plea for a more honest 
approach to the limits and possibilities of politics, and a guide to getting 
things done, whatever obstacles others may place in your way. A century on, 
it remains an entertaining read; it may also yield a few insights into what 
makes Sir Mark Walport tick. 
This book contains no shortage of advice to academic politicians. The 
appointment of a new GCSA creates a natural opportunity to take stock of 
relations between science, evidence, politics and policy, and over the past 
six months a number of organisations teamed up to host a series of events 
looking at the future of scientific advice in Whitehall.4 These have fed into 
this collection, which brings together perspectives from current and former 
science advisers, civil servants, policy analysts and academics.
In this introduction, we draw out some of the most important threads 
from these contributions and weave them into a set of reflections on the 
prospects, priorities and dilemmas for scientific advice over the next five 
years. 
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Experts as intermediaries
One central theme of the collection is eloquently summarised in Geoff 
Mulgan’s essay: ‘the key role of a scientific adviser is to act as an 
intermediary and broker rather than an adviser…consequently their skills 
need to be ones of translation, aggregation and synthesis as much as deep 
expertise.’ Sir John Beddington makes a related point, when he describes 
the role of the GCSA as ‘a conduit of advice rather than a single expert 
opinion.’
From across the Atlantic, Roger Pielke Jr. observes that governments 
everywhere ‘are chock full of experts, agencies and advisory mechanisms.’ 
In his account, the role of the science adviser is a combination of 
championing the role of science in government, convening relevant 
expertise, helping decision makers to navigate wisely between the scope of 
available choices on a given topic, and supporting the quality of evidence 
and expertise in government by ‘providing advice on advice’.
This emphasis on the ‘expert as intermediary’ is important in the context 
of a recent inquiry into chief scientific advisers (CSAs) by the House of 
Lords, which expressed concern about unevenness in the status, authority 
and influence of CSAs across different government departments.5 Similar 
points have been made by the Campaign for Science and Engineering.6 
The Lords’ report attempts to codify the ‘essential characteristics’ of a CSA 
that are required if he or she is to operate effectively. Foremost among 
these - the ‘primary and essential characteristic’ - is that CSAs ‘must have 
standing and authority within the scientific community, nationally and 
internationally.’ This phrase is not defined with precision, but is taken to 
imply that CSAs should be externally-appointed senior figures, drawn from 
academia or occasionally from industry, who are ‘able to access a wide 
range of expertise’ by dint of their seniority. It leads the Lords to criticise 
the appointment of Whitehall insiders to some CSA positions. 
A cynic might observe that it is hardly surprising to find a committee of 
British peers, several of whom are themselves eminent scientists, arguing 
for an elite cadre of CSAs to be cast in their own image. And to be fair, the 
Lords report does go on to list a number of additional qualities that CSAs 
need to bring to the job. However, the focus is on getting the ‘right’ people 
in post, and then tinkering with departmental structures, budgets and 
reporting lines, to ensure that they are able to operate effectively.
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The essays here suggest a different approach.7 As Geoff Mulgan argues, 
what might be characterised as the ‘clever chap’ theory of scientific advice 
is outdated and inadequate to the task: ‘Simply putting an eminent scientist 
into a department may have little effect…many who aren’t well prepared 
for their roles as brokers, feel that they rattle around without much impact.’ 
Jill Rutter acknowledges the value of a good CSA’s networks but argues 
that their ‘ability to cope with, and even relish, policymaking in a political 
environment needs to be as much of a test when they are recruited as 
their academic credentials.’ And Roger Pielke Jr. reminds us that ‘science 
advisers are not superheroes’, capable in some unproblematic way of 
representing the ‘authority of science as a counterbalance to the messiness 
of politics.’ 
Ecosystems of expertise
A focus on skills of translation, aggregation and synthesis requires us 
to shift our attention from the experience and status of the individual 
adviser, to the dynamics of the advisory system in which they sit. In some 
respects, CSAs are the charismatic megafauna of the science advisory 
system. As a result, they will always attract a lot of attention, but their 
role needs to be understood within a rich ecosystem of expert advice, 
which includes analytical professionals within the civil service, external 
advisory committees, policy ‘tsars’,8 national academies, learned societies, 
universities, NGOs and civil society organisations - and many others.
The UK’s current science advisory system is largely a product of lessons 
learned from the BSE crisis of the mid 1990s. However, several essays point 
to constraints in the current scope of the system. Brian Collins, himself a 
former CSA in two departments, argues that as more of the execution of 
public policy is outsourced to agencies or the private sector, Whitehall-
based scientific advice fails to engage with the complexities of delivery 
and implementation. Chris Tyler makes the case that scientific advice to 
Parliament is ‘poorly understood and systematically overlooked.’ Dave 
O’Brien highlights wider changes in the culture, identity and capacity of the 
civil service, which need to be factored into these debates, and asks: ‘who 
will make evidence-based policy a reality?’
In their essays, Jill Rutter and Miles Parker explore how the role of the civil 
service is changing, as it grapples with tighter budgets, heightened demands 
for accountability, and a reform agenda that promises to ‘make open 
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policymaking the default’.9 Parker is optimistic about the contribution that 
the science and engineering profession within Whitehall can make to this 
reform agenda, and charts the progression over the past 20 years towards 
more rigorous, multidisciplinary approaches to policy analysis. Rutter also 
detects signs of progress, but argues that more effort is required to ensure 
scientists and engineers rise to the very top of the civil service.
Sir John Beddington notes diplomatically that ‘open policymaking is 
still a fluid term’, and Jill Rutter reminds us that ‘previous attempts at 
civil service reform have faltered as the initial impetus fizzled out.’ But 
the 2012 reform plan points towards something more transformative. 
In their essay, Jack Stilgoe and Simon Burall argue for a more radical 
interpretation of openness, which draws systematically on engagement and 
dialogue with the wider public. They point to an uneasy settlement since 
the BSE crisis between old and new models of expertise, and ask whether 
open policymaking will be more about ‘open doors, welcoming in new 
perspectives; open minds, reflecting on the limits of centralised control 
and predictability; or transparent but closed windows, revealing policy but 
maintaining control of its contributors.’ Alice Bell describes how new forms 
of social media are changing the style and speed of interactions between 
experts, policymakers and publics, and suggests that the ‘messiness’ of 
such online discourse is how we create the capacity ‘for more coherent 
exchanges, build trust, learn and digest.’ 
The science of scientific advice
From time to time, prominent voices within the scientific community call 
for science to be given greater authority in policy and political decision-
making.10 Such calls are well intentioned, but they sometimes fall into 
the trap of reinforcing what are misleading or inaccurate accounts of the 
relationship between science and policy. Fortunately, as Geoff Mulgan 
reminds us, there is ‘a science as well as a craft of scientific advice.’ A core 
argument of his and other essays is the need to learn more systematically 
from existing research and practice ‘on why certain kinds of knowledge and 
advice are acted on, and others are not.’ And as Mulgan says, ‘perhaps the 
most important finding of almost all research on this topic in that demand 
matters as much as supply.’ 
Geoff Mulgan emphasises the importance of ‘evidence about evidence.’ 
As one example of this, in his essay, David Cleevely describes the ways in 
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which network analysis can inform our understanding of how scientific 
advice works in practice, and can assist in the construction of more 
intelligent systems of knowledge exchange. 
In her essay, Sheila Jasanoff probes further into the foundations of 
scientific advice, distilling some of the insights that can be drawn from 
three decades of work in the field of science and technology studies (STS). 
She acknowledges that the questions raised by STS can sometimes be 
‘associated with unproductive wheel-spinning and relativism’, but insists 
that ‘the wheels, in my view, can spin with traction.’ She concludes that 
the relationship between creators and critics of scientific advice is ‘fraught 
but indispensable.’ In democracies, no institutions should place themselves 
beyond critique: ‘If judges may not presume to stand above the law, still less 
should science advisers seek to insulate themselves from the critical gaze of 
the science of science advice.’
Policy demand and the disciplinary mix
In a valedictory March 2013 evidence session in front of the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee,11 Sir John Beddington ran 
through an impressive list of achievements from his period in office. He also 
expressed a few regrets, including the absence of a high-level champion for 
the social sciences within the CSA network - a role that had been performed 
by Paul Wiles, the former Home Office CSA, but which has been ‘in limbo’ 
for a couple of years. The post of ‘national adviser’ for the new network 
of ‘what works’ centres for evidence in social policy12 will go some way 
towards plugging this gap, but Beddington admitted that ‘my own view 
is that we need someone at the highest level from social research … that 
senior challenge function is really missing.’ 
The case for a chief social scientist is elaborated more fully in the essay 
by Cary Cooper and Stephen Anderson. They make some persuasive 
arguments. Finding solutions to cross-cutting policy problems - from 
obesity to healthy ageing, food security to climate change - will require 
insights from the social sciences, often in combination with the natural 
sciences; and the methods and approaches of the social sciences are 
sufficiently distinctive to justify their own seat at the ‘top table’ of evidence-
based policy.
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If, however, we accept the case for a chief social scientist, how far do 
we follow it through? Do we settle for one social scientist coordinating 
everything at the centre? Or do we instead push for a more ambitious, 
cross-departmental network, parallel to that of the CSAs? And why stop 
there? There are already chief economists in most departments, connected 
through the Government Economic Service to HM Treasury, the real heart 
of epistemic authority in Whitehall. How about a few chief philosophers, 
able to interrogate ministerial logic and pose deep questions about the 
purpose of government? And, as Rebekah Higgitt and James Wilsdon ask in 
their essay, what about the role of historians in providing what Lord Butler 
described recently as a ‘rear mirror’ for the policymaking process?13 
Geoff Mulgan notes that historians have made important contributions 
to the field of ‘evidence about evidence’.14 Historians of science have a 
particular contribution to make to science and innovation policy. Given 
Walport’s support for the medical humanities during his time at the 
Wellcome Trust, Higgitt and Wilsdon suggest that one way he could signal 
his commitment to the value of historical methods and insights would be 
to pilot a ‘hindsight project’ within the Government Office for Science’s 
Foresight Programme. 
Even under the more plural, interdisciplinary model of scientific advice that 
Sir John Beddington encouraged, there are still implicit hierarchies between 
disciplines, which are not properly explained or written down. If some 
departments benefit by appointing engineers and social scientists as CSAs, 
what is the ideal balance across the network as a whole? And if an engineer 
could one day occupy the top job of GCSA, is the same true for a social 
scientist? 
This takes us back to our earlier point about experts as intermediaries. 
Creating stand-alone advisory structures for the social sciences, engineering 
or history is a clumsy solution, which ducks the bigger challenge of how to 
integrate an appropriate mix of expert advice from all subject areas. It is 
easy to understand why some academics prefer to view government through 
a university lens, projecting on to it the disciplinary silos and rivalries that 
remain a feature of campus life, and trying to build a stronghold for their 
own academic tribe inside Whitehall’s walls. But this ‘supply side’ view 
makes little sense from the ‘demand side’ perspective of policymakers, who 
want access to the most relevant expertise, wherever it can be found within 
the university system, and beyond.
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Proposals and priorities
In an editorial welcoming Walport’s appointment, the journal Nature 
observes that one of the hallmarks of the GCSA role is its flexibility: ‘to 
a great extent the job is what the holder makes of it.’15 At the Wellcome 
Trust, Walport was a vocal advocate for genomics research and open access 
publishing. During his first year in office as GCSA, he will confront myriad 
competing demands for his attention. What are his likely priorities? 
Here, we conclude with ten items that we would expect to find high on the 
incoming GCSA’s ‘to do’ list. A few of these ideas will no doubt be ruled out 
as dangerous precedents; others as thin wedges. But we hope that some 
may prove useful to one particular academic politician, whose role has 
never been more important.
1. Build on Sir John Beddington’s legacy 
Walport’s predecessor is widely judged to have had a successful tenure 
as GCSA; a recent Guardian editorial praised Beddington for having 
‘trodden a thin line with grace.’16 Arguably his greatest achievement 
was to have extended the network of CSAs into every corner of 
Whitehall, and to encourage it to work in a more collegiate way across 
government, supported by a strengthened science and engineering 
profession (as Miles Parker describes). Updated guidelines were also 
produced for the use of scientific advice in policy17 following the 
controversial sacking of Professor David Nutt in 2009. Walport needs 
to ensure that the CSA network is maintained, its disciplinary breadth 
extended and its connections deepened, and that the guidelines are 
taken seriously across government.
2. Position science within a leaner, meaner Whitehall 
Walport is taking over at a turbulent time, as government departments 
contend with diminished budgets and pressure for civil service reform. 
With structures for scientific advice still fragile in some quarters of 
Whitehall, and departmental research budgets vulnerable to ever deeper 
cuts in the next spending review, Walport needs to position the CSAs 
and the science and engineering profession in the vanguard of Whitehall 
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reform - as a model of how to do ‘open policymaking’ that can provide 
an example to others. He should also tightly align them to broader 
efforts to promote evidence-based policy, including the use (where 
appropriate) of methods such as randomised controlled trials (RCTs) 
and the new network of ‘what works’ evidence centres.
3. Bang the drum (but an evidence-based drum) for   
 investment in research 
Making the case for research funding is not a formal part of the GCSA’s 
remit, but as Roger Pielke Jr. reminds us, the scientific community will 
inevitably look to Walport for leadership on this issue, particularly in the 
run-up to the 2015 general election and subsequent spending review. 
Walport’s own background as the head of a premier league funder, 
with vocal opinions on the organisation of the research and innovation 
system, make it even more likely that he will engage. The challenge 
here is to maintain the commitment to robust evidence that the GCSA 
is meant to bring to all areas of policy. Creating a UK equivalent to the 
US ‘science of science policy’ programme18 is one way that Walport 
could strengthen the evidence base for investment. Former US science 
adviser John Marburger won plaudits for his willingness to ask frank 
questions about research funding; Walport should do the same.19 He 
should also wield the collective clout of the Council for Science and 
Technology, with its reinvigorated line-up of business and academic 
leaders, to produce an agenda-setting report on the evidence for 
research investment ahead of the next election.20 Importantly, these 
efforts should focus not only on the economic case for research funding, 
but also on its social and public value, and on opening up debates about 
research priorities and purposes to more diverse perspectives.21 
4. Champion the full breadth of academic expertise 
In recent years the network of CSAs has expanded to include a wider 
range of disciplinary expertise. The latest annual report from the 
Government Office for Science lists two engineers and four economists 
among the 22 CSAs.22 Given that there is now widespread acceptance 
of the benefits that can flow from examining problems through an 
interdisciplinary lens, Walport has an opportunity to champion within 
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government the breadth of all that the natural sciences, engineering, 
social sciences, arts and humanities have to offer. Until recently, the 
recruitment materials for new departmental CSAs have indicated 
that successful candidates are ‘likely to require a FRS or FREng, or 
equivalent standing in a commercial/industrial field’.23 These criteria 
need to be rethought in light of a broader interdisciplinary model, and 
the crucial importance of intermediary, brokering and translational skills 
as emphasised by Geoff Mulgan, Jill Rutter, Roger Pielke Jr. and others.
5. Build towards a multidisciplinary ‘government evidence  
 service’
There has been encouraging progress in strengthening the science 
and engineering profession across Whitehall, and these efforts should 
continue.24 However, as Miles Parker highlights, government analysts 
across the board are now working more closely with policymakers in 
multidisciplinary teams. The ultimate end-point could be a deliberate 
blurring of the distinction between the government economic service, 
the science and engineering profession and other analytical professions 
across Whitehall, and their replacement with a more integrated 
‘government evidence service’, which blends disciplinary expertise 
as required and facilitates the pooling of analytical services between 
departments. Walport has first-hand experience of how to improve the 
translation of biomedical knowledge into practice; a similar focus in his 
GCSA role on ‘knowledge brokering’ to meet the needs of policymakers 
would give greater prominence to intermediaries and translators 
between different forms of specialist knowledge.
6. Keep a cool head in a crisis 
Scientific advisers have to remain vigilant to the ever-present threat of 
the unexpected. Beddington handled a succession of crises - volcanic 
ash, Fukushima and ash dieback - with considerable skill. He also 
placed scientific issues on the National Risk Register, and managed 
to embed a new Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies into the 
government’s civil contingencies procedures.25 At some point on 
Walport’s watch, a crisis (or probably several) will flare up which will 
place scientific credibility on the line. Such situations will test his 
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judgment and leadership. As well as coordinating Whitehall’s response, 
he will have to communicate risks and uncertainties to the country 
at large. Treating the public like grown-ups, acknowledging areas of 
scientific uncertainty or disagreement, and avoiding false reassurances 
are the hallmarks of mature crisis management. 
7. Define agendas and broker solutions
Sir David King chose climate change, Sir John Beddington the ‘perfect 
storm’; sooner rather than later, Walport is likely to want to choose a 
policy agenda that he can call his own. This is a good idea, though there 
is now scope for such an agenda to be collectively defined and advanced 
by the entire network of CSAs, and this could have even greater impact. 
Jill Rutter suggests the CSA network should follow the model of the 
Chief Medical Officer in producing a high-profile annual report. At the 
same time, Walport and the other CSAs should bear in mind Roger 
Pielke Jr.’s point that scientific advice is more often about helping 
policymakers to navigate options than it is about providing them with 
single answers. This is particularly important when commenting on 
controversial issues such as GM crops, fracking or nuclear power, when 
personal views or interpretations of evidence, however legitimate, can 
at times lead to the inappropriate exercise of scientific authority to 
artificially narrow debate or limit options. Leadership must be combined 
with humility, and a willingness to listen and learn from a variety of 
perspectives.
8. Strengthen foresight and move it closer to the heart of   
 industrial policy 
One of the most effective parts of the Government Office for Science 
is the Foresight programme, which looks in-depth at emerging 
technologies and topics such as computer trading in financial markets, 
global food security and flood defences.26 Since the global financial 
crisis, there has been a renewed interest in the UK and other countries 
in the use of foresight processes to help identify technologies and 
sectors with long-term growth potential. As the UK teeters on the brink 
of a triple-dip recession, Walport should push for a more ambitious 
role for foresight in economic and industrial policy, and ensure that 
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it influences priorities for policy and investment. This should be part 
of a broader focus on the longer term, which as Natalie Day argues 
in her essay, is an increasingly vital - if politically difficult - lens for 
policymaking. In line with the recommendations of a recent Cabinet 
Office review,27 Day describes how the GCSA could help to embed more 
systematic horizon scanning across government. 
9. Advance the UK’s science diplomacy 
The GCSA has long been an important ambassador for UK science 
on the international stage. There is now a more sophisticated 
understanding of the contribution that science and innovation can 
make to diplomacy,28 which has been reinforced by the appointment of 
a CSA to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and by the valuable 
work of the BIS/FCO ‘Science and Innovation Network’ which is spread 
across the UK’s embassies and high commissions.29 At a time when the 
‘UK model’ of scientific advice is increasingly viewed as a template by 
others (for example in Australia, as Paul Harris describes in his essay), 
and when novel international advisory structures are being created 
(notably Anne Glover becoming the first Chief Scientific Adviser to 
the President of the European Commission, and the creation of new 
international assessment processes, as discussed by Mike Hulme and Sir 
Bob Watson in their essays), it will be important for Walport to continue 
advancing the science diplomacy agenda. He should also foster stronger 
international networks for the exchange of best practice. Currently, 
the main forum for this is the Carnegie Group of Science Advisers, 
which was established in 1991 to enable CSAs and science ministers 
from the G8 nations to meet annually. Its membership has expanded in 
recent years to include Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. 
But given the importance of scientific advice worldwide, a larger, more 
open network is now required, where CSAs and others with expertise 
to offer can meet to exchange ideas, discuss what does and does not 
work within national advisory systems, and identify opportunities for 
international collaboration. This network should include the leaders 
of international advisory bodies, such as the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES). 
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10. Mark the GCSA’s 50th anniversary with a high-profile   
 conference on ‘experimental government’ 
Geoff Mulgan expresses the hope that we are entering a period of 
more ‘experimental government’,30 where policymakers ‘are willing to 
test their ideas out - to run RCTs and embed continuous learning and 
feedback into everything they do.’ As Walport looks towards 2014, 
the 50th anniversary of Sir Solly Zuckerman’s appointment as the first 
GCSA, he should convene an international meeting, bringing together 
policymakers, practitioners, ‘scientists of science advice’, and thinkers 
from around the world, to reflect on progress, share ideas, and chart 
future agendas for experimental government. Such a meeting could also 
define the aspirations against which the legacy of Sir Mark Walport’s 
tenure as GCSA will eventually be judged. 
James Wilsdon is professor of science and democracy at the Science 
Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University of Sussex, and former 
director of science policy at the Royal Society (@jameswilsdon). 
Robert Doubleday is executive director of the Centre for Science 
and Policy, University of Cambridge (@robdoubleday)
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EFFECTIVE ADVICE
John Beddington
There are times when a government knows it needs science or engineering 
advice. Perhaps most clearly when the physical world asserts itself in 
dramatic ways: the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, the 
emergence of the swine flu pandemic, and the volcanic eruption in Iceland 
being recent examples.
Although the issues can be complex, such events are among the more 
straightforward situations for a government scientific adviser: there 
are willing recipients of the advice and the challenge is to collate the 
evidence and present it in the most effective way. What is more difficult 
is ensuring that science is brought to bear effectively on the questions 
which policymakers know matter but which don’t present a single decision 
moment, or where it is less obvious that science can help. These include 
the “wicked problems” that cross departments, cross disciplines and have 
timescales longer than the lifetimes of governments. Obesity, mental health 
and flood risk are examples.
This is the challenge in the role of the Government Chief Scientific Adviser; 
to ensure that the best science and engineering advice is brought to bear 
effectively on all government policy and decision making. It requires 
navigating strategic long-term advice on one hand and the responsive 
marshalling of evidence for immediate questions on the other. It also 
requires ensuring that science and engineering capability is in place to 
underpin policymaking at all levels of government.
Foresight
Foresight is perhaps the most high-profile and sustained programme to 
draw government attention to what science has to tell us about long-term 
challenges. Foresight projects aim to provide new research where it is most 
needed, providing policymakers with clear and accessible advice, helping 
them to keep pace with technological change.
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For example, the Foresight project on the future of Computer Trading,1 
which launched its findings in October 2012, took an authoritative and 
cross-disciplinary look at evidence on market behaviour, stimulated by 
the ‘Flash Crash’ of 6 May 2010 when the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
dropped 9 per cent, as one trillion dollars evaporated from the US equity 
markets only to be recovered in minutes.
Figure 1: 6 May 2010 US ‘Flash Crash’
The project found that computer-based trading, despite the controversy, has 
several beneficial effects on markets. Most notable among these are that 
transaction costs have fallen and that liquidity and price efficiency have 
improved. In addition, the project did not find any empirical evidence that 
high-frequency trading increases market abuse. Lastly, although no direct 
evidence showed that volatility had increased, the report did show that in 
specific circumstances the presence of computer-based trading can lead to 
significant instabilities, which often take the form of reinforcing feedback 
loops.
Source: http://tinyurl.com/d5vmx77
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The project informed financial policy on a global scale. Its findings 
highlighted the gaps in current knowledge, and called for closer co-
operation between the industry and the research community, with the long-
term aim of translating greater access to data into evidence-based analysis 
and regulation. Other specific recommendations were grounded in cross-
market co-operation, and were targeted at limiting possible future market 
disturbances and facilitating market surveillance. In addition, the project 
examined particular policy options that were part of the current regulatory 
debate, in terms of efficacy. 
The benefits of Foresight often come from creating links across departments 
and across disciplines. Many Foresight projects have taken authoritative 
cross-disciplinary looks at the major challenges ahead due to drivers such 
as climate change, natural hazards and demography. In the Foresight project 
on Migration and Global Environmental Change,2 we brought together 
around 350 leading experts and stakeholders from 30 countries across the 
world to look 50 years into the future. We examined how profound changes 
in environmental conditions such as flooding, drought and rising sea levels 
will influence and interact with patterns of global human migration. The 
report revealed that we have so far underestimated the major challenges 
associated with migration in the context of environmental change and 
that millions will be ‘trapped’ in vulnerable areas and unable to move, 
particularly in low income countries. We also showed how migration can 
help bring greater resilience to communities facing hardships. The report 
has had a marked impact at home and abroad, informing the work of inter 
alia the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 
United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) 
population division, who have used the report in a wide variety of ways to 
inform their work.
A rigorous approach gives us studies which can stand the test of time. The 
2004 Flooding and Coastal Defence study3 has had major international 
impact, not least as the basis of a four-year UK-China ‘flagship’ project on 
sustainable flood-risk management in the vulnerable Taihu Basin, which 
accounts for 3 per cent of the population and 13 per cent of China’s GDP. 
On infectious diseases, a consortium of leading African organisations from 
five countries established the Southern African Centre for Infectious Disease 
Surveillance in Tanzania, specifically to realise Foresight project findings. 
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This Africa-led initiative has so far attracted over $10 million in support 
from international donors such as the Wellcome Trust, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and Google.org to help ensure its success. The African Union 
commissioned Foresight’s lead African experts to develop a Science and 
Technology Framework for the Detection, Identification and Monitoring of 
Infectious Diseases in Africa. This framework has been endorsed by the AU 
Scientific, Technical and Research Commission, and African national and 
regional stakeholders are a step closer to creating two new regional centres 
for infectious disease surveillance in Eastern and Western Africa.
Advice at shorter notice
Whereas Foresight projects each take one to two years to publication and 
engage with several hundred academics and experts over that time, much 
advice has to be provided much more rapidly. On a timescale of three 
to nine months, I introduced the ‘Blackett’ reviews, named after Patrick 
Blackett, physicist and one of the founders of operational research. These 
typically tackle a more immediate challenge, often in the security or defence 
arena.
The most recent Blackett review examined prospects for improving 
the detection of biohazards. It brought together leading academics and 
industrialists from diverse disciplines including epidemiology, genomics, 
analytical chemistry, atmospheric physics and systems engineering who 
met three times over four months, reporting to the Ministry of Defence, 
Home Office, Department of Health, and Cabinet Office on improving UK 
capability in the short to medium term.
We established some quick wins and areas of research and action. A 
key recommendation was that government should assess the impact 
of developing an automated reporting system for biological hazards, 
integrating signals from a broad range of information sources and informed 
by an array of deployable sensors, to enable a near real-time response to 
a biological hazard. The benefits of such a capability are wide-ranging and 
could significantly impact on public, animal and plant health.
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Figure 2: National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies
Sometimes, of course, the challenge is so immediate that we have minutes 
or hours to provide advice. During pandemics, the disruption to air travel 
caused by volcanic ash, and the emergency at Fukushima Dai-Ichi after 
the tsunami, I relied on the immediate advice of small groups of experts 
forming the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE). SAGE, 
which I chaired, reports to the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) 
committee, chaired by the Prime Minister.
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As GCSA, I worked with the Cabinet Office to ensure that not only do 
we give the best advice possible at the time, but that we also use each 
experience to embed improvements in future arrangements. We have linked 
these experiences with the increasingly strong use of science as part of risk-
based assessments underpinning the National Risk Register.
Underpinning capability - networks of advice
Effective advice both on long-term issues or in response to emergencies 
begins with having the right people in the right place when they are needed 
most. For the first time we now have departmental Chief Scientific Advisers 
(CSAs) covering all government departments. In 2012, the House of Lords 
Select Committee report confirmed the immense value of this network and 
the Government’s response consolidated it.4 Between them, the CSAs have 
expertise in physical, life and social sciences, and engineering. They bring 
senior academic, business and Whitehall experience to the table. No two of 
them have exactly the same role. What they each do reflects the scientific 
and policy needs of their department, along with its structure, history and 
provision of all forms of analysis. 
It is a network that is greater than the sum of its parts. Meeting regularly, 
CSAs have been able rapidly to exchange the latest intelligence, provide 
deep specialist science and engineering expertise and provide advice and 
impromptu problem-solving support to each other. Over the last few months 
alone, they will have discussed subjects as varied as ash die-back, growing 
threats from antibiotic resistance, the implications of the West Coast rail 
franchise affair, and how the UK can benefit financially from the science of 
the sea floor. 
Of course, many leading scientists work in or closely with business. As 
GCSA, I have had the privilege of co-chairing the Prime Minister’s Council 
for Science and Technology. During this time the CST’s membership has 
broadened to include more senior representatives from R&D intensive 
businesses such as Rolls Royce and IBM. Drawing on its academic and 
private sector membership, the CST has presented on the science of 
genomics to the PM and contributed strongly to the development of the 
Life Sciences Strategy. It has also carried out complementary work on 
innovation in the NHS to secure the continued growth of one of the UK’s 
most valuable industrial sectors.
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I have also been glad to see the way in which working with or in 
government is increasingly valued by academics. In the Government 
Office for Science we have benefitted greatly from Research Council and 
other placements. We are increasingly working with universities and 
others supporting exchanges between government and academia. This 
interchange is happening organically but, at any one time and in addition to 
secondments, there may well be over 1,000 scientists working formally with 
government on councils, committees or projects. 
Dialogue with the national academies has also reached a new level. It is not 
the only example of the many ways in which all the academies contribute 
to policy work, but last year’s joint report by the Royal Society and Royal 
Academy of Engineering on the risks associated with hydraulic fracturing 
to access shale gas5 illustrates how a relatively rapid response by the 
academies to a well posed question can directly inform government decision 
making. The working group, led by Professor Robert Mair of Cambridge 
University, took five months to make its report, which was delivered to the 
Secretary of State at the Department of Energy and Climate Change in time 
to inform policy decisions on the future of shale gas exploration in the UK, 
which were announced in December 2012. 
Looking forward, and with so many environmental, social and economic 
challenges facing us, science in government matters more than ever. But 
sometimes it is not enough to consider issues and take action in the UK in 
isolation. This is particularly the case for the big global challenges such as 
energy security and climate change. I’d like to see the benefits of science 
advisers networking in the UK extended much more strongly abroad.
A small number of other countries have a GCSA-equivalent, most notably 
the US but also Australia, the Czech Republic, India and Latvia for example. 
Last year the EU, after many years’ deliberation, appointed Professor Anne 
Glover to the role of European Commission CSA. Many other countries 
have mature and independent science advisory systems that are not based 
on a single GCSA-type role. Clearly, each country has to develop a model 
that works with the grain of its unique political and academic system. But 
it will help to ensure that we all get the best value from science advice 
if it becomes easier for scientists to work together across boundaries. 
Sometimes, for example, it helps just knowing who to call in a crisis.
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I’ve particularly valued working with colleagues in the Office for Nuclear 
Regulation and elsewhere in the UK, together with colleagues in the 
Japanese government, to provide advice when requested on developing a 
new system for ensuring the safety of nuclear plants. The Japanese are also 
considering introducing a GCSA role. The UK GCSA has always benefitted 
from a close relationship with his counterpart in the US and John Holdren 
and I have discussed a wide range of issues over my time: most recently, 
for example, sharing information about assessing and managing the risks 
from space weather. More broadly, the GCSA abroad supports a wide range 
of UK government objectives, building relationships to support research 
collaborations, inter-agency agreements, and informing debates on global 
issues such as climate change, migration and food security. 
Underpinning capability: the scientific civil service
CSAs depend on a wide range of scientists and engineers working at every 
level in the public sector. When I arrived in post one of my biggest surprises 
was that, although I was formally head of the science and engineering 
profession, no-one knew how many scientists and engineers were actually 
working in government departments. Whitehall doesn’t collect information 
like that. So I invited scientists and engineers to step forward and form the 
Government Science & Engineering community. From a standing start, we 
now have over 3,500 members.
Towards the end of my tenure, I led a group including representatives from 
the policy and analytical profession, the unions and professional bodies, 
to review what government will need from the science and engineering 
profession in the future, and to take stock of the existing community. 
The review shows scientists and engineers come from a huge range of 
disciplines, work across all areas of the Civil Service, and are proud to be 
doing so. Ninety-one per cent of the thousands surveyed for the review were 
positive about declaring themselves to be scientists or engineers, and 61 
per cent felt influential in their current role.
In broad terms, their roles are either those of the specialist ‘practitioner’ 
- the ‘integrator’ who works closely with practitioners and external 
academics procuring, managing or accessing research; or those of ‘an 
informed advocate’, senior decision makers or policy officials who act as a 
sophisticated client for science and engineering advice.
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Figure 3: Wordcloud of GSE members’ own descriptions of 
their professional identity
Over the next few months, leaders in the community will use the findings 
of this review to improve talent management and leadership, create clearer 
career pathways, and enable the network to respond more flexibly, by 
working across departmental and disciplinary boundaries to meet Ministers’ 
needs. As a pilot last year, scientists and engineers from a range of 
departments and disciplines got together with external experts to advise the 
Ministry of Justice on drug detection technologies to help reduce drug use 
in prisons.
Reflections on five years as GCSA
We are in a strong position to meet the challenges ahead because of the 
progress we have made. This is not just about shifts in how science advice 
is provided. It is also about the ways in which policymaking is evolving. 
Open policymaking is still a fluid term, but it clearly creates opportunities to 
further strengthen the provision of good science in government. On a daily 
basis, members of the Government Science & Engineering community are 
working with those who develop and deliver policy to ask questions, to be 
curious and innovative. They develop networks that reach into academic, 
NGO and business communities. They know how to call on these networks 
at a few hours’ notice, and how to engineer new insights and solutions to 
complex issues over the longer term. 
Source: Taken from the review of the science and engineering profession in the Civil Service 2012
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The UK as a whole punches above its weight in science: UK research is the 
most productive and efficient in the G8; we produce more publications and 
citations per pound of public funding than any of our major competitors. 
UK scientists are some of the best in the world, winning 76 Nobel Prizes 
for their scientific achievements. The UK is also number two in the world 
for university collaboration with business, according to a recent World 
Economic Forum report.6 My hope and expectation is that, just as the UK 
punches above its weight in its contribution to research, so we will be world 
class at using science in decision making.
The key point, and a fitting one on which to conclude at the end of my term 
as Chief Scientific Adviser, is that ensuring government is properly informed 
by science is something that all scientists should be involved in. The role of 
a government scientific adviser, whether on long-term issues or in a crisis, 
is to act as a conduit of advice rather than a single expert opinion. It is that 
ability to draw on the ever-developing knowledge of the wider scientific 
community that ensures the best advice possible is brought to bear.
Sir John Beddington CMG FRS was chief scientific adviser to  
HM Government from 2008 to 2013 (@SirJBeddington)
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EXPERTS AND EXPERIMENTAL  
GOVERNMENT
Geoff Mulgan
Governments should want and even crave the best possible scientific advice. 
With reliable knowledge come better decisions, fewer mistakes, and more 
results achieved for each pound spent. In many respects it’s remarkable 
that only now are governments setting up and funding centres dedicated to 
assessing and communicating ‘what works’.1 
But knowledge is not always easy to use or to digest. The most authoritative 
advice may be uncomfortable, or at odds with what the public want. What’s 
recommended may appear inordinately expensive, with uncertain benefits to 
be reaped in the distant future. Harassed ministers with a low tolerance for 
ambiguity may be frustrated when they’re told how uncertain the knowledge 
is. And experts too, can be fallible, perhaps more than they would like to 
admit. 
We should certainly want evidence to be more visible, more influential and 
better used. The drive to create institutions to promote evidence, such as 
the Alliance for Useful Evidence, and the new ‘what works’ centres, is a 
vital part of making government more competent, and more deserving of 
trust. But anyone concerned to promote evidence needs also to be attuned 
to the subtleties, and to the many reasons why the pure ideal of government 
guided by wise elders is neither possible nor desirable.
Evidence about evidence
To help us understand what kinds of evidence are most useful, and most 
likely to be used, there is, luckily, a science as well as a craft of scientific 
advice itself, although much of the commentary on scientific advice appears 
to be unaware of the extensive research on why certain kinds of knowledge 
and advice are acted on, and others are not.2 
I’m one of the guilty, in that I was for many years a champion of rational 
advice in government, but only belatedly caught up with the evidence about 
evidence. As a civil servant in charge of the government’s Strategy Unit, I 
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brought in many people from outside government, including academia and 
science, to work in the unit, dissecting and solving complex problems from 
GM crops to alcohol, nuclear proliferation to schools reform. In our work 
we promoted rigorous analysis, and wherever possible published surveys 
of evidence. We encouraged better skills of modelling and quantitative 
analysis. And we prompted departments to undertake more rigorous 
mapping of future possibilities.
All of these were valuable counters to the influence of spin doctors and 
tacticians. Some were well ahead of their time - including work on topics 
such as behaviour change, happiness and systemic change. But I also 
learned that it’s not enough to bring clever people into government, or for 
advice to be rigorous and rational. Methods of this kind survive only as long 
as there is a political appetite for them, and the conditions in which they 
thrive may even be quite unnatural. 
That prompted me to ask what was known about the role of knowledge in 
government. It’s true that the science of scientific advice is patchy. There 
have been a few randomised control trials (RCTs) to test how knowledge is 
taken up within professions3 (and why even apparently compelling evidence 
is often ignored). But the study of high-level advice has fallen more to 
historians and political scientists, and experts in the burgeoning study of 
knowledge itself.4 From their work, a reasonably coherent picture of how 
knowledge is formed, exchanged and used in practice, both on the front line 
and within policy, has built up. 
What their research shows is not definitive, but it is clear, and its consistent 
message is that the effectiveness of advice doesn’t depend greatly on the 
cleverness of the person giving the advice or even the logical cogency 
of their arguments.5 Instead it matters a lot who gives the advice - and 
whether they are trusted and reputable. It matters how advice is given, and 
in particular how it is framed6 - preferably fitting the cognitive style of the 
receiver, and with a tone that is neither hectoring nor patronising. It matters 
when the advice is given - either in the heat of a crisis or emergency, or 
when an issue is salient. And it matters where the advice is given - the most 
influential scientists have usually installed their offices close to those with 
the greatest power, or ensured plenty of physical interaction (for example at 
conferences or on study trips).7 
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Advice on demand
Perhaps the most important finding of almost all research on this topic is 
that demand matters as much as supply. The most brilliant advice may go 
wholly unheeded if it’s not fitted to the social context of decision makers, 
the psychology of people making decisions in a hurry and under pressure, 
and the economics of organisations often strapped for cash. What works 
for whom and in what circumstances are crucial factors;8 and evidence and 
advice have to make themselves useful if they are to be used.
That demand is as likely to happen on the front line as in Whitehall. 
Evidence-based practice tends to matter more than evidence-based policy, 
which may be why NICE focuses exclusively on what doctors do and 
prescribe (though some use of evidence in shaping policies for the NHS 
might not go amiss). For a field like policing, it probably matters even more 
that police officers learn about evidence from the start, and engage with it 
throughout their careers, than that Home Office officials draw on evidence 
before they shape new laws. And for all professions it matters that there are 
opportunities - for example in study circles - for professionals to engage 
with recent research and discuss its relevance.
So how should advisers raise the odds of having impact - and of being 
useful? In my experience, the successful ones understand two fundamental 
aspects of the context in which their advice will be heard, both of which are 
radically different from the cultures they are likely to have experienced for 
most of their careers outside government.
The first is that they are operating in a context where there are often 
multiple goals and conflicting values. As a result, there may often not be 
a single right answer (though there may be any number of demonstrably 
wrong answers). Instead there will be right answers that are more or less 
aligned to the priorities of government (and of the public). The better the 
providers of advice understand decision makers’ perspectives and needs the 
more likely they are to be influential.9 
Take energy. I twice had to oversee reviews of energy policy and in each 
case the scientific analysis of such things as potential energy sources, 
current and future renewables or carbon scenarios, had to be linked to 
the very different goals of ensuring affordable energy, energy security, and 
protecting the world from catastrophic climate change. Scientific method 
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cannot tell us which of these goals is more important. This is a matter for 
judgement and wisdom - and as the study of wisdom tells us, wisdom tends 
to be context-specific, rather than universal like natural science.
The second vital, but not always obvious, point is that governments have 
to deal with multiple types of knowledge. A minister making decisions on a 
topic such as the regulation of pesticides or badger culls may need to take 
account of many different types of knowledge each of which is provided by 
a different group of experts. These include: evidence about policy, such as 
evaluations of public health programmes; knowledge about public opinion, 
and what it may or may not support; knowledge about politics, and the 
likely dynamics of party or parliamentary mood; intelligence, whether 
human or signals; statistics; economics; history; knowledge about Civil 
Service capacities; and performance data, for example on how hospitals or 
police forces are doing. 
Trump cards and clever chaps
Formal scientific knowledge sits alongside these other types of knowledge, 
but does not automatically trump the others.10 Indeed, a politician, or civil 
servant, who acted as if there was a hierarchy of knowledge with science 
sitting unambiguously at the top, would not last long. The consequence is 
that a scientist who can mobilise other types of knowledge on his or her 
side is likely to be more effective than one that cannot; for example, by 
highlighting the economic cost of future floods and their potential effect on 
political legitimacy, as well as their probability.
These points help to explain why the role of a chief scientific adviser (CSA) 
can be frustrating. Simply putting an eminent scientist into a department 
may have little effect, if they don’t also know how to work the system, or 
how to mobilise a large network of contacts. Not surprisingly, many who 
aren’t well prepared for their roles as brokers, feel that they rattle around 
without much impact. 
For similar reasons, some of the other solutions that have been used to 
raise the visibility and status of scientific advice have tended to disappoint. 
Occasional seminars for ministers or permanent secretaries to acclimatise 
them to new thinking in nanotechnology or genomics are useful but hardly 
sufficient, when most of the real work of government is done at a far more 
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junior level. This is why some advocate other, more systematic, approaches 
to complement what could be characterised as the ‘clever chap’ theory of 
scientific advice. 
First, these focus on depth and breadth: acclimatising officials and 
politicians at multiple levels, and from early on, to understanding science, 
data and evidence through training courses, secondments and simulations; 
influencing the media environment as much as insider decision making 
(since in practice this will often be decisive in determining whether advice 
is heeded); embedding scientists at more junior levels in policy teams; 
linking scientific champions in mutually supportive networks; and opening 
up more broadly the world of evidence and data so that it becomes as much 
part of the lifeblood of decision making as manifestos. Here the crucial 
point is that the target should not just be the very top of institutions: the 
middle and lower layers will often be more important. A common optical 
mistake of eminent people in London is to overestimate the importance of 
the formal relative to the informal, the codified versus the craft.
Second, it’s vital to recognise that the key role of a scientific adviser is 
to act as an intermediary and broker rather than an adviser, and that 
consequently their skills need to be ones of translation, aggregation and 
synthesis as much as deep expertise. So if asked to assess the potential 
commercial implications of a new discovery such as graphene; the potential 
impact of a pandemic; or the potential harms associated with a new illegal 
drug, they need to mobilise diverse forms of expertise. Their greatest 
influence may come if - dare I say it - they are good at empathising with 
ministers who never have enough time to understand or analyse before 
making decisions. Advisers who think that they are very clever while all 
around them are a bit thick, and that all the problems of the world would be 
solved if the thick listened to the clever, are liable to be disappointed.
Experimentalist government
One reason that I’m optimistic is that in the coming period we may see 
a revolution in how evidence feeds back into decision making, thanks to 
the proliferation of data, new tools such as semantic analysis of social 
media, and the proliferating sensors of the Internet of Things. At the very 
least it’s likely to become more natural for professions like teaching or the 
police to be influenced by data - whether it’s the real time personalised 
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feedback on how individual pupils are faring, or data on crime patterns 
in neighbourhoods. Schools in places like Singapore already have journal 
clubs where teachers read, and discuss, the latest research. The Narayana 
Hrudayalaya hospital in India is famous for requiring doctors to meet 
weekly to discuss performance data - something that’s normal in a Japanese 
car factory but oddly alien to many professions.
This is also an era when the scientific method is becoming normal well 
beyond the confines of the university. Firms like Amazon and Google use 
thousands of RCTs to evaluate new services; individuals monitor their own 
bodies; and everyday life is being reshaped by a flood of data and feedback. 
In this context, scientific advice has many allies, and is going with the grain 
of a more reflective, more data-savvy culture.
The authority of CSAs will often depend on how well they provide useful 
answers at moments of crisis; when a minister or Prime Minister needs 
to know how to cope with an epidemic or natural disaster. But advisers 
don’t, and shouldn’t, only offer answers. I remember Margaret Thatcher’s 
CSA saying that she had told him that what she really valued were better 
questions more than better answers. 
In optimistic moments, I hope that we are moving towards a period of 
more overtly experimentalist governance,11 where governments are willing 
to test their ideas out - to run RCTs and embed continuous learning and 
feedback into everything they do. Experimentalist government would 
certainly be better than government by instinct, government by intuition 
and government solely guided by ideology. 
In such a context, the old model of a clever man given a desk in Whitehall, 
sitting in a corner writing memos may be even more anachronistic. We 
certainly need highly intelligent, eminent experts to guide decisions.12 We 
need to pay more comprehensive and sophisticated attention to not only 
the supply of useful knowledge, but also to how that knowledge is used. By 
doing this, governments and advisers can make more informed decisions, 
fewer mistakes and respond better to the complex problems they face. But 
let’s be as serious in making use of the evidence about evidence, as we are 
about the evidence itself.
Geoff Mulgan is chief executive of Nesta (@geoffmulgan)
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A BETTER FORMULA: WILL CIVIL  
SERVICE REFORM IMPROVE  
WHITEHALL’S USE OF EXPERT ADVICE?
Jill Rutter1
Good policy needs the right blend of the technocratic and the political.2 
Both need to be present if a policy is to work. Ministers should want to 
know a policy is technically feasible, has a reasonable chance of working, 
and is the best available option; but, however technically robust, a policy 
also needs to be able to command sufficient political and public support to 
be implemented. 
That is not the only dichotomy within Whitehall. Not all issues are equal. 
There will be some issues on which ministers have strong views, based 
on a mix of evidence and ideology; and those are likely to be the areas 
they are most keen to pursue in government. But much of the business 
of government is not about pursuing flagship policies; it’s about finding 
solutions to problems that arise. The former No.10 adviser Steve Hilton 
observed that 70 per cent of the issues crossing ministers’ desks were not 
in the coalition’s ‘Programme for Government.’3 
Take my old department of Defra for example: few ministers arrived 
motivated by the desire to deal with a zoonotic disease (indeed they 
probably had no idea what one was before they got the briefing pack). 
However they may have held strong views on the importance of preserving 
the beauty of the countryside versus the desirability of promoting onshore 
wind power. On the first issue, they will give a large role to experts; on the 
second, evidence will take more of a back seat. This is the UK equivalent of 
what Roger Pielke Jr. describes as the divide in the United States between 
‘tornado’ and ‘abortion’ politics.4 
This is the environment in which experts have to operate if they are to 
influence policy. Few of the principal decision makers have a science or 
engineering background. Of the current crop of permanent secretaries in 
charge of departments, two have a degree in maths and one a degree in 
accountancy. The rest, as the diagram below illustrates, are drawn from the 
humanities or social sciences (though increasing numbers have a Master’s 
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degree in economics.)5 Not one has progressed to permanent secretary 
from the science profession within the civil service: so an issue that was 
raised in the 1968 Fulton report on the civil service remains as stark now as 
it was then.6 The Cabinet ministers they serve are, if anything, less likely to 
have any sort of scientific or technical qualification. 
Figure 1: Degree backgrounds of permanent secretaries
But Whitehall is undergoing change: radical downsizing combined with 
a programme of civil service reform, launched in June 2012,7 which is 
designed to make it more unified, more accountable, more skilled and more 
professional. What will these reforms mean for the future of expert advice?
The starting point
Formal scientific advice has enjoyed a mixed decade. Under the last 
government, there were some notable steps forward with a gearing up of 
the chief scientific adviser network so that most departments had externally 
appointed chief scientists with genuine ‘expert’ credentials, and a clear rise 
in the profile of the Government Chief Scientific Adviser. However, in 2009, 
there was the notorious sacking by the Home Secretary of Professor David 
Nutt, chair of the longstanding Advisory Council on Misuse of Drugs, for 
expressing his views on the relative dangers of ecstasy and horseriding.8 
This episode raised fresh questions about the way in which government 
handled scientific advice. 
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Scientific advice is one subset of the wider class of ‘evidence’ that 
policymakers can draw on. The last government was committed, in 
principle at least, to ‘evidence-based’ policymaking.9 The current coalition 
government has made some notable strides to embed independent 
evidence making in specific areas: the establishment of the Office for 
Budget Responsibility to take over fiscal forecasting from the Treasury, the 
Independent Commission on Aid Impact, and the Education Endowment 
Foundation, to test what works in tackling educational disadvantage.10 
On the other hand, the government’s public bodies’ reform programme 
has seen the abolition or status change of a number of expert advisory 
bodies, including high-profile casualties like the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution.11 
A smaller civil service 
Departments have all had to commit to substantial staffing reductions, with 
numbers reduced by 12 per cent in aggregate since the 2010 spending 
review - and with deeper cuts of some 20 per cent in four departments.12 
The result has been considerable churn within departments, with teams 
spread thinner and potential loss of knowledge and relationships. A number 
of CSAs have been appointed at lower grades than their predecessors and 
been moved off management boards. In some departments, directors of 
analysis have double-hatted as CSAs. 
These changes have led to concerns that CSAs - and thus scientific advice 
- are being marginalised. Yet none of these changes are science specific: 
top teams have been halved in most departments and management boards, 
now chaired by Secretaries of State rather than Permanent Secretaries, are 
supposed to focus on corporate management rather than policy issues. 
This was the basis on which the Head of the Home Civil Service rejected 
recommendations from the House of Lords Science and Technology Select 
Committee on the status of CSAs.13 
The critical issue is access both to the early stages of the policy process 
and to final decisions. The Campaign for Science and Engineering (CaSE) 
produced a recent assessment of CSA influence. Most of its criteria made 
sense, and it ranked Sir Bob Watson at Defra and Dame Sally Davies as the 
most influential CSAs (scoring 5 out of 6).14 But both of these CSAs fell 
down on one criterion - whether there was a record of their meetings with 
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the secretary of state over the past year. What the CaSE assessment failed 
to appreciate was that the most influential CSAs have far too many meetings 
to record. This depends less on grade than on the personal impact of the 
CSA - the openness of the department to engage them, and their willingness 
to get properly engaged in policy. The influential CSAs are those who can 
both bring expertise into the department through their networks and help 
ministers and senior civil servants apply it to produce policy - like Bob 
Watson, who had previously worked at the White House and World Bank 
(and was never shy of mentioning that). The CSA’s ability to cope with, and 
even relish, policymaking in a political environment needs to be as much 
of a test when they are recruited as their academic credentials. They also 
need good support within the department so that they can rapidly become 
an integral part of normal departmental processes. CSAs who look equally 
eminent on paper have been variably effective in achieving this. 
A reformed civil service? 
The civil service reform plan recognises that the civil service needs to 
change if it is to be more effective with fewer resources. It emphasises 
the role of the Heads of Profession in strengthening capabilities: “The 
‘Heads of Profession’ operate as cross-Government leaders, and have 
an essential role in improving skills and maintaining professional 
standards. The Plan will boost the importance of their role in raising 
standards, departmental appointments, succession planning and 
talent management.”15 The GCSA has already undertaken a review of the 
science profession in response.16 
There are three other areas in the civil service reform plan that will affect 
the future of expert advice: 
•	Sharing analytical services. 
•	Open policymaking and transparency.
•	Improving the quality of evidence. 
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1. Sharing analytic services
This is an area where work by the Cabinet Office is promised, but is 
yet to see the light of day. The models appear to be the Cabinet Office’s 
Behavioural Insights team, established shortly after the election, which 
acts as a cross-government expert resource on applying behavioural 
economics to specific policy problems, and the Shareholder Executive, 
which manages government shareholdings in privatised companies 
or the nationalised banks. An alternative to this model of a centre 
of internal expertise would be to pool analytic services between 
departments, or between a department and its arm’s length bodies. So 
far this model has not been developed further, but in his response to the 
House of Lords’ Science and Technology Committee, Sir Bob Kerslake, 
Head of the Home Civil Service, noted that sharing CSAs was something 
which could “bring real benefits.”17 
There is potential for this model to act as a valuable counter to 
Whitehall’s silo mentality: sharing analysis to give Ministers the best 
available assessment of the evidence, or designating a cross-Whitehall 
expert lead on an issue which cuts across departmental boundaries. 
But in a culture which still values presenteeism there is a danger that 
a shared, part-time, CSA, particularly where there is little synergy 
between departmental areas of concern, may simply lack impact in two 
departments rather than be effective in one. 
2. Open policymaking and transparency
This is a much bigger theme in the civil service reform plan, with 
a promise to “make open policymaking the default”, recognising 
that Whitehall itself does not have a monopoly on expertise. The plan 
itself promises a new model of open policymaking and launches the 
‘contestable’ policy fund, to allow Ministers to commission policy work 
from external sources including academics and think tanks. The reform 
plan gives some examples of new ways of collaboration - including 
crowdsourcing and policy labs (along the lines of Mindlab in Denmark) 
- but also stresses that “the need to maintain a safe space for policy 
advice should not be used to prevent the maximum possible 
openness to new thinking or in the gathering of evidence or insight 
from external experts.” The government also promises to “make 
more data freely available so experts can test and challenge our 
approaches effectively.”
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On paper, this looks like a development with considerable potential to 
enable external experts to be involved in the policy process in different 
ways. But thus far, most of the examples of external involvement, 
which is in itself nothing new, have focussed on the involvement of 
practitioners, think tanks or the public, including the establishment of a 
‘Practitioners’ Advisory Group’.18 In September 2012, the government 
made its first (and thus far only) commission of external policy advice: 
a study by the Institute for Public Policy Research on accountabilities of 
ministers and civil servants.19 
The potential for external experts to engage in policymaking depends 
on their capacity to work to the government’s timetable. This can 
be a problem as a minister explained at a seminar at Institute for 
Government: “I sat down with a research body the other day and 
they set out what they were planning to do. I said that ‘do you 
realise that by the time you reach your conclusions, it will be far 
too late to be of use to anybody. It will be great history, but it won’t 
help anyone make policy.”20 This is why what government really values 
in external experts is not the latest research paper, but accumulated 
expertise based on long study of an issue, communicated in an 
accessible form, ideally with clear implications for action. 
A more promising route to long-term policy influence may come 
through the commitment to transparency. Opening up big government 
data sets should allow much better applied academic work on the 
impact of government policy. But if these routes to influence are to be 
exploited, the next iteration of the Research Excellence Framework 
needs to do more to incentivise the production of applied research and 
the provision of expertise to policymakers. 
3. Quality of evidence
The civil service reform plan makes two specific proposals in 
relationship to the quality of evidence in departments. First, it states 
that “permanent secretaries must be accountable for the quality of 
the policy advice in their department and be prepared to challenge 
policies which do not have a sound base in evidence or practice”. 
This is in line with a recommendation the Institute for Government 
made in our 2011 report, Making Policy Better.21 If taken seriously, 
this has the potential to change the dynamic between civil servants 
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and ministers, and put permanent secretaries very much on the side 
of their expert advisers. It should also address concerns over the lack 
of access of CSAs to the policy process. Chris Wormald, the newish 
Permanent Secretary of Department for Education (and head of the 
‘policy profession’ across government), recently commissioned Bad 
Science guru Ben Goldacre to look at the use of evidence in education.22 
More generally though, it is not clear that this element of the civil 
service reform plan is being taken that seriously - and it is likely to need 
some sort of institutional bolstering to be effective. It would be greatly 
reinforced if Parliament took a routine interest in the quality of the 
evidence base for policy by government. 
For some topics that bolstering may come from a second commitment 
in the civil service reform place, which came to fruition in March 2013, 
when the Cabinet Office announced the establishment of new evidence 
centres on ageing, local economic growth, early intervention and crime 
reduction. These join the existing Education Endowment Foundation 
and National Institute for Clinical Excellence to form a network of six 
‘What Works’ centres.23 To be effective, these centres will need to build 
an evidence base for the policy framework as well as give best practice 
guidance to local commissioners, and there need to be adequate 
incentives to ensure policymakers seek their advice.
Science in Whitehall: prospects for change?
There are some positive steps in the civil service reform plan, but on their 
own they look unlikely to lead to a marked change in the way expert advice 
is handled in Whitehall. Previous attempts at civil service reform have 
faltered, as the initial impetus fizzled out.24 Many of the problems around 
the integration of scientists and scientific advice into the civil service 
identified by the Fulton Report as far back as 1968 were echoed in the most 
recent report on the government science profession.25
But it is not a completely lost cause. The Fulton Report also identified a 
lack of economic and social science skills among generalist civil servants. 
That has changed radically. The last three Cabinet Secretaries have been 
trained economists, and the last two entered the civil service through the 
Government Economic Service. Economics is increasingly the language of 
Whitehall, with substantial crossover into senior policy positions. But there 
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is a contrast - economics brings a set of tools, whereas science brings both 
a way of thinking and also detailed knowledge. Most professional scientists 
in government seem to prefer to stay within their field of expertise, rather 
than broaden and apply the scientific approach to a wide range of issues. 
Moreover there is a gap in the science career structure - most CSAs are 
distinguished external recruits with one foot in academia. Chief economists 
tend to be promoted from within. 
If Whitehall is to become more scientifically literate, there need to be 
more people with science backgrounds working on policy. At the same 
time, members of science professions need to understand the needs of 
decision makers, and be able to communicate and act as effective mediators 
between them and external experts. They need to understand trade-offs and 
opportunity costs. Policymakers without scientific backgrounds need to be 
supported to ask the right questions of their specialist advisers. 
This still implies a model where the expert is on hand to advise when 
necessary, but does not help to set the agenda. This can mean that 
important issues get missed or undervalued. In his book The Geek 
Manifesto, Mark Henderson noted that the Government Chief Scientific 
Adviser was not consulted on the first National Risk Assessment, which is 
why it left the UK unprepared for the threat that materialised over Icelandic 
volcanic ash, at substantial cost to the aviation industry, travellers and the 
economy.26 The Institute for Government has argued that the civil service 
needs to take more personal responsibility for the quality of policy, and 
scientific advisers and their teams are well placed to do that. 
CSAs might also look to another, venerable model for bolstering their 
influence in government: the annual report of the Chief Medical Officer, 
which dates back to the 1850s. The most recent one recalled its aim: 
 …to provide an independent assessment of the state of the public’s health. 
Chief Medical Officers have produced their annual reports in different 
ways, but each with the aim of highlighting a limited number of issues 
which were, in their opinion, the ones that should be the current focus for 
policy and action to improve the health of the nation.”27
If the CMO can do this for health, there is no reason why the CSA 
community cannot produce a broader annual assessment of future 
“
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challenges for government. Such a move could help to set wider policy 
agendas, and move science advice out of the margins and into the 
mainstream. 
Jill Rutter is a programme director at the Institute for Government, and 
prior to this worked in Defra, HM Treasury and No.10 (@jillongovt)
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MAKING THE MOST OF SCIENTISTS  
AND ENGINEERS IN GOVERNMENT 
Miles Parker
The establishment by Sir John Beddington of ‘Government Science and 
Engineering’ (GSE) as a profession to parallel the other evidence and 
analysis specialist groupings in Whitehall is one of the most important 
outcomes of his term of office as Government Chief Scientific Adviser 
(GCSA).1 It is arguably the most important step forward for the recognition 
of scientists in government since the Fulton Report in 1968.2 Fulton 
concluded that “[m]any scientists, engineers and other professional 
specialists were not given the responsibility or authority they 
deserve...” and recommended that “these specialists should be given 
more policymaking and management opportunities, and training to 
equip them for their new work.” As with many of his recommendations, 
this was not implemented, probably because of cultural opposition within 
the civil service. 
A recent review of scientists and engineers in government, published in 
January 2013, makes important recommendations to take GSE forward; it 
identifies the roles that scientists play and suggests how their effectiveness 
in policymaking and implementation could be improved.3 The review found 
that the strengths of the current science cadre include its disciplinary 
diversity and expertise, its professionalism and accountability, and its 
openness to the wider science community. These are characteristics that 
will be essential in a smaller, flatter, more open civil service. In particular, 
the experience of scientists within government of engaging with the 
wider science community could serve as a model for aspects of open 
policymaking.4 
At the same time, the review concludes that the government science 
community is not as joined up as it could be, and is too invisible to 
policymakers. Government scientists often lack the skills and agility to 
ensure that policy-relevant science is presented in politically effective ways. 
GSE was established to support the professional standards of scientists and 
engineers in government and the review makes valuable recommendations 
on training and development for agility, leadership and openness. A priority 
for Sir Mark Walport, as the incoming GCSA, will be to oversee an active 
programme of implementation.
50  EXPERTS AND EVIDENCE IN WHITEHALL
Scientists in policymaking
The review identifies some 12,000 scientific posts in government and 
develops a typology, distinguishing: 
•	Practitioners (the great majority, mostly in ‘arms length bodies’ 
outside Whitehall, and often deep subject experts, applying science in 
analysis, inspection, advice and services).
•	Integrators (managers or commissioners of science programmes, 
engaged in policy or operations). 
•	Informed advocates (scientists no longer practising their science 
but able to take an informed view of science advice in their policy or 
operational roles). 
This three-part typology makes a distinction with important consequences. 
Practitioners - such as specialists in delivery agencies (e.g. Defra’s 
Environment Agency) and public sector research institutes (e.g. Defra’s 
Food and Environment Research Agency) - already have scientific career 
structures and professional development. However, the Integrators are 
a relatively small group and have to some extent been orphaned since the 
post-Fulton disappearance of the old Scientific Civil Service arrangements 
in the 1970s. 
Within the Integrator group, a still smaller subset work directly within 
Whitehall; their functions range from commissioning research and other 
information gathering to its analysis and translation to policy advice, and 
in some cases to policymaking and even its leadership. Although small, 
this is an important sub-group on which I will focus in this essay. I want 
to consider the context in which this group operates, by reflecting on 
the changing role of scientists in policy advice within the Department for 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) during my 11 years as its 
Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser (2001-2012).
EXPERTS AND EVIDENCE IN WHITEHALL 51
Lessons from Defra
Defra grew out of the demise of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF) in 2001, following the disastrous foot and mouth disease 
outbreak of 2000, and its merger into the environment component of the 
previous Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions. 
This brought together two completely different traditions of science 
management, centralised in MAFF and integrated in DETR, and provided 
an opportunity to rethink how to deliver good science into evidence-based 
policymaking, in the context of the latest Guidelines on Scientific Advice 
and Policymaking (the 2000 version had just emerged).5 
Over the last ten years, Defra has:
•	Replaced the previous Director-level Chief Scientist posts with a Board 
(Director General) level Chief Scientific Adviser.
•	Integrated science teams into policymaking teams.
•	Developed multidisciplinary teams of science and other evidence and 
analysis specialists.
•	Decentralised the management of evidence budgets to policy teams and 
strengthened strategic planning under the CSA.
•	Introduced matrix management to support engagement in policy with 
quality assurance and professional development.
The Department of Environment had a long history of integrating science 
staff into policy teams, going back to Fulton’s principles.6 MAFF’s scientists 
were centralised in a Chief Scientist’s Group, and were more focused on 
research commissioning than analysis and advice; the MAFF model more 
closely reflected the thinking of the Rothschild Report of 1972,7 which 
recommended that government departments hold and invest an applied 
science research budget. The aim of Rothschild’s recommendations was 
to enhance government’s ability to be an intelligent customer for the 
burgeoning science of the time. So the process of integration involved two 
cultural shifts for ex-MAFF specialists, away from a central team and a 
focus on R&D commissioning, a process aided by the substantial decline in 
departmental research budgets during recent government spending rounds.
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It also helped that the demise of MAFF had been due in part to perceptions 
of incompetence in the handling of science advice through the controversy 
over bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which began in the late 
1980s and lasted through the 1990s, and the outbreak of foot and mouth 
disease in 2000.8 This gave Howard Dalton, the newly appointed CSA, 
greater status through the recognition of his importance to the new 
department’s scientific, and therefore political, reputation. His position 
on the Board, especially in a period of budgetary stringency and almost 
continuous management review and downsizing, meant that he could argue 
the case for changes (specifically, those needed to implement the GCSA’s 
guidelines) at the highest levels.9 
Science and evidence
At the same time, the then Labour Government’s adoption of the mantra 
of ‘evidence-based policymaking’10 was particularly helpful in encouraging 
a rethink about the relationship between disciplines in policymaking. 
‘Evidence’ was clearly something more than just science, or just economics. 
Multidisciplinary approaches were self-evidently necessary for dealing with 
multifactorial policy questions, but came as a culture shock to quite siloed 
professions. 
The move towards matrix management coincided with the arrival of Bob 
Watson as CSA and Richard Price as Chief Economist in the mid 2000s. 
Both Watson and Price recognised the need to bring all sources of evidence 
into policy discussions. The day-to-day engagement of science with policy 
was the responsibility of the policy leads, and Heads of Profession had 
oversight of the professional development and integrity of the analysts. 
At the same time, decades of pressure to enhance the department’s social 
science saw the appointment of the department’s first senior level Head 
of Social Science in 2007 reflecting emerging thinking about behavioural 
rather than regulatory policy options. Now, the CSA chairs a Heads of 
Profession group that oversees the professional integrity, standards and 
development of specialist staff as well as the direction of the Department’s 
strategy for investment in evidence gathering and analysis.11 
The integration of science staff in policy teams has been a long journey 
but has left Defra in a stronger place than its predecessors; reviews by 
both the GCSA’s office and by the Head of the Home Civil Service over 
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the last decade have repeatedly emphasised Defra’s excellence in handling 
evidence in policymaking.12 Continued budgetary pressures are likely to 
lead to further changes in the relationships between the various elements in 
evidence gathering, notably in the relative emphasis on research and other 
forms of evidence gathering and analysis; however this simply continues 
a trend in which the Department has moved from a position of relative 
self sufficiency to one in which it has built strong partnerships with other 
funders.13 This shift brings strong benefits in terms of more open gathering 
of advice for policy and helps the department avoid the classic policy trap 
of ‘unknown knowns.’14 
Open policymaking
It is interesting to speculate on future changes in the context of the 
Civil Service Reform Plan and moves towards ‘open policymaking’.15 
This is emerging as a key response to what has seemed a hermetic and 
unaccountable Whitehall process. While protecting the space of Ministers to 
consider options without the pressure of unhelpful scrutiny, current models 
of policymaking have been ineffective in delivering the radical changes 
needed to address fiscal, social and environmental pressures. 
The commissioning model introduced initially under Rothschild focused on 
the role of in-house specialists being the department’s conduits to external 
expertise. In-house specialists combine a broad and respected knowledge 
in their discipline with a professional understanding of policy processes 
and excellent communication and networking skills. It is exactly these skills 
that will be important in developing open approaches to both the framing 
of policy problems and the design of options for solutions. Specialists can 
be valuable brokers between the policy world and academic and other 
sources of specialist research and analysis, helping to ensure that each 
side understands the other. Evidence-based policymaking will be more of a 
reality in a context where the policymaking process is more open to being 
informed and challenged by the widest range of sources of evidence.
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Specialists and generalists
In closing, let me note that there is one cultural risk in all the gains that 
have been made. This is that the establishment of a multidisciplinary 
approach to evidence has within it the seeds of a new problem, a potential 
categorisation error between ‘specialists’ and ‘generalists’. The distinction 
implies that, on the one hand ‘we’ (the specialists) provide evidence 
and ‘they’ (the generalists) don’t, but correspondingly that ‘they’ make 
policy and ‘we’ don’t. Neither is correct; on the one hand, specialists are 
increasingly directly engaged in policymaking and in some cases, where 
specialist understanding is important, lead it. At the very least, to be 
effective and useful, specialists need good policy skills, a point emphasised 
in Sir John Beddington’s review. 
Moreover, evidence is not solely derived from people with PhDs. While it is 
essential that experts remain expert (and that a multidisciplinary approach 
does not mean the loss of disciplines; on the contrary), we also need to 
recognise that the ‘generalists’ in practice have substantial expertise and 
knowledge. Much of this knowledge, of particular policy sectors (e.g. the 
agriculture, fisheries or food industries) or contexts (e.g. Europe, regional 
or local government) as well as of administrative law and practice, is tacit 
or experiential but it is just as essential, and needs to be subject to the same 
rigour as knowledge derived from the more formal disciplines. 
Perhaps the next steps will involve recognising that policymaking is carried 
out not by individuals but by teams, sharing common policy skills, balancing 
aptitudes and competences, and bringing diverse mind-sets, experience and 
knowledge to complex policy problems. We can then replace the separate 
labels of specialist and generalist with the common name of civil servant, 
and finally implement one of the key conclusions of Fulton.
Dr Miles Parker OBE FSB is a senior research associate at the  
Centre for Science and Policy, University of Cambridge (@MFairhaven)
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CIVIL SERVICE IDENTITY, EVIDENCE 
AND POLICY 
Dave O’Brien
Debates over the role and function of the civil service are nothing new. 
Politicians from left and right regularly complain that the civil service is a 
barrier to their agendas, while senior civil servants express concern about 
threats to their impartiality from politicisation or an erosion of the public 
service ethos. These debates crystallise around the question of whether 
the civil service is fit for purpose; capable of providing advice to ministers 
in the weighing up of policy options, and then delivering on ministerial 
decisions. 
The promise of evidence based policymaking is that it will give a more 
central place to the type of rationality associated with the scientific method. 
However this promise must be fulfilled by actual people working in actual 
government departments. Here I want to consider an issue that is often 
overlooked: who will make evidence-based policy a reality?
Different groups construct this question in different ways. For politicians, 
the focus is on the day-to-day aspects of appointing staff or setting up 
structures that will enable their agenda to be delivered. For civil servants, 
keen to protect their impartiality and the autonomy it brings, it is often a 
matter of implementing organisational change, whilst preserving established 
hierarchies of oversight and control. In media discussions, the question of 
who will be doing evidence-based policy often seems to boil down to the 
need for a more prominent role for those with a scientific training within 
the Whitehall machine. All three constituencies share an implicit, but often 
unarticulated, interest in the identity of the civil servant.
This identity has in recent years undergone a change from what might 
best be described as the gentlemanly amateur, so endlessly caricatured, 
to a more technical identity capable of coping with evidence-based 
policymaking.1 This change is central to understanding the prospects for 
a Whitehall capable of responding to the technical challenges of scientific 
controversies, and synthesising evidence in the economics-driven, cost 
benefit framework that characterises HM Treasury’s preferred approach to 
policy development.
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The many faces of the civil service
The civil service contains a range of roles with differing identities. 
Those most crucial in the use of evidence are the analytic professions of 
economists, social researchers and statisticians. It is possible to situate the 
professional identity of these analysts in relation to three ideal types; the 
gentlemanly amateur Whitehall civil servant, the technocratic bureaucrat 
and the social scientist. Each form of professional identity requires 
construction, negotiation and maintenance within the bureaucratic and 
political structures of contemporary Whitehall life, and each is intertwined 
and interdependent with the others.
These three forms of identity are useful heuristics for understanding how 
evidence is used in central government. They are also constructed forms of 
identity that are both the product of historical and contemporary realities, 
and resources for civil servants to draw on when thinking about their role 
(even if this is implicit or unacknowledged). Such ‘social imaginaries’ - in 
the case of the civil service, both the products of individuals’ activities, as 
well as academic and popular narratives - act as ‘resources used to perform, 
justify and legitimate both individual and collective actions’.2 
The origins of the ‘modern’ civil service associated with the popular 
caricature of Sir Humphrey, or the less normative idea of the gentlemanly 
generalist, has its roots in the rise of the nation state in the UK at the end 
of the eighteenth century, driven by the need to create a governmental form 
capable of financing war and administering the national debt. As the modern 
bureaucratic state evolved, the Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1854 sought 
to separate the practice and identity of the civil servant ‘both from the pull 
of political patronage and from narrow, specialised expertise’.3 This further 
contributed to the creation of the ideal type of the generalist, admitted 
by exam and capable of general public management, associated with the 
English upper classes of the time. This identity was closely associated with 
the practices of the Oxbridge curriculum, providing the curious closed 
meritocracy that would dominate the civil service until (and beyond) the 
Fulton Report of 1968.4 
This identity also underpinned the tradition of civil service neutrality, 
grounded in a sense of professionalism. This aspect of the civil service has 
been subject to extensive criticism, from both left and right, as a myth, 
concealing the real establishment or counter-reforming positions of the 
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civil service. However, that professionalism was not purely based on the 
generalist of the Victorian imagination, and has continued across a range of 
transformations in Whitehall. 
Middle-class identities in a hollowed-out state
The rise of an alternative identity to the generalist civil servant was 
concurrent with wider changes to Whitehall and public administration that 
resulted from the post-1970s hollowing out of the British state. Aspects 
of this hollowing out include the dominance of non-departmental public 
bodies for the delivery of public services; a new ‘public’ face of the civil 
service for the purposes of transparency and accountability; the rise of a 
politicised cadre of special advisers; the application of management theory 
to the policy process; and a much more complex political relationship 
between politician and bureaucrat. Senior civil servants are now “heavy-
duty managers rather than the most penetrating intellects of each 
graduating cohort from the top universities, are there primarily to 
deliver policy rather than to formulate it or to police the boundaries of 
constitutional propriety, and are paid high-level corporate salaries in 
exchange for being in the line of fire for public blame when things go 
wrong.”5 
The rise of a more technocratic civil service needs to be understood against 
the backdrop of social change in post-war Britain. Mike Savage describes 
how middle class identity broke away from traditional notions of status and 
“emphasised instead the technocratic and scientific capabilities of the 
middle class…as key parts of an efficient and modernising nation.”6 
This went hand-in-hand with the reflexive role of social science in society, as 
social science concepts and findings were increasingly used by individuals 
to construct their identities.
Analysis of these dimensions of identify has often been overlooked in 
discussions of the civil service. Recent reforms, involving the development 
performance management regimes and market-based policy frameworks, 
would not have been possible without the associated identities to operate 
within these regimes. We see these dynamics too in key institutional 
moments such as the 1968 Fulton Report, and in the post-war work of the 
Colonial Office, which embraced the specialisation, rational planning and 
scientific methods more closely associated with the policy process of more 
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recent times.7 By the time of Fulton, the emergence of technocratic forms 
of expertise is neatly summarised by David Edgerton’s observation that 
“only a profoundly technological nation could harbour the technocratic 
rhetoric of Harold Wilson.”8 
Social scientists in suits
Traces of gentlemanly identity remain within the technocratic mindset that 
now characterises Whitehall. And a third identity has been added that is 
crucial for the analytic professions within government departments: that of 
the social scientist. 
This reflects Max Weber’s conception of social science in his essay ‘Science 
as a vocation’, where Weber attempts to draw boundaries around science’s 
role in answering technical questions and its potential to assist in political 
decision-making.9 This belief that the role of the analytic profession is 
to provide technical assistance to political decision-making is vital to 
understanding the identity of those who will be most directly involved in 
evidence-based policymaking. It is also an important aspect of the wider 
civil service identity. The longstanding division between political decision-
making, and its counterpoint in advice and delivery, may find a new 
legitimacy by drawing on social scientific identity, in addition to technical 
identity, as a basis for the continued validity of the civil service’s traditional, 
gentlemanly, sense of itself. 
These identities are not confined to Whitehall. A recent study of social 
scientists in Wales’ devolved administration found a complex diffusion of 
social science expertise and practices associated with the task of public 
administration.10 The study suggests that social scientists do not draw 
directly on the disciplinary expertise associated with their academic 
qualifications, but that social scientific training still played a crucial role in 
project management, in assessing the quality of evidence, external research 
reports, and in their dealings with ‘policy customers.’
Analysis of these changes in the identity of civil servants provides a more 
grounded, historicised explanation for who will be capable of actually 
implementing evidence-based policymaking. However broader questions 
remain about the future shape of the civil service. The Institute for 
Government has discussed the impact of attempts to cut Whitehall costs 
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by up to 50 per cent, through reduced staff numbers and other austerity 
measures.11 The issue may, no longer, be who and which identities are 
necessary to embed evidence in policy. Instead we need to worry about 
the sustainability - and even survival - of technical identities in a context 
where those with the necessary skills are increasingly expected to find their 
vocation elsewhere. 
Dr Dave O’Brien is a lecturer in cultural and creative industries at 
City University London (@DrDaveOBrien)
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THE SCIENCE OF SCIENCE ADVICE
Sheila Jasanoff
Institutions that play a watchdog role in society offer a persistent challenge 
for democracy: who shall watch the watchers? We shrink at the thought 
of unlimited police power or judges who place themselves above the 
law. Scientific advice is not immune to such concerns. Its role is to keep 
politicians and policymakers honest by holding them to high standards of 
evidence and reason. Arbitrary and unfounded decisions are anathema to 
enlightened societies. But who ensures the rationality of science advisers, 
making sure that they will be held accountable for the integrity of their 
advice?
That question may seem too trivial to be worthy of serious consideration. 
Aren’t science advisers accountable at the end of the day to science itself? 
Most thoughtful advisers have rejected the facile notion that giving scientific 
advice is simply a matter of speaking truth to power. It is well recognised 
that in thorny areas of public policy, where certain knowledge is difficult to 
come by, science advisers can offer at best educated guesses and reasoned 
judgments, not unvarnished truth.1 They can help define plausible strategic 
choices in the light of realistic assessments of evidence;2 rarely can they 
decree the precise paths that society should follow. Nonetheless, it is widely 
assumed that the practice of science imposes its own discipline on science 
advisers, ensuring that they are bound by known facts, reliable methods, 
responsible professional codes, and the ultimate test of peer review. Seeing 
their role as apolitical, science advisers are not inclined to introspection 
in situations where their work fails to persuade. It seems more natural 
to blame external factors, from public ignorance and media distortion to 
the manipulation of science by powerful corporate funders or other large 
interest groups.
Science and technology studies
Ironically, there is one kind of science that science advisers rarely turn to 
for insights into how best to define their role in the policy process. That is 
the body of scholarship which has emerged from some three decades of 
research in the field of science and technology studies (STS).3 STS starts 
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from the proposition that scientific knowledge is one of the basic means 
with which modern societies make sense of who they are, how they relate to 
the world around them, and what they can or should do in order to improve 
their conditions. It follows that societies also need to study the processes 
through which science and technology are made in order to understand 
how knowledge advances, what makes innovation happen, and why things 
do not always progress as hoped or planned. These questions assume 
greatest importance for human well-being when significant public decisions 
hinge on science and technology, as in today’s urgent choices about how 
to cope with climate change. Accordingly, STS scholars have taken up the 
production of policy-relevant scientific knowledge as a specific, salient topic 
of investigation.
An early and generative focus of STS inquiry was the matter of scientific 
controversies.4 If science is the closest approximation we have to reality, 
then science should end controversy, not prolong it. Yet, across a wide 
swathe of health, safety, environmental, and other social issues, science 
seems more often to serve as a lightning rod for disagreement. The easy 
explanation, which many still buy into, is that this happens only because 
science gets captured by political interests, canonically illustrated by the 
energy industry’s sponsoring of climate research,5 or, more notoriously, the 
tobacco industry’s funding of studies debunking the connection between 
smoking and cancer.6 It follows that the solution is to erect higher barriers 
around the conduct of science for policy, shielding science from corrupting 
influences.
Intelligent engagement with politics
STS scholarship, backed by detailed studies of science advice in action, has 
come to almost the opposite conclusion: that better science advice requires 
more intelligent engagement with politics. This observation may initially sit 
uncomfortably with advisers but should in the end lead to more accountable 
uses of their knowledge and judgment. The most relevant findings from STS 
research can be summarised as follows: 
•	First, ‘regulatory science’ (the science most relevant to policy) does 
not simply exist as such in the outside world but rather is the output of 
advisory processes which are themselves loaded with value judgments, 
64  THE DISCIPLINARY MIX 
often in a form that social scientists call ‘boundary work’: for example, 
which facts and disciplines are relevant; when is new knowledge reliable 
enough for use; which dissenting viewpoints deserve to be heard; and 
when is action appropriate, even if not all questions are answerable on 
the basis of available knowledge. Accordingly, science advice can never 
stand wholly aloof from politics. The problem is how to manage its 
boundary-straddling role without compromising scientific integrity. 
•	Second, public refusal to accept the judgment of science advisers does 
not reflect intellectual ‘deficits’ on the public’s part but rather the 
failure of decision making processes to resolve underlying questions 
of responsibility: for example, who will be monitoring risky new 
technologies after they have been released into the market, and who will 
pay if the consequences are unintended but harmful? Science advisers 
may consider these issues outside their remit, but publics have good 
grounds to believe that experts will take note of these contextual factors 
when they advise policymakers on matters of risk and safety.
•	Third, science advice often tracks the promises and practices of science 
itself, attaching disproportionately greater value to what is known or 
can be learned than to what is unknown or outside the reach of the 
advisers’ immediate consciousness. That tendency leads in turn to a 
relative disfavoring of hard-to-gather social and behavioral evidence, as 
compared to measurable facts about the natural world. It also makes the 
process of science advice inattentive to hierarchies of power and money, 
not to mention to cultural biases and global resource inequalities, which 
shape the problem framings and methods of investigation that scientists 
bring to bear on social problems. 
•	Fourth, science advice partakes of, and to some degree reproduces, 
salient features of a nation’s or region’s political culture, including a 
society’s relative weighting of experts’ technical knowledge, personal 
integrity and experience, and capacity to represent significant 
viewpoints in society.7 In turn, those ingrained but on the whole invisible 
cultural preferences may affect an advisory system’s own resilience and 
ability to learn from its past mistakes and false turns.
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The uses of science and technology studies
The implications of these findings for the ongoing work of science advice, 
as well as for the broader relations of STS scholarship to policy, are not 
obvious, and this is why sustained engagement between science advisers 
and the scientists who study their work could prove beneficial for society. 
We can outline in the broadest strokes three kinds of roles that STS 
research could play in a more self-conscious advisory system: instrumental, 
interpretive, and normative.8 Of these, the instrumental role has already 
been recognised as valuable in some advisory contexts, most notably the 
introduction of new and emerging technologies. The other two roles, almost 
by definition, fall outside the purview of advisory bodies and may even seem 
antithetical to the two prime mandates of advice giving: be timely and be 
policy-promoting. That apparent inconsistency, however, vanishes on more 
careful analysis.
Instrumental uses of STS expertise are not only inevitable but are to some 
extent justifiable in the interests of democracy. It is reasonable for societies 
to expect that knowledge leading to greater self-awareness should be put 
to use in reforming the institutions and processes of governance; in short, 
enabling societies to achieve their own best hopes for themselves. This 
expectation is all the more warranted when support for STS research comes 
from public resources. 
Nevertheless, a few notes of caution are in order for both STS scholars 
and those inclined to draw immediately applicable lessons from their 
knowledge. Such transmission-belt models of ‘use’ and ‘application’ seldom 
question the deeper purposes for which knowledge is being harnessed. It 
is not uncommon these days for governments or their science advisers to 
call on STS scholars to design better communication practices between 
science and the public. Consciously or unconsciously, such reliance often 
rests on outmoded understandings of the reasons for controversy and 
rather reductionist views about how to make communication work better. 
Science, as understood by advisers, remains in the driver’s seat; publics 
are cast as useful junior partners in the corporate enterprise of producing 
‘better science,’ that is, knowledge within-the-frame that further embeds 
entrenched modes of thinking.
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It is less usual for science advisers to ask STS scholars for their interpretive 
skills, to help redefine unfounded problem framings: for example, the 
widespread tendency to medicalise, even ‘geneticise,’ persistent social 
problems such as poverty and gender inequality; or to favour natural 
as opposed to behavioral models for explaining degradation of the 
environment; or, even more foundationally, to rely on notions of scientific 
objectivity that simply amount to enacting cultural preference by other 
means.9 
We can well understand why policy advisers should wish to shy away from 
such uncomfortable insights, especially when they come from outside 
the zones of public decision making. They destabilise order at the most 
disturbing levels. They question authority, even when authority is essential 
for the orderly running of complex societies. Most troubling perhaps, a 
constant re-examination of taken-for-granted foundations seems to leave 
societies perennially off-kilter, without answers and without the will or 
capacity to build themselves afresh. The very principle of sustainability, 
after all, coincides with the aims of good historic preservation: to respect 
the footprints of the old while labouring to raise up the new.
Science advice: collaboration between creators and critics
These worries point to the third way in which the resources of STS could 
be used to further the goals of science advice, that is, through the field’s 
potential to tease out the normative implications of producing regulatory 
science. One should not minimise the difficulty of such a collaboration. 
Work that probes into the foundations of knowledge making is sometimes 
associated with unproductive wheel-spinning and radical relativism, denying 
the very possibility of truth and progress. Yet the wheels, in my view, can 
spin with traction. The purpose of asking how we know what we know is not 
to tear down knowledge but to make it serve us better. 
In its focus on making and construction, STS reflects the instincts of the 
good engineer, the rebuilder of societies. In a world that seems too often to 
be hurtling toward planetary self-destruction, we need the capacity - and 
will - to question our purposes deeply: to ask over and over how knowledge 
underpins institutions and policies that are sometimes serviceable but other 
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times perverse; and to explore how even esoteric social institutions such as 
scientific advice-giving can stay in touch with ongoing reflection on where 
we have come from and where we are going. Sustainable societies demand 
the possibility of querying their conceptions of the good - no less in pursuit 
of good science advice than in any other sphere of decision making.
It is one thing to lay out the merits of closer interaction between STS 
and science advice, quite another to imagine how those closer relations 
might come about in practice. Universities, in my view, bear a special 
burden, as training grounds for experts in most fields and as places in 
which reflective and interpretive disciplines such as STS can find a secure 
home. A recent report of the US National Academy of Sciences, Using 
Science as Evidence in Public Policy,10 comes close to endorsing this 
recommendation. The report calls for increased research and education 
on the use of science in policy and points to the need for more courses in 
policy schools teaching “an anthropological, sociological, or humanistic 
approach to policy making.”11 But collaboration between the institutions 
of science advice and the scholars who study them cannot stop with 
academic training. There is need for a more continuous, empathetic, and 
professional interaction, through enhanced representation for STS scholars 
in key regulatory agencies, advisory committees, peer-review processes and 
public consultations.
The relationship between creators and critics is fraught but indispensable. 
Good critics pick at the flaws in a creative enterprise but they are also best 
placed to celebrate its genuine achievements. Science advice has become 
a vitally important site of knowledge creation in modern societies, a site in 
which knowledge combines with wisdom to everyone’s benefit. It is time 
for science advisory systems to recognise that - to stay honest - they too 
need critics from the communities of research studying how knowledge and 
action are linked together. In democracies, no institutions of power should 
be beyond critique. If judges may not presume to stand above the law, still 
less should science advisers seek to insulate themselves from the critical 
gaze of the sciences of science advice.
Sheila Jasanoff is Pforzheimer professor of science and technology 
studies at the Harvard Kennedy School (@SJasanoff)
68  THE DISCIPLINARY MIX 
Endnotes 
1. Jasanoff, S. (1990) ‘The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers.’ Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
2. Pielke, Jr., R.A. (2007) ‘The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and 
Politics.’ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Hackett, E.J., Amsterdamska, O., Lynch, M.E. and Wajcman, J. (Eds.) (2007) ‘The 
Handbook Of Science And Technology Studies, Third Edition.’ Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
4. Nelkin, D. (Ed.) (1992) ‘Controversy: Politics of Technical Decisions, Third Edition.’ 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
5. Oreskes, N. and Conway, E.M. (2010) ‘Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists 
Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming.’ New York: 
Bloomsbury Press.
6. Brandt, A.M. (2007) ‘The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of 
the Product That Defined America.’ New York: Basic Books.
7. Jasanoff, S. (2005) Judgment under Siege: The Three–Body Problem of Expert 
Legitimacy. In Weingart, P. and Maasen, S. (Eds.) (2005) ‘Democratization of 
Expertise? Exploring Novel Forms of Scientific Advice in Political Decision–Making.’ 
Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp.209–224.
8. Jasanoff, S. (2011) Constitutional Moments in Governing Science and Technology. 
‘Science and Engineering Ethics.’ 17(4), pp.621-638.
9. Jasanoff, S. (2011) The Practices of Objectivity in Regulatory Science. In Camic, C., 
Gross, N. and Lamont, M. (Eds.) ‘Social Knowledge in the Making.’ Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, pp.307-337.
10. National Research Council, Committee on the Use of Social Science Knowledge in 
Public Policy (2012) ‘Using Science as Evidence in Public Policy.’ Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press.
11. Ibid., pp.75-76.
THE DISCIPLINARY MIX 69
THE CASE FOR A CHIEF SOCIAL  
SCIENTIST
Cary Cooper and Stephen Anderson
In the UK, central government is a major commissioner and user of social 
science research. Many departments, including the Department of Health, 
the Department of Work and Pensions, the Department for Communities 
and Local Government, and the Department for the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs do this in a significant way (although amounts of spending 
are not always visible publicly). In addition, the Government Office for 
Science undertakes various multi-disciplinary pieces of analysis to inform 
science in government, and the Foresight programme engages in valuable 
horizon scanning. The Government Economic and Social Research services 
undertake their own analyses and research investigation. Autonomous units, 
such as the Behavioural Insights Team - the so-called ‘nudge unit’ - in the 
Cabinet Office, trial and promote particular interventions. There are close 
links through the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills with the 
Research Councils and other publicly funded bodies who undertake and 
fund a range of investigations independently, but whose outcomes are of 
interest and concern to policymakers. Finally, there are specialist Scientific 
Advisory Committees (SACs) who provide input on particular issues, which 
are frequently cross cutting and require a multidisciplinary approach.
There are many very able people engaged in all of these pursuits; but 
nowhere does social science come together functionally in a completely 
holistic way. It is true that the Heads of Analysis Group, chaired by the 
Permanent Secretary at HM Treasury, and a Departmental Directors of 
Analysis group, chaired by the National Statistician, work to bring some of 
this together, and perform a quality assurance and risk assessment function. 
The Government Economic and Social Research services have sponsored 
a number of cross-cutting analytical groups, on topics such as behavioural 
economics, the green economy and growth, localism, social cohesion, social 
impacts and social mobility. These develop intellectual capital and evidence 
to inform cross-departmental policy issues. But because neither grouping 
is chaired by a senior social scientist, the full benefit of these processes 
cannot be fully realised. Only a senior social scientist, trained in research 
methods and in touch with the profession on the latest thinking across a 
range of multidisciplinary issues, can fully bring this to bear.
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Social science and the CSAs
There is a further issue. The government engages some 20 departmental 
chief scientific advisers with particular briefs for advising their own 
departments on policy development, analysis and the scientific evidence 
base. It is here that there is no social scientific adviser, following the 
retirement in 2010 of Professor Paul Wiles, previously CSA to the Home 
Office (and head of the Government Social Research service). It is at this 
level where access to ministers and the Government Chief Scientific Adviser 
occurs directly, where influence can be greatest, and where formal and 
informal discussions about policy arise.
Does this matter? The Academy of Social Sciences believes there are four 
reasons why it does, which are why we have lobbied for the appointment of 
a chief social scientist.1 First, departmental scientific advisers are currently 
rooted in the physical, life and medical sciences. Inevitably, this restricts 
their ability to draw on the insights that the social science community can 
offer because it is not their area of expertise. There is a risk of not using 
social scientific tools to look at social issues - missing an entire branch of 
scientific endeavour. Second, the current CSAs do not have established or 
regular links with external communities of social scientists and are not fully 
conversant with the latest thinking or evidence on particular issues. Third, 
there is a lack of strategic oversight at the senior level about the social 
science information needs of government as a whole. Finally, there is a risk 
that social science evidence is used inappropriately or not at all and that 
insufficient weight is given to the insights it can offer.
The case for a chief social scientist was supported twice by the House of 
Lords Science and Technology Committee in recent reports.2 The House 
of Commons went further to suggest that a senior government minister 
should have a particular responsibility for social science and be able to 
take a cross-government view in ministerial discussions, and respond to 
Parliamentary questions and reports from select committees.3 The science 
spokesman for the Liberal Democrats has also taken up this call.4 
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A seat at the top table
Social science, with key contributions to make to some of society’s most 
pressing and costly issues, such as climate change, wellbeing, social 
cohesion, children and ageing, is just too important in the national agenda 
not to have a seat at the top scientific adviser table where the real influence 
is felt.
We regard the March 2013 announcement of a national adviser to oversee 
the network of What Works centres as a welcome step in the right direction. 
The role of the national adviser will be more limited than that of chief social 
scientist. A reporting line into the Cabinet Office and the Treasury suggests 
a brief focused more on improving cost efficiency than increasing policy 
effectiveness, but the working out of all of this remains to be seen.
Crucially though, there is an announced commitment to the National 
Adviser reviewing the case for a chief social scientist with the social science 
community. A chief social scientist would be a much bigger role because 
the person appointed would work across Whitehall and oversee functionally 
all the various places where social science is done. It remains to be seen 
whether the What Works national adviser is a further step towards the 
restoration of the full chief social scientist role or is the end of the story for 
the moment.
Reading the riots
It is in the nature of social science that it is inherently provisional; the 
ongoing interpretation of evidence is vital. The chief social scientist has 
a key role to play in this process. The interesting conversations will arise 
when that evidence is counter-intuitive or contested. Diagnosing the causes 
of the riots which occurred in England in 2011 and framing appropriate 
media and policy responses is a classic case where senior level input from 
a chief social scientist could have helped politicians and police chiefs alike 
to a broader view than that these were simply acts of violence perpetrated 
by a criminal and feral underclass. Another example would be in respect of 
current plans to discontinue the census in its current form. 
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The most interesting conversations in public policy occur where research 
evidence comes up against political dogma. But that is precisely why there 
needs to be a chief social scientist to play a full part in those conversations, 
which occur in the first instance beyond the public gaze.
Professor Cary Cooper CBE AcSS is chair of the Council of the 
Academy of Social Sciences (@ProfCaryCooper) and Stephen 
Anderson is its executive director (@CfSocialScience)
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ENGINEERING POLICY: EVIDENCE,  
ADVICE AND EXECUTION
Brian Collins
The evidence base from pure science is used at all stages of the policy 
lifecycle, but the use of applied scientific evidence in support of 
engineering-based policy execution has diminished in the UK in recent 
years.1 A number of factors have contributed to this reduction, not least 
of which, in the UK at least, is the outsourcing of most engineering-based 
policies to agencies or to the private sector. This has resulted in the 
creation of a gulf between those responsible for the initiation of policy and 
those responsible for its execution. This gulf has particularly important 
consequences for the use of engineering evidence. Ensuring that a policy 
when designed is actually practicable is an essential feature of the policy 
framework if robust policy execution is to be achieved. Given the distance 
that has been created between those that design policies and those that 
execute them, this assurance of practicability has been severely weakened. 
Consideration of why this situation has come about is worthy of analysis.
I offer these reflections as a former Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) in two 
UK government departments, transport and business, and earlier as a civil 
servant working as chief scientist and director of technology in another 
department. My main observation is that there has been a loss of policy 
execution expertise over the 50 years since the end of the UK’s post-WWII 
rebuilding programme (in roughly 1960). This loss of competence has 
resulted in a lack of knowledge of how the ‘world works’ in the political 
classes and the civil service, both central and local. I experienced this 
shortfall in the planning for transport improvement programmes, in low 
carbon energy systems and in understanding the potential of modern 
manufacturing methods for stimulating growth. This is not to be critical 
of the motivation, loyalty and intellectual capability of the civil service 
and political public servants with whom I worked; just that their prior 
experience had not equipped them for delivering policies. Successful 
execution demanded engineering expertise. It should also be added that 
advice on how to do better was in most cases sought and gladly received. 
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Beyond market mechanisms
Taking a more analytical approach, the dominant approach to achieving 
efficiency in policy execution in the UK has been to exploit market 
principles and their associated success metrics. Yet unregulated markets 
have very simple success metrics: profitability, financial sustainability and 
return to investors. Public policy effectiveness is not in scope unless it is 
regulated to be so, or is in a contract. If a regulator’s duties include the 
delivery of effective engineering solutions then markets can deliver policy 
execution as long as the regulations can be made compatible with this 
objective; this in turn depends upon regulators having the necessary skills, 
professional competencies and advice. If the means by which effective 
execution is achieved is via a contract or set of contracts, the contractual 
agreements must contain effective policy execution as a contractual 
obligation, which for complex packages of contracts can be very difficult to 
achieve.
If the risks of using competitive market principles to deliver effective 
policy execution are considered too great, one alternative is the use of 
collaborative public-private frameworks. This approach has been taken in 
some sectors in the UK, but usually only for the capital investment element 
of policy implementation, and not earlier in the design phase or later in the 
operational phase; in all cases there seems to be no institutional framework 
for independent advice being considered or evidence gathered to ensure the 
engineering feasibility of what is being proposed. 
There is a systematic failure to seek evidence on how any given 
proposed solution can be operated and sustained in the face of changing 
circumstances, whether financial, environmental or social. It seems the risks 
have been displaced from the domain of the market and the regulator to the 
legal and contractual frameworks; but a significant risk of engineering and 
execution failure remains. Accountability for success and failure remains 
in the public sector, usually with politicians, even though the authority and 
responsibility has been ‘outsourced’.2 In most branches of management 
teaching, this separation of accountability and authority is not regarded as 
good practice, as risk mitigation becomes very difficult if not impossible.
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Systems of systems approaches 
The fruitful combination of systems of systems thinking and the recognition 
that the problem of policy execution is in the class of ‘wicked’ problems 
is generating fresh approaches. It is becoming increasingly clear that an 
embedded learning environment along with the continuity of expertise 
and personnel is crucial for the successful execution of policies where 
the outcomes are uncertain, the context is intrinsically dynamic and the 
emergent properties of the execution may or may not be desirable. Such a 
learning environment would enable lessons to be taken on board as they are 
spotted during a programme of policy development and execution, rather 
than waiting for the end of the programme. Lessons would be disseminated 
using the modern push-pull methods enabled by the worldwide web 
and opened to a broader community than those directly involved in any 
given programme. However, rapid turnover of key staff and diminution 
of expertise remains a risk factor which has to be taken into account. If 
such changes are inevitable then identifying ways in which expertise can 
be replaced with some level of handover, and hence greater retention of 
corporate memory, is essential.
This analysis suggests that advice to government on science and 
engineering should cover a much wider community that just the central 
government department that produces the core policy vision. Agencies, 
regulators and contractors and other actors in the ‘theatre’ could benefit 
from an evidence-based approach to policy advice, so that coherent 
approaches are taken not only to policy generation but also to policy 
execution, especially where engineering aspects are critical to success.3 
The fragmented approach currently in place can cause perverse outcomes 
to emerge from a package of policies and also result in friction and 
inefficiencies in execution, exactly the opposite of what is desired.
This approach would also enlarge the remit of advisers to government 
and add to advisory costs where budgets for such advice are measured in 
millions, but could result in lower risks to implementation and hence to 
smaller budgets for policy implementation and execution where budgets are 
measured in billions. This gearing ratio would be an effective way of using 
existing expertise to de-risk policy execution. An additional positive factor 
is that much of the expertise to be exploited is itself a result of government 
investment in scientific research and education. Ensuring this publicly 
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funded expertise contributes to reducing the risk and adding to the value 
that accrues from efficient policy execution therefore increases the return 
on government investment in science.
Spanning policy design and execution
Because policy implementation and execution in complex contexts 
has unexpected emergent properties it is essential to grow a learning 
environment around policy generation and execution processes. This 
learning environment should enable a transformation from a linear ‘develop 
and approve and execute’ process to one where modification can occur as 
a result of experience along the way; feedback loops must be explicit. The 
idea that it is possible to identify a policy purpose and design its execution 
ab initio in complex situations must be discarded. This hypothesis changes 
the way in which policy is thought about and changes the processes 
whereby it is executed. 
The idea that policy development frameworks should be reconsidered 
in the light of new circumstances is not new; it has happened many 
times in the last half century in a number of policy areas. What is new 
about the current situation is the complexity of the context and the 
multiplicity of interdependent factors which need to be taken into account. 
Using outmoded ways of developing and evaluating policies results 
in inefficiencies and heightened risks or paralysis because there is no 
obvious way forward. But such changes to policy frameworks have risks in 
themselves and so have to be managed with care and consultation.
This analysis of the policymaking ecosystem implies a need for changes 
in a number of aspects of the policymaking ‘machine’, and these changes 
are potentially destabilizing if not treated holistically. Given that the 
responsibility for the ‘machine’ is distributed amongst a number of 
government departments in the UK and in most other western democracies, 
it is unlikely that a ‘grand project’ of policymaking reform would be 
successful, even if it was politically acceptable. But unless policymaking 
reform occurs, policy execution will continue too often to produce less than 
desirable outcomes, and on occasion very bad outcomes.
One route forward is to identify through research what elements of 
policymaking it is essential to improve to lower risk and propose pragmatic 
THE DISCIPLINARY MIX 77
programmes to improve those elements. Examples might be regulatory and 
planning coherence across a domain and between domains; the instantiation 
of cross-sector learning processes within disciplines such as engineering; 
and multifactorial assessment of value during the process of development 
of need. Embedded data and information collection should also be a 
prerequisite for all policy execution programmes so that effectiveness can 
be easily evaluated and the evidence-base improved. 
Ingenuity in the service of better policy
These examples all come from my experience as a Chief Scientific Adviser 
in two government departments over a period of nearly five years, where I 
saw inadequacies in the policy process which resulted in plans for execution 
that were higher risk than desirable. In a number of cases, remedial action 
was possible in time to mitigate the risks, but as there was no learning 
‘apparatus’ as described above, the lessons learnt have been rapidly 
dissipated as civil service staff, contractors and advisers - including myself 
- have moved on. Steps are being taken in a number of UK universities 
to further the research and teaching agenda on all aspects of policy. 
Engagement with civil service officials and leaders of other government 
bodies will be essential if the quality and effectiveness of policy execution is 
to be improved. 
This engagement can take many forms: from seminars and roundtables, to 
short courses, executive education and Master’s degrees. However since a 
considerable element of policy execution is and will be in the private sector 
it is also essential, if the whole ecosystem is to improve, that engagement 
occurs in a similar way with leaders in those companies that are major 
players in policy execution, and with the regulators that determine the 
scope of the licence to operate in and between regulated sectors. Other 
actors in the space include lawyers and accountants who also have a 
profound effect on the ecosystem dynamics.
The analysis presented here is not the only approach to how policy 
execution could be made more effective. Research is needed to see how 
other approaches based on anthropological, political, cultural and economic 
scholarship could add a richer perspective to the delivery of policies for 
the public good. No one discipline or branch of scholarship can have all the 
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answers and research is also needed in how to synthesise the deliberations 
from each contributing discipline into a framework for policymaking and 
execution that is sustainable, resilient and pragmatic. 
Furthermore, allowing any one discipline to become dominant alienates 
those who practise in others and causes friction, even to the extent that 
paralysis occurs in taking forward any given policy objective. An evidence-
informed synthesis of viewpoints will more often than not cause better 
outcomes, but idiosyncratically not always. There are a number of episodes 
from the past where the vision and even hunches of individuals has allowed 
leaps forward in the delivery of public goods; there are of course examples 
of where the reverse is also true. The argument between those who say ‘we 
have always done it this way’ and others who insist ‘history proves nothing’ 
is still alive and well. Wisdom may lie in the ability to see in which camp 
any given issue lies, and to determine policy accordingly. Such wisdom in 
support of policy decisions may well be critical given the stresses on the 
human species, the planet and its resources, and hence the urgent need to 
exploit our knowledge and our ingenuity, the origin of the word engineer, to 
the best effect. 
Brian Collins CB FREng is professor of engineering policy at 
University College London (@UCLEngineering)
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THE BENEFITS OF HINDSIGHT:  
HOW HISTORY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO 
SCIENCE POLICY
Rebekah Higgitt and James Wilsdon 
It is easy to chant the mantras of evidence-based policy, but less 
straightforward to determine which forms of expertise and evidence should 
count. There is now a welcome recognition across government that many 
policy problems benefit from multidisciplinary perspectives. But implicit 
hierarchies between disciplines persist, which are rarely explained or 
written down. Economics has long been the primary source of epistemic 
authority in Whitehall, with its political powerbase in HM Treasury. The 
natural sciences enjoy a significant, and growing, role. Engineers and 
social scientists have now been welcomed into the club. But the humanities 
-including history - often remain out in the cold.
There have been several efforts to demonstrate its value of the humanities 
to policy in recent years, including helpful contributions from the British 
Academy, the Arts and Humanities Research Council and individual 
humanities scholars.1 Some progress has been made, but as the historian 
Roger Kain put it in his October 2011 oral evidence to the House of Lords 
inquiry into chief scientific advisers (speaking on behalf of the British 
Academy): “the term science and engineering seems at the moment 
to not exclude but marginalise the humanities and social science 
in relation to advice and expertise: culture, history, language, 
psychology, and political science.”2 
The potential contribution of a number of ‘marginalised’ disciplines merits 
serious discussion. Here we want to focus on history, and call for the 
evidence and expertise of historians to be taken more seriously in policy - 
particularly science policy - alongside evidence from the natural and social 
sciences. Given Sir Mark Walport’s support for the medical humanities 
and the history of science during his decade as director of the Wellcome 
Trust, we hope this is an agenda where he will want to demonstrate some 
leadership during his tenure as government chief scientific adviser.3 And 
we suggest that one way he could signal his commitment to the value of 
historical methods and insights in science policy would be to pilot a small 
‘hindsight project’ within the government’s existing Foresight Programme.
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Lullabies and rear-view mirrors
This is an argument with a history of its own. Most recently, it received a 
high-profile endorsement from Lord Butler, the former cabinet secretary, 
who published an article in March 2013 making the case for historical 
advisers in every department. ‘Those who take major policy decisions in 
ignorance of relevant history,’ he wrote, ‘are like a driver who commits to 
some manoeuvre in the road without looking into the rear mirror.’4 The 
Whitehall historian Lord Hennessy added to this by arguing ‘a historian can 
inject an element of humility when the politicians are singing themselves 
lullabies.’5 
Lord Butler’s article contained echoes of an earlier call by Sir David 
Cannadine, in 2007, for a ‘government chief historical adviser’ and network 
of departmental historians. Its timing was also deliberate: with momentum 
building around the use of evidence in policy and new initiatives such as the 
Cabinet Office’s network of ‘what works’ centres, historians feel they are in 
danger of being undervalued as an asset to the policy process.
Why history matters to science policy
In science policy, history often plays a role as example or justification, 
based on assumptions about how science is done or how innovation occurs 
that misrepresent our knowledge of the past. As Virgina Berridge notes 
in her study of history in health policy, there can be a ‘totemic role’ for 
historians,6 where historical messages are ‘misunderstood or used for 
particular policy purposes.’ And history is often used without the mediation 
of historians, presented by ‘other interests in the policy field.’7 
Historians, naturally, have an interest in making sure that the history used in 
the public sphere is not completely divorced from their research, especially 
since most of it is publicly funded. That science policymakers should make 
use of scholarship in the history of science and other allied fields, including 
philosophy and sociology of science, is perhaps less obvious, as are the 
mechanisms by which historians would get their voices heard. Initiatives 
like History and Policy are focused on encouraging historians to see the 
potential relevance of their work and, through policy-friendly reports, aim 
to show that ‘historians can shed light on the causes of current problems 
and even suggest innovative solutions.’8 
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Historians have occasionally found a role within policymaking through 
research focused on topics of recent history and obvious relevance. One 
example is Catherine Haddon who, having produced a thesis on Whitehall 
and Cold War defence, is now a research fellow at the Institute for 
Government, where she has co-authored reports on managing government 
transitions and dealing with minority and coalition governments.9 Similarly, 
there was interest in historian Abigail Wood’s work on foot and mouth 
disease, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis of 2001.10 
Dispelling myths and challenging assumptions
However, there is a role for a broader input from the history of science, 
based on insights for which there may be general agreement within the 
discipline but sharper divergence from more popular accounts. Historians 
are good at judging the interests that lie behind differing interpretations 
of the past, as well as exploring their validity. One example is the work of 
David Edgerton, who has highlighted a number of areas in which common 
assumptions in science policy are shown to be problematic. These include 
challenging the perceived economic and technological significance of 
publicly funded research, and cherished notions of researcher autonomy 
such as the ‘Haldane Principle’.11 
Although Edgerton has shown that the so-called ‘linear model’ of innovation 
is a recent academic construct, created as a foil to better models, there 
is frequent recourse, both by science lobbyists and austerity-juggling 
politicians, to economic arguments for science funding that sound 
suspiciously similar.12 The same is true for the argument that pure scientific 
research is the best means of producing new and unexpected technologies, 
a notion which dates back to the early 19th century and has been corralled 
into support for the increased state funding of science ever since.13 
Historical research has shown that the processes and locations of 
technological innovation are largely separate, and have impacted science 
much more quickly and directly than the other way round. What is classed 
as ‘pure’ scientific research can often be seen as the product of research 
programmes focused either on specific outcomes, or existing within what 
Jon Agar has called ‘working worlds’ of ‘projects that generate problems.’14 
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Historical myths, assumptions and analogies frequently find their way into 
policy announcements and, even if merely as throwaway devices to help 
frame a speech, can by repetition serve to cloud important issues. One 
example is the persistent myth of Britain being good at discovery and poor 
at supporting innovation, referred to in a 2010 speech by David Willetts, the 
minister for universities and science, as ‘that old British problem of failing 
to make the most of our own discoveries and inventions.’15 
That same speech begins with a nod towards Joseph Priestley, his 
experiments on gases and the application of such knowledge to the 
development of carbonated drinks. Willetts, bizarrely, casts the admittedly 
Swiss Johann Jacob Schweppe as a foreigner profiting from undeveloped 
British ideas. In fact, he had taken up a British product that had gone 
through several stages of development and already entered into an existing 
British market.16 
Eyes on the prize
One opportunity for the input of historical expertise to discussions about 
science, technology and innovation is in the recently established Centre 
for Challenge Prizes within Nesta, the UK innovation foundation. As the 
‘Landscape Review’ for this centre indicates, one of its activities will be 
research into the effectiveness of challenge prizes, past and present.17 The 
historic context into which the review plays is immediately obvious: its front 
cover is adorned with an image of John Harrison’s first sea clock ‘H1’, and 
the British Longitude Act of 1714 is set within a timeline of similar prizes or 
rewards. This and later initiatives have frequently been evoked as successful 
precedents, especially in the current climate of tight public funding, for the 
affordable stimulation of innovation through prizes. 
A current AHRC-funded research project, based at the University of 
Cambridge and the National Maritime Museum, is examining the history of 
the Board of Longitude and is, therefore, well-placed to offer commentary 
on the use of the 1714 Act as an emblematic example of challenge prizes.18 
While the well-known version of the longitude story would seem to back 
claims about the efficacy of one-off inducement prizes, this new research 
underlines that in order to provide a practical solution to the problem of 
finding longitude at sea, the Board was necessarily much more flexible in 
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the range of funding mechanisms they used than the simple version of the 
story suggests. The research also shows the extent to which successful 
solutions and their sources had long been anticipated and developed. 
Given the focus on challenge prizes as economically efficient, perhaps the 
most problematic claim is that they ‘generate commercial activity.’ It was 
the already-thriving commercial activity surrounding instrument making 
in 18th-century London that enabled production of potential longitude 
solutions, rather than the large reward acting as an incentive to commerce. 
Where the Board of Longitude was particularly significant was not in a one-
off reward but through long-term support of longitude solutions, as they 
gradually became accepted, embedded and commercially viable. 
The idea that financial risk can be limited ‘by awarding a prize only when 
the challenge is successfully met’ raises pertinent questions, which troubled 
the Board greatly, about how to judge success. As well as paying out smaller 
rewards for promising ideas, the Board paid Harrison a very large reward 
despite the fact that his single, expensive and complex product was a long 
way from solving the problem for every naval vessel. The lessons to be 
learned are that prize criteria must be drawn up with extreme caution, and 
organisers must be clear about how much money is worth risking on a 
potentially prize-winning but not problem-solving solution.
The Longitude case is one in which the history is partially known, in ways 
that are informed by erroneous assumptions about the nature of innovation. 
Familiar stories of remarkable geniuses who work alone to produce 
products that solve problems, more or less at a stroke, could hardly be less 
useful. Harrison was certainly remarkable, but he did not work in isolation 
and relied heavily on existing craftsmanship and expertise in London. The 
large reward was also not enough to allow sufficient R&D, and he achieved 
his results through longer-term financial support from government and 
elsewhere. Finally, his sea watch was neither a complete solution nor 
a commercially viable product. Decades more of active support of this 
method, and the necessary and complementary astronomical methods and 
infrastructure, were required. Similar stories can be unearthed about other, 
more recent examples of challenge prizes and should be incorporated into 
thinking about what can be expected from such initiatives.
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Hindsight enriching foresight 
Of course, historians are not likely to be welcomed to the party if their 
only contribution is ‘but it’s more complicated than that.’ An ability to 
unpack assumptions, myths and the lost contexts in which particular policy 
ideas were formed can be particularly useful. Dealing with nuance and 
complexity in evidence, and how perspective changes its interpretation, 
are commonplace skills in historical research and could be invaluable for 
mitigating potential policy failures and controversies, for example around 
new and emerging technologies. As Geoff Mulgan argues in this volume, 
historians and political scientists have also made important contributions to 
the field of ‘evidence about evidence’, helping policymakers to understand 
how knowledge is formed, exchanged and used in policymaking.19 
All of this leads to our modest concluding proposal. Sir Mark Walport knows 
well the value of the humanities and history of science from his decade at 
the helm of the Wellcome Trust, during which he launched the Wellcome 
Collection, in 2007, as a major public venue dedicated to the exploration of 
the links between medicine, life, history and art, and initiated new funding 
programmes for researchers in the medical humanities.20 As he takes over at 
the Government Office for Science, one small but significant way in which 
he could signal his commitment to the value of historical methods and 
insights would be to pilot a ‘hindsight project’ within the existing Foresight 
Programme.21 Adding one or two historians of science to the policy mix 
could provide the Government Office for Science, and the wider science and 
engineering profession in Whitehall with the ‘rear mirror’ on which, as Lord 
Butler argues, every good driver should rely.
Rebekah Higgitt is curator of the history of science and technology 
at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich (@beckyfh). James 
Wilsdon is professor of science and democracy at the Science Policy 
Research Unit, University of Sussex, and former director of science 
policy at the Royal Society (@jameswilsdon)
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David Cleevely 
It is obvious how scientific advice ought to get incorporated into 
policy. Scientists should be called on to set out the implications of the 
latest discoveries or technologies, while policymakers, frowning with 
concentration, listen attentively, ask astute and penetrating questions, and 
then put together a policy firmly rooted in evidence.
It is equally obvious that this is not what happens. The process is nonlinear, 
sometimes generating policies that have scant regard for evidence, with 
occasional breakthroughs, and many delays or cul-de-sacs. Yet, oddly, 
instead of standing back and trying to explain what is observed in practice 
and using that practical understanding to create better processes, systems 
are created based on what ought to work. Scientists bemoan this messy 
system and insist that, if only it were rational and linear, how much better 
it would be. It is ironic that an area of human endeavour that is based on 
positive analysis should find itself making normative proposals. Before 
suggesting how the system ought to work it would be worth applying the 
scientific method to understanding how scientific advice gets incorporated 
into policy.
Let’s be positive
Like Democritus, we should wake up and smell the baking bread. Our 
commonplace observations can help to explain what is going on and, with 
some serious thought, generate fresh insight and better ways to incorporate 
scientific advice into policy.
During the Second World War, the engineer Barnes Wallis wrote a report 
on preliminary trials for the bouncing bomb which he knew, despite 
positive progress, was likely to find little favour given prevailing support 
for strategic mass bombing. In the margin at the end of his report, he 
wrote “help, oh help”. These words were read by the recipient who passed 
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the report to the most senior levels in government, with the result that 
resources were made available. The consequences were strategically 
important, and of great value for propaganda and morale.
What Barnes Wallis did was to break the governance rules: he exploited 
his network, as in turn did his correspondent. Anecdotes like this are 
commonplace. Those involved in policymaking and science can usually give 
first hand accounts of serendipitous meetings or communications which led 
to a better outcome. These could be regarded as policymaking at its best or 
at its worst. Best because they have a positive outcome and worst because 
they sidestep all the processes put in place to achieve rational decisions. 
Yet despite networks pervading all aspects of policymaking - and many 
participants regarding chance and connections as critical - it is surprising 
that they do not play a more central role in accounts of how scientific advice 
ought to get incorporated into policy. 
Yes, but does it work in theory?
It is said that an economist is someone who, when they see something 
working in practice, cannot help but wonder if it would work in theory. 
In this spirit, let us consider a simple example of a model network to 
understand more about its properties and what these imply.
Imagine you drop 1,000 buttons on the floor, then pick up two buttons at 
random and tie them together. After you have linked the pair of buttons 
with thread, drop them again on the floor and repeat the process. At first 
you will almost always pick up buttons that are not linked to any other 
buttons. But at some point, you will pick up a button that is already linked 
to another button, and then this will happen with increasing frequency until 
the majority of the buttons you pick up are already attached to others. With 
1,000 buttons this change occurs when you have picked up just over 600 
buttons. By the time you have picked up 700 or so, every button you pick 
up is already connected to every other button.
There are several important observations that you can draw from this. 
Once you have connected enough pairs of nodes in a network, all the nodes 
become connected, even if you may have to go through a relatively large 
number of intermediate nodes. This transition from partially connected to 
fully connected happens very suddenly (what a physicist would recognise 
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as a phase change). There will be a few nodes with many direct links to 
other nodes, and many nodes with only one or two links. And before all the 
buttons in our network were connected together - say when 400 buttons 
have been picked up - then it would have been possible to observe a number 
of clumps in which tens of buttons formed small networks.
Does this tell us anything useful?
If we wish to use networks in order to help incorporate scientific advice into 
policy, then this model points to a number of specific recommendations. 
First, you need to work hard to make sure that there are sufficient pairwise 
links between the nodes. Second, you should expect that there will be a 
point at which suddenly, and almost magically, every node or person in that 
network will be connected to everybody else. At that point, the ability for 
people to communicate across the network will change because everyone is 
accessible. Third, you should expect to find cliques or silos with members 
connected to each other but poorly connected elsewhere. 
Finally, there will be ‘super nodes’ in the network: people who are highly 
connected with many others. If you can enlist their support then you can 
communicate more quickly and effectively with the rest of the network. 
In practice this is very important; the ‘super nodes’ become well known 
(because they are very well connected) and everybody wants to connect 
with them. So in networks of people, instead of the nodes being connected 
at random (as in the example with the buttons) there is a bias to connecting 
to already well-connected nodes which makes them extraordinarily 
effective. If you want to influence what is going on, find the ‘super nodes’. 
Buttoned-down organisations
A great deal of effort in the theory and practice of management has been 
devoted to ensuring that information is shared effectively, and common 
goals are pursued. Whether it be the adoption of a new IT system or 
ensuring that a particular policy is implemented, most attention is paid to 
how the message is propagated through the organisation and in ensuring 
that the ‘super nodes’ are fully briefed and in agreement with the proposed 
course of action. 
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Seen from the perspective of organisations as networks, it is easy to 
see why effecting change and propagating information are difficult, and 
why those concerned with management pay such attention to it. Most 
organisations are partially connected, which means that many links may 
have to be used to get from any one individual to another. If members of 
a group share a particular view, and that group is poorly connected to 
the rest of the network, then it is easy to see how a network can maintain 
silo-like behaviour. Not only can we see how it could become difficult to 
have a common view across the whole network, but as ideas change, delays 
in communicating between the silos might lead to such a network never 
coming to a single coherent view.
When organisations were pure hierarchies (if such a moment ever existed) 
then decisions were taken and propagated downwards, and information was 
collected and propagated upwards. Both these happened in a regular and 
predictable manner because the network and the organisational structure 
were one and the same thing. In an age of email, Twitter, flat organisations 
and open innovation, formal organisational structures rarely reflect the 
networks being employed. Understanding and influencing the behaviour of 
these networks is becoming increasingly important. 
Two examples help to illustrate this point. First, in a 2005 paper, Beck, 
Dickson and Asenova state that the bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE) outbreak in the UK “led to the slaughter of 3.3 million cattle 
and estimated economic losses of £3.7 billion.”1 They conclude that 
“a centralized system in which government agencies control science 
for government is inherently vulnerable to alliances of experts and 
interest groups.” Second, in July 1985, the mechanical engineer Roger 
Boisjoly wrote a memo to his superiors, warning of a faulty design in the 
space shuttle’s solid rocket boosters, which could lead to a catastrophic 
event. Six months later, the Challenger disaster occurred. In contrast to 
Barnes Wallis, Boisjoly’s memo had been ignored, and he had no other path 
to turn to. In both cases, the structure of networks helps to explain how 
events occurred, and perhaps suggests how to do things better. 
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Let’s do some research
If networks and ‘super nodes’ are critical for the incorporation of scientific 
advice into policy, are there some modifications to our current approach 
which it might be useful to adopt? One obvious, and perhaps controversial, 
recommendation would be that chief scientific advisers (CSAs) are recruited 
for their networking ability as well as for their knowledge. Whilst the skill 
of being able to understand and interpret scientific and engineering advice 
is of course essential for any such post, perhaps CSAs ought to be recruited 
for who they know as much as what they know.
But remember the word ‘perhaps’… We should be asking ourselves about 
the evidence: what do we know about how networks operate; do ‘super 
nodes’ really play such a major role; can we form hypotheses based on 
networking and test them? We need a new research agenda, directed 
towards how scientific advice gets incorporated into policy, and how 
new technologies are changing our economic, governmental and social 
organisation. This research would need to draw upon graph theory, social 
anthropology, behavioural economics and many other disciplines.
Over the past three years, the Centre for Science and Policy at the 
University of Cambridge has helped to lay the groundwork for such an 
agenda.2 The design of our network of Policy Fellows is based on inferences 
drawn from the theory of networks, and practical observations of what 
works and what doesn’t. Better understanding of what does work should 
enable us to move on from naive and linear views of what ought to work. 
We need to understand more about how scientific advice gets incorporated 
into policy, and use these insights to support better governance. 
Dr David Cleevely CBE FREng is founding director of the Centre for 
Science and Policy, University of Cambridge (@DavidCleevely)
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WINDOWS OR DOORS? EXPERTS,  
PUBLICS AND OPEN POLICY
Jack Stilgoe and Simon Burall 
The addition of the phrase ‘open policymaking’ to the Whitehall lexicon 
would seem to be a straightforward step towards greater engagement 
between experts, publics and policymakers. The recent civil service reform 
plan sets out an aspiration to “establish a clear model of open policy 
making”, but what this means in practice is still to be defined.1 
In this chapter, we describe recent movements that have opened up 
policymaking, particularly around issues involving science. These issues 
force experts, policymakers and others together in ways that can prove 
fractious. We should not pretend that there are not tensions between 
science and democracy. Nico Stehr has provided an interesting account of 
scientific frustrations with what he calls ‘inconvenient democracy.’2 But 
rather than providing an excuse for detachment, such tensions suggest the 
need for better engagement. 
Since the 1980s, UK policymakers have abandoned a technocratic model in 
which experts were relied upon to settle policy issues away from the public 
spotlight. But, as we will describe, there is not yet a consensus on what 
the alternative should look like. We have seen institutional experiments 
in openness come and go, without clarity about what they are trying to 
achieve. Everyone accepts that transparency is important. The Freedom 
of Information Act provides just one of the new windows on the world of 
policymaking. But not all policymakers take openness to the next level, 
opening the doors to a wider range of advice and input. Over the last 
decade, the UK has built a rich experience of public dialogue on issues 
involving science, much of it run through Sciencewise.3 Our view is that 
such work can and should provide a basis for robust, credible, open policy.
Institutions of openness
In the 1990s, a spate of science policy issues, such as those around bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), genetically-modified crops and in-vitro 
fertilisation, led to the creation of new institutional machinery, including 
NETWORKS, PUBLICS AND POLICY 93
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, the Agricultural 
and Environmental Biotechnology Commission, the Human Genetics 
Commission and the Food Standards Agency. These bodies all blended 
science with other inputs - from ethics, social science, interest groups and 
members of the public - in order to build more credible policy. 
Much of this institutional machinery has since been scrapped or downsized. 
There is a danger that, as crises fade, administrations forget the importance 
and the complexity of building conversations between scientific experts, 
policymakers and the public. Usable, relevant, credible evidence for policy 
is very different from just expecting our scientists to deliver the goods when 
policymakers come knocking. Where we once relied on systems of national 
laboratories, intimately linked with government, most science is now 
devolved to our universities, complicating conversations with policymakers 
and making the job of intermediaries ever more important. 
There is often confusion in policy, highlighted by the Council for Science 
and Technology with respect to nanotechnology,4 between the science 
that we want - Nobel Prizes and papers in Nature - and ‘the science we 
need’ - locally relevant and commissioned for particular purposes. Both 
are necessary, but the relative detachment of science from other social 
institutions means less attention is paid to the latter.
In 2005, Sciencewise was set up to enable a range of government 
departments and agencies with responsibilities involving science to carry 
out public dialogue. Dialogue, as envisaged by Sciencewise, is an approach 
to involving members of the public in decision making which brings 
together a diverse mix of citizens with a range of views and values, and 
relevant policymakers and experts, to discuss, reflect and reach conclusions 
on complex or controversial issues likely to be important in future policies.5 
Over 20 Sciencewise projects have been completed since the programme 
began. These have ranged across a wide variety of policy areas involving 
science and technology, but all have involved deliberations among members 
of the British public, policymakers, scientists and other groups. All have 
aimed to influence a policy under development at the time of the dialogue. 
94  NETWORKS, PUBLICS AND POLICY
Public dialogue has a number of features that seem to fit well with an open 
policymaking approach:7 
However, public dialogue usually involves a relatively small number of 
people at a particular moment in the development of a policy. At the same 
time as the dialogue is taking place, government is collecting evidence to 
feed into the policy using a wide variety of methodologies and information 
sources. The challenge for the policymaker is to absorb and synthesise 
the vastly different forms of inputs that are required to make a more 
informed decision. To better understand the role of public dialogue in open 
policymaking, we therefore need to look at moves towards openness in a 
more conventional advisory setting. 
Openness and open-mindedness
One moment in particular marks a watershed for the rethinking of 
conventions of expert advice. More than two decades on, the shadow of 
mad cow disease still looms over discussions of expertise and policymaking. 
Table 1: Features of public dialogue
Informed 
Facilitated
Deliberative
Diverse
Purposeful
Impartial
Expansive 
Two-way 
Participants are provided with information and access to experts.
The process is carefully structured to ensure that participants receive the 
right amount and detail of information, a diverse range of views are heard 
and taken into account and the discussion is not dominated by particular 
individuals or issues.
Participants develop their views on an issue through conversation with other 
participants, policymakers and experts.
Participants tend to be recruited to ensure they represent a diverse range of 
backgrounds and views (participants are not self-selecting).
Dialogue engages the public at a stage in a decision-making process where 
the policy can be affected.
Public dialogues are often convened, designed, delivered and facilitated by 
independent individuals or organisations to help ensure the process is not 
biased in favour of a particular outcome.
Public dialogue opens up conversations rather than closing them down.
Participants, policymakers and experts all give something to, and take 
something away from, the process; dialogue is neither solely about informing 
the public nor extracting information from them.
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In 1990, then environment minister John Gummer infamously dismissed 
uncertainties about a new disease in cattle. Four years earlier, BSE had 
begun to strike cattle, raising the question of whether this unknown disease 
might be transmissible to humans. Gummer, seeking to reassure the British 
public, farmers and the food industry that beef was safe, fed his four-year 
old daughter a burger for the benefit of the national media. 
The Conservative government admitted its mistake in its final months, 
confessing that BSE was linked to the fatal variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
Disease. The Phillips Inquiry of 2000 eviscerated the structures and 
cultures of advice and decision-making that had allowed for what has been 
called ‘the most serious failure of UK public policy since the Suez invasion 
of 1956.’8 The Phillips report, in 16 thick volumes, remains the most 
important, forensic analysis of expert advice to government.9 It is required 
reading (at least in its abridged form) for any chief scientific adviser and its 
insights have informed the various iterations of government guidelines for 
scientific advice.
The most important conclusions of the Phillips Inquiry as they relate to the 
question of openness are that:
•	Trust can only be generated by openness.
•	Openness requires recognition of uncertainty, where it exists.
•	The public should be trusted to respond rationally to openness.
•	Scientific investigation of risk should be open and transparent.
•	The advice and reasoning of advisory committees should be made 
public.
Openness, according to Phillips, is not just about transparency. It also, 
crucially, is about being open-minded. Opening up expert advice means 
paying attention to scientific uncertainties, rather than obscuring them. 
It means opening up the inputs to scientific advice (who is allowed to 
contribute, how and on what terms?). And it means changing the outputs 
from advice, such that they do not offer single prescriptions but rather help 
to inform the range of available policy options.
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In the UK, we have confidently left behind one model of expertise, but not 
yet landed on a satisfying and coherent alternative. We sit between two 
models (see box below). The old model, in which science and expertise 
are seen as trumping the values, preferences and knowledge of publics, is 
profoundly undemocratic. We have moved rapidly away from this, but the 
current state is rather confused. When we talk about being ‘open’, what do 
we mean? Are decision makers really interested in diversifying their sources 
of advice and expertise or are they more concerned with whether people 
trust them? Is it a case of, as one commentator put it, “give ‘em bread, 
circuses and a bit of open government”?10 
We must not forget that Phillips’s call for openness was not simply following 
a political fashion for transparency. The realisation, post-BSE, was that 
openness must also be about open-mindedness - realising the limits of 
conventional systems and engaging with new perspectives. Daniel Fiorino 
gives three main reasons for public participation in policy: first there is the 
normative - that democracy is a good thing in itself; the second reason is 
instrumental - that engagement might lead to greater trust and expedite 
particular policy measures; the third is substantive - that engagement, done 
Old model of expertise 
•	Closed
•	Homogenous
•	Hubristic
•	Demanding public trust
•	Expecting expert consensus 
and prescription
•	Managerial control
•	Presenting the evidence
New model of expertise 
•	Open
•	Diverse
•	Humble
•	Trusting the public
•	Expecting plural and 
conditional advice 
•	Distributed control
•	Presenting evidence, 
judgement and uncertainty11 
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well, makes for better decision making.12 It is easy for policymakers to fall 
back on the first two rationales in the heat of the moment. But they should 
not forget that public engagement is only worth doing if it has substantive 
benefits. Nothing looks more untrustworthy than efforts to build trust 
instrumentally. 
Facts and values 
The assumption behind ‘evidence-based policy’ is that there are ‘hard facts’ 
and ‘soft values’. But all too often policy reality gives us the opposite. When 
BSE, SARS or avian flu arrived, there was scant evidence on which to build 
a watertight policy. There was a clear need for regulatory certainty, but the 
science was riven with uncertainty. The facts looked flimsy and the values, 
interests and politics were hard-fought.13 The job of the experts in such 
situations is to help policymakers navigate these uncertainties. But as we 
saw with BSE, it is rarely clear who the most relevant experts are. Policy 
remains filled with politics, values and difficult choices. These demand open 
debate, but political cultures still harbour a technocratic reflex that tries to 
strip these things away. The new enthusiasm for openness has coincided 
with interest in evidence-based policy. While few would argue with the need 
for evidence, the use of the term ‘evidence-based’ can become a shield 
against criticism, shutting off important perspectives. 
Supporters of public dialogue and other forms of opening up, such as lay 
membership of previously expert committees, have felt obliged to position 
their arguments in ‘evidence-based’ terms. So they contort ‘public evidence’ 
to fit it in the pile of facts through which policymakers purport to sift. 
This model feels unsatisfactory. Scientific evidence cannot just be weighed 
against ‘social intelligence’. These things play profoundly different roles. 
They can point in different directions, revealing the multidimensionality of 
issues. For people who have been involved in public dialogue on emerging 
policy issues, it is often clear that the important contribution is not to the 
evidence base, but to the framing of the issue itself. Public dialogue can 
sometimes provide answers. But, more often than not, its value is in the 
questions that it places on the table. 
If we take a contentious issue like genetically-modified foods, we can 
look back on a string of attempts to engage members of the public on 
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questions of whether GM would or would not be acceptable. But each was 
hampered by a narrow framing of the relevant question. If policymakers 
treat members of the public as a jury for particular technologies, they are 
likely to find that sometimes the answers that emerge are uncomfortable. If, 
however, we allow members of the public to help frame issues, we can build 
constructive conversations. So, rather than talking about GM, we can talk 
about the problems to which GM might contribute - such as food security 
- and assess the merits of a range of alternative options.14 The Research 
Councils UK Global Food Security programme is aiming to do just this, 
drawing on a range of inputs from experts and publics.15 
Openness and muddling through
Over the last 30 years, policymakers have rethought the contribution that 
publics and experts can make to policymaking. With both, we can see that 
the word ‘open’ is not straightforwardly defined. Are we talking about open 
doors, welcoming in new perspectives; open minds, reflecting on the limits 
of centralised control and predictability; or transparent but closed windows, 
revealing policy but maintaining control of its contributors? 
If we adopt the instrumental rationality of ‘evidence-based policy’, we can 
tie ourselves in knots trying to work out how expertise, evidence and public 
inputs should all be ‘balanced’ as we assemble a justification for policy 
action. If however, we relax this view, and recognise that policy is often 
messy, surprising and responsive - what Charles Lindblom memorably called 
‘muddling through’16 - then we can identify more constructive, sympathetic 
roles for these plural inputs. They all, in their way, help us make sense of 
the many dimensions of issues. 
The motivations for open policy-making as currently expressed may be in 
tension. We should not deny that one of the driving forces behind recent 
moves is a need to cut costs at the centre of government. The assumption 
is that sharing policy responsibility involves outsourcing and therefore 
generates new efficiencies. The inconvenient lesson from BSE onwards is 
that new sorts of institutions may be required in order to build socially-
robust, credible policy. Sciencewise provides one location for policy 
learning across various domains of science and technology. But others may 
be required if we are to avoid further surprises.
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THE POWER OF ‘YOU’: EXPERTISE  
BELOW THE LINE
Alice Bell 
Time magazine’s person of the year in 2006 was, famously, you. “Yes, 
you” they self-consciously assured; selling the story on the shift from the 
normal parade of “the few, the powerful and the famous who shape our 
collective destiny.”1 This is not “you” in a specific sense but a rhetorical 
you, a you-in-general, perhaps akin to what Mike Micheal refers to as 
“publics-in-general”.2 Because “America loves its solitary geniuses - its 
Einsteins, its Edisons, its Jobses - but [with the advent of the web] those 
lonely dreamers may have to learn to play with others”.3
So far, so surprisingly egalitarian. Except those with a desire to share 
agency through society at large have much to be sceptical of here. If 
nothing else, it’s worth noting that even the web version of this Time piece 
largely limits interaction to an invitation to a Facebook-branded ‘like’, 
or LinkedIn ‘share’. There is no comment function, let alone anything as 
open as a “wiki” open editing option (where readers can edit text). Time 
magazine may deliver the message that ‘you’ have more power of media 
messages, but it is not inviting you to be part of making that message. We 
might also, following Jaron Lanier, question whether we really want to be an 
anonymous part of such a “hive mind”.4 
I rehearse this story because the power of ‘you’ is increasingly being 
applied within and around science. Or at least, science policy debate is 
bleeding into social media. You can follow both @uksciencechief and @
EU_ScienceChief on twitter, for example. Andrew Wadge, Chief Scientist at 
the Food Standards Agency, has a blog5 and David MacKay, Chief Scientific 
Adviser at the Department for Energy and Climate Change arguably has 
the web to thank for the success of his book ‘Sustainable Energy - without 
the hot air’.6 The Department of Business, Innovation and Skills has even 
been playing with Instagram and Pinterest - http://pinterest.com/bisgovuk/ - 
where its images of the Farnborough Air Fair and Hadron Collider at CERN 
provide some balance to the site’s tendency towards cupcakes and kittens.7 
We may still love our Coxes, our Walports, Nurses and Bell Burnells, but 
there is at least an appeal to play with others. This taps into a long history 
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of ‘public engagement’ but has, arguably, been given new energies online in 
recent years. 
Networks of science blogging are now relatively firmly established within 
mainstream science news reporting, though not always comfortably, 
providing greater diversity of commentary and reporting, and often driven 
by a desire to drown out or at least rebut ‘bad’ science media.8 We’ve 
also seen active online campaigning on issues to do with scientific work 
which play on a discourse of people against elite power, whilst also being 
an attempt to extend the powers of what are, arguably, elite institutions 
and interests: Science is Vital, on science funding, the anti-anti-GM ‘Don’t 
Destroy Research’ and ‘All Trials Registered, All Results Reported’ (or 
the more 140-character-friendly, #alltrials). New science celebrities have 
developed online, or at least social media has played a role in constructing 
public profiles of prominent voices in science policy. Ben Goldacre is 
perhaps the best example. On a much smaller level, I doubt I’d have been 
invited to write for this collection it wasn’t for social media 
In terms of journalistic output, the relatively new space offered by 
the comments below the main body of web-published text can seem 
threatening. However, it can also play a constructive role in the making 
and discussion of science. The ‘Arsenic Life’ controversy is one powerful 
example,9 or the collaboration set up by Ed Yong between a biologist and 
a farmer over a shared interest in a chimeric chicken.10 Familiar friends 
and previously undiscovered experts dwell online, as well as those more 
mythical creatures such as trolls or flat-earthers.
As with the Time example, there’s a lot to be skeptical of here. But it does 
also reflect new patterns of scientific power. It offers, perhaps, a chance 
for greater openness in lobbying around science; opening it to scrutiny, 
and making it more accountable and able to learn from other perspectives. 
It also offers us a new way round preoccupations with linear and deficit 
models, as online spaces ‘below the line’ enable publics to network with 
each other. As media scholar Henry Jenkins argues, online engagement is 
less about a back and forth between author and audience, and more about 
peer to peer.11 Still, just because there are small moments of openness 
doesn’t mean that the majority of power brokering in science isn’t still 
esoteric, or even secretive and largely top-down. 
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Openness and allusions to ideals of public participation are often only 
rhetorically applied. Hashtags have histories and hierarchies; there are 
cultures and contingencies to consider. So here are three sets of questions I 
think we should be asking: 
First, we should ask questions about the forms of expertise on offer here; 
which ones are being disrupted, and which we’re happy to change. The 
participation of ‘you’ is one thing for music reviews, but different for 
physics. This is not to plead a special case for science, nor to dismiss the 
role of professional music journalism, but to acknowledge the equipment, 
time, prior knowledge and large networks of people required to do modern 
science. As Jack Stilgoe says, today’s science is “an expensive, equipment-
heavy team sport”; we’re not about to see “street gene-sequencing 
parties or the Women’s Institute designing a particle accelerator” 
any time soon.12 The same is true of other areas of expertise. Just because 
scientists increasingly communicate directly with the public does not mean 
those same scientists can pick up the work created by falling numbers of 
specialised science journalists. Professional journalists bring their own 
expertise, skills, networks and critical distance. The way public relations 
activities sometimes try to fill this role, under the guise of directly bringing 
science to the people, is especially worrying.13 This is not to suggest a 
defence of the status quo; simply that we should find ways to maintain the 
worth of scientific and journalistic skills online, whilst also using the web to 
critique, disrupt and share such skills. 
Second, we should ask what we want openness to mean online, what forms 
we want to invest in, and how this should be organised. There is a lot more 
to open science than simply open access. Indeed, a preoccupation with the 
latter as a solution to social ills may well be a way of avoiding dealing with 
the former.14 Further, how we choose to finance and manage forms of open 
access is far from straightforward. Whilst politicians, scientists, publishers 
and learned societies argue it out, the #icanhazpdf hashtag is gradually 
whittling away at current publishing models (used so people looking for 
paywalled papers can find those with institutional log-ins who are willing 
to be generous on their library’s behalf). Scientists may feel persecuted 
by activists, especially if they engage in debates over climate change, 
alternative medicine or animal rights. They may also feel that when work 
flows into ‘social media’, even more of their private lives are being taken 
over by work. Online interaction can be tiring. 
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A related issue is whether the public can be trusted with science in the 
open. One might, for example, feel pleased when the Science Media Centre 
manages to keep a story out of the press (as when I heard senior scientists 
cheer in the case of a story about GMO food last year). Alternatively, one 
could follow the lead of the Cancer Research UK news blog15 which accepts 
that stories they don’t agree with will get published, but uses the more 
open spaces of the web to put extra context out there, hoping those who 
care will find it. One recent piece of research argues that the ‘incivil’ tone 
of web comments can derail evidence-based public debate on science, 
technology and especially environmental and health issues.16 For all that 
I can personally relate to this (having uncomfortably found myself being 
incivil myself, as well as at the receiving end of incivility), such calls for 
polite behavior online leave me uneasy. Complaints about ‘tone’ are too 
easily used to quell dissent. Words like ‘troll’ can become a proxy for what 
is, at best, disagreement, and worst, class hatred. Moreover, there are other 
ways to view such spaces: Marie-Claire Shanahan’s work on peer-to-peer 
communication under health news articles in the Canadian press suggests a 
privileging of scientific expertise.17 
Finally, we should question allusions to public participation, or at least 
acknowledge when more traditional offline, esoteric forms of power 
brokering in and around science play a role. At the more extreme level, this 
can take the form of ‘astroturfing’ - a concerted effort to create the illusion 
of ‘grassroots’ public support, sometimes heavily funded.18 There are also 
ways in which real publics are used by campaigns in ways that express the 
public voice without necessarily feeling a need to listen to it. In many ways, 
campaigns like Don’t Destroy Research, Science is Vital, All Trials and the 
like are more about enumerating the actors of public relations than diffusing 
political power. Even if these campaigns draw in a lot of expertise alongside 
more passive ‘clicktivist’ support - from lawyers, lobbyists, designers or 
programmers - they don’t seem to have any great interest in finding new 
opinions; merely to show there are people who have the same opinion as 
them. A campaign like Science is Vital also drew on decades of lobbying on 
science funding, and the networks and capacity of existing groups like the 
Campaign for Science and Engineering; it wasn’t just a story of an inspired 
post-doc taking to the blogosphere.19 This isn’t necessarily a bad thing - we 
can have public campaigns as well as public debate and online campaigns 
can augment offline work - as long as we recognise the difference between 
public relations and public engagement, and recognise which spaces are left 
closed.
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In conclusion, I’m unsure about celebrating the role of an all-encompassing 
public ‘you’. It seems too broad, too bland, too easily applied to obscure the 
real faces of human interaction with science and technology policy. It’s too 
clean. For all that online science policy campaigns have a grassroots feel, 
they usually promote rather traditional top-down expressions of scientific 
expertise. It is largely deficit model business as usual. The caricature of an 
upstart blogger takes on a slightly different hue when he’s already a Fellow 
of the Royal Society. This isn’t a bad thing. Arguably it’s a brilliant way to 
share wisdom, and occasionally a productive disruption of the limitations of 
professional journalism. But we need to stay attuned to the power dynamics 
at play. 
It is now 18 years since Bruce Lewenstein suggested a ‘web model’ as an 
alternative to top-down ideas of science communication in his study of the 
cold fusion controversy.20 This networked view seems almost too obvious 
today, as gross a simplification as the deficit model. But it contains an 
important message that is increasingly hard to ignore: the simple messiness 
of scientific discourse. Although neater debate has its uses, especially in 
policymaking, that doesn’t mean we should aim to tidy it all up. This mess is 
how we build capacity for more coherent exchanges, build trust, learn and 
digest. It is also where people can show dissent and support for science, 
both of which are important. We should be wary of being too spooked by 
the incivility or apparent lack of expertise online. As science policy debate 
bleeds onto social media, we shouldn’t be scared to take a dip below the 
line, and take some time to look and listen. You never know what we might 
find. 
Dr Alice Bell is a research fellow and head of public engagement at the 
Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University of Sussex. She also 
blogs for the Guardian and co–edits the New Left Project (@alicebell) 
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THE POLITICS OF POSTERITY:  
EXPERTISE AND LONG-RANGE  
DECISION-MAKING 
Natalie Day 
Four months into the UK’s coalition government, the Deputy Prime Minister 
Nick Clegg gave a speech to the Institute for Government on “governing 
for the long term.”1 It wasn’t a premature pitch for re-election; rather, the 
speech sought to highlight how a culture of short-termism pervades political 
life, and how “the longer-term vision we are adopting in government 
will help to wipe the slate clean, and ensure that future generations 
can thrive.”
Clegg might struggle to make such a speech today. Difficult decisions such 
as those required on nuclear power, a third runway at Heathrow, House of 
Lords reform and Britain’s place in Europe have been delayed, or are beset 
with uncertainty. The constraints of a fixed, five-year coalition agreement 
have been exacerbated by the erosion of Whitehall’s capacity to think long 
term, through the scrapping of bodies like the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, 
the Sustainable Development Commission and the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution.
The Arab Spring, the Icelandic volcano and the Fukushima nuclear disaster 
are all examples of unexpected events that can demand immediate policy 
attention. But this is no excuse to be unprepared. Across a host of policy 
agendas - from coping with an ageing population, to ensuring a secure and 
sustainable energy supply, and coping with climate change - longer-term 
perspectives are required. 
Short-term pressures, long-term challenges
Given the pervasive short-termism in our politics, exacerbated by the 
news cycle and the immediacy of social media, is it realistic to hope that 
governments and policymakers might look beyond the next election? The 
beneficiaries of painful policy choices today may not yet have been born, 
making those decisions difficult to justify to the voting public. Progress 
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on trade, climate change and many other issues requires international 
agreement, where progress is increasingly hampered by the absence of 
consensus and unclear accountability. Meanwhile, company reporting cycles 
and just-in-time production systems reinforce a short sightedness in the 
private sector, which can prevent constructive conversations about the 
future. 
Several of the essays in this volume focus on the challenge of how to fit 
‘supply-side’ academic expertise to ‘demand-side’ needs of the policy 
cycle. But there is also a critical question of how to extend time horizons 
within the policy world, and the role of expertise in highlighting both 
gradual trends and unexpected developments which merit serious policy 
consideration. 
In this essay, I look at ways to overcome impediments to long-range 
decision making, by drawing lessons from a few iconic examples in 
recent UK policy history. I also consider the role of novel institutions and 
structures in the UK and elsewhere, which can provide a platform for 
longer-term perspectives. 
Environmental enlightenment
In 1970, the UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) 
was created as an independent body, appointed by the Queen and funded 
by government, to consider environmental policy issues facing the UK and 
the world.2 Over the course of four decades, RCEP is widely credited with 
having ‘influenced the content, even the fundamental tenets, of policies 
affecting the environment, with a reach that often extended into the wider 
international arena’.3 Over 30 reports were produced, on topics ranging 
from nuclear power and industrial pollution; to the environmental impact 
of housing; genetically modified organisms (GMOs); and managing waste. 
Although it fell victim to the ‘bonfire of the quangos’ in the coalition 
government’s 2011 austerity drive, there is much to learn from the 
influence and effectiveness of RCEP over its long life. 
RCEP was considered influential because it was an authoritative, 
autonomous and trustworthy body. Its independent status enabled the 
Commission to consider issues of its own choosing, and importantly, it took 
a longer-term view, often in areas ‘where ministers and their officials might 
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hesitate to tread’.4 In some cases, RCEP’s policy recommendations were 
immediately accepted by government; for example, in relation to GMOs. 
In others, the acceptance of more radical recommendations had a longer 
gestation. It was more than 20 years after RCEP’s original report that its 
suggested carbon dioxide emission reduction targets were endorsed. 
Beyond its formal reports, Susan Owens (a former RCEP member who has 
also analysed its work) argues that the Commission’s wider ‘atmospheric 
influence’ was powerful in promoting fundamental principles such as 
precaution and transparency in environmental policy over many decades. It 
was a significant source of ‘enlightenment’; enabling knowledge and ideas 
to percolate gradually into policy over time through processes of diffusion 
that were only possible because of its longevity.5 
The politics of pensions
The Pensions Commission,6 led by Lord Adair Turner from 2002 to 2006, 
provides another example of the importance of creating novel institutions 
to bring expertise to long-term issues, even in politically uncomfortable 
terrain. Unlike RCEP, the Pensions Commission was set up specifically 
to confront one issue. In a highly charged political environment, it 
sought to depoliticise the pensions debate and build consensus through a 
comprehensive assessment of the future trends likely to impact an under-
prepared and under-resourced UK pension system. In 340 fact-packed 
pages, its first report debunked a number of assumptions and highlighted 
how increased life expectancy, low predicted birth rates and a two-fold 
increase in the population over 65 by 2050 would place significant strain on 
the pension system.7 Their analysis demonstrated that the existing offsets 
between private pensions and the ‘relatively ungenerous public system’ 
were not sustainable, and showed that 60 per cent of employees over 35 
had inadequate pensions.8 
The second report of the Commission, released in 2006 after extensive 
consultation, concluded that Britons needed to work longer, save harder 
and ultimately pay more tax to achieve a more secure pensions system. 
Describing these as “clear and unavoidable trade-offs”, Lord Turner 
argued that an increase in the state pension age, in line with rising life 
expectancy, was essential to keep the system affordable and fair between 
generations.9 Remarkably, given the sensitivity of this recommendation, 
the Pensions Commission eventually received cross-party support. By May 
NETWORKS, PUBLICS AND POLICY 109
2006, Tony Blair, who was passionate about pension reform, had set out 
a two-stage legislative programme to reform the UK system. Fast forward 
to 2013, and the recommendations of the Commission are still influential. 
A recent House of Lords inquiry, led by Lord Filkin, acknowledges 
the progress in pension reform as a result of Lord Turner’s work, but 
argues that the government may now need to go further, citing Turner’s 
recommendation that the pension age could be lifted to 70 years old by 
2030.10 
What lessons can we draw from this to inform today’s policymakers? 
As highlighted in analysis by the Institute for Government, the Pensions 
Commission is an example of how independent commissions can be 
valuable, particularly when issues are politically sensitive, analytically 
complex and widely consequential.11 By separating the diagnosis and 
prescription stages, it was easier to depoliticise the debate and establish 
authority. Extensive efforts in consultation, openness and public debate 
through the media and other channels were instrumental in shaping the 
Commission’s response (and in galvanising support for its controversial 
proposals); whilst its longer timeframe was also instrumental in being able 
to affect change on such a complex issue. 
Foresight and horizon scanning
The UK government’s Foresight programme provides another useful 
template for longer-term analysis and horizon scanning. Established in 
1994, Foresight is charged with ‘helping government think systematically 
about the future’ and reports to the government’s chief scientific adviser 
(GCSA) and to the Cabinet Office.12 From food, farming, floods, finance 
and future disasters, Foresight projects tackle diverse topics, and are well 
respected in the policy community. Each project typically runs for two 
years, guided by a high-level stakeholder group, chaired by a government 
minister. Day-to-day management is led by a small secretariat, located with 
the Government Office for Science, with expert advice provided by a Lead 
Experts Group, largely made up of senior scientists and social scientists. 
This structure is particularly important for building relationships and 
networks between a wide range of experts and policymakers. 
Whilst the GCSA has the final say on approved projects, selection criteria 
include the need to be future orientated, looking at least ten years or 
beyond; to focus on areas of uncertain or rapid change; and to require inter-
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disciplinary and inter-departmental approaches.13 Department ‘buy-in’ is 
also deemed critical, particularly for successful impact and implementation. 
Some projects, such as Computer Trading in Financial Markets, work to a 
ten year horizon, but others, such as Flood and Coastal Defences, can look 
up to 80 years ahead. 
Targeted primarily at the UK government, the research community and the 
third sector, Foresight’s work also gains increasing attention internationally, 
with evidence of its methodologies and findings being applied in China, 
South Africa and the European Commission. Looking at the impact of 
the work closer to home, Foresight’s work on tackling obesities in 2007 
shaped the government strategy launched in January 2008, which included 
an additional investment of over £372 million over three years. Its 2004 
project on future flooding substantially informed a cross-government 
20-year strategy, and provided the evidence base to justify a doubling of 
government expenditure in this area by an additional £300 million.14 
Beyond Foresight, the capacity for deep analysis and systemic review of 
longer-term issues across government is more patchy. A recent civil service 
review, led by the Cabinet Office, has acknowledged this and sought to 
improve horizon-scanning functions as part of ‘the capabilities and structures 
used by the Civil Service to anticipate risk and identify opportunities over the 
medium-to-long term’.15 The review called for better coordination of horizon 
scanning activity through a new Cabinet Secretary Advisory Group and, in 
a nod to political pressures, reminds the civil service of its ‘responsibility to 
look beyond the parliamentary term’ and ensure that ‘day to day issues and 
short-term politics don’t drive every policy agenda.’16 
Nudging forward
Whether such recommendations will prove successful remains unclear. At 
a time of acute government austerity, longer-term perspectives can seem 
a distraction from the more pressing demands of the day. And there is a 
more widespread concern in Whitehall that - despite Nick Clegg’s warm 
words in 2010 - this government has eroded strategic capacity at its centre. 
In particular, the decision at the end of 2010 to close the Prime Minister’s 
Strategy Unit sent a worrying signal about the place of longer-term analysis 
in the new government. 
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The Strategy Unit, established by Tony Blair in 2002, was the primary 
source of futures thinking at the centre of government throughout Labour’s 
period in office. Such units have been established and disbanded throughout 
recent political history, with an earlier incarnation set up by Edward Heath 
in 1971, only to be disbanded by Margaret Thatcher following the 1983 
election. Blair’s Strategy Unit carried out policy reviews, analysed emerging 
evidence and trends, and aimed to inject more long-term strategic thinking 
into core policy debates.17 During its time, it conducted reviews across 
education, healthcare, energy, social mobility and risk. The unit’s former 
director, Stephen Aldridge describes how it could “step back a bit from the 
events of the day, the immediate crises, and offer a more considered 
view to the Prime Minister and Number 10 than would otherwise be 
possible”.18 
Downing Street argues that these functions have now been absorbed 
elsewhere, within its now-enlarged Policy Unit, but it was a degree of 
separation between the Strategy Unit and the manic day-to-day pressures 
of No. 10 which seemed to be part of its success. In its place, there has 
been great interest in the government’s Behavioural Insights Team or 
‘nudge unit’, based in the Cabinet Office.19 Building on the work of Richard 
Thaler and other behavioural economists, this unit seeks to apply those 
perspectives to a range of social policy issues and has also promoted the 
use of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and other methods to improve 
the evidence base for policy.20 
By their nature, however, ‘nudge’ interventions suggest modest, incremental 
change rather than large-scale, more visionary shifts in policy; which is 
symbolic of the perceived scaling back of this government’s longer-term 
vision across the board. The nudge model is arguably well-suited to the 
pragmatic realities of fixed-term coalition government. There is a danger, 
however, that the UK nudges forward at the expense of bolder, longer-term 
action on challenges such as industrial policy, energy, infrastructure, climate 
change and ageing that all demand a longer-term view.
Far-flung futures 
Outside the UK, there are a number of models aimed at embedding 
long-term thinking in policymaking which may offer useful lessons. 
Developmental states like China, India, Singapore and Malaysia have 
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long histories of conducting cross-government five-year plans, guided 
by strategic priorities in economic development. The rate and success 
of implementation varies, with some described as an “exercise in wish 
fulfillment as much as anything.”21 National planning commissions 
(NPCs) are another institutional model used in countries like India and 
China. South Africa established an NPC in 2010, with a mandate to lead, 
advise, mobilise and ultimately implement a long-term strategic plan leading 
up to 2030.22 
Although this post has now been axed, Hungary’s appointment of a 
Parliamentary Ombudsman for Future Generations, as an advocate for 
sustainability issues across generations, received some international 
attention. It was the inspiration for a call by the World Futures Council at 
the Rio+20 summit for the United Nations to create a similar role.23 More 
promisingly, Finland’s Committee for the Future is a cross-government 
parliamentary standing committee tasked with creating policy on the future, 
including assessment of technological developments and their consequences 
for society. Established in 1993, and now a permanent fixture, the 
committee’s focus has ranged from healthcare, social capital and 2030 
scenarios for Russia, to a recent report on ‘crowdsourcing for democracy.’24 
The extent to which these various models provide an integrated, enforceable 
and accountable system for long-term, strategic thinking is debatable. The 
most successful models provide appropriate incentives and institutional 
structures to ensure accountability, and display an openness and 
transparency that is usually required to mobilise long-term public support. 
The politics of posterity
When we consider the complexity and gravity of global challenges, 
improving the evidence base and time horizon of decision making should 
be a priority for every responsible government. Understanding how best to 
engage with and empower experts as part of this process is also crucial, and 
there are lessons from all of the models above that can be usefully applied. 
But more thinking about how to do this effectively is required. In September 
2012, the Oxford Martin School established a Commission for Future 
Generations, chaired by Pascal Lamy, the director-general of the World 
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Trade Organization.25 Frustrated by the gap between knowledge and action 
in relation to many of the most pressing issues of the 21st Century, the 
Commission will consider how countries and global institutions might look 
beyond the pressures of short-term crisis management to respond more 
effectively to global challenges. Due to report in late 2013, the Commission 
hopes to provide some insights and practical advice on how to remove 
impediments to action, drawing inspiration from examples around the 
world. 
Nick Clegg spoke in 2010 of ensuring that future generations can thrive, 
without being burdened by the ‘dead weight’ of earlier policy failures. Our 
fear is that without appropriate action on critical longer-term issues, the 
burden for future generations will prove unbearable. 
Natalie Day is head of policy at the Oxford Martin School and 
coordinates the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations 
(@natalieday1) 
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SCIENTIFIC ADVICE IN PARLIAMENT 
Chris Tyler 
There is nothing easy about making public policy. It is rarely the case 
that one ‘correct’ answer exists to a given policy challenge, and even well 
designed and implemented policies usually have some significant downsides. 
People whose job it is to make policy have a bewildering array of options, 
opinions and potential outcomes to consider; and while they typically 
approach their jobs with the best of intentions and careful consideration, 
they always do so with incomplete information.
One important kind of information that can inform the policymaking 
process is evidence produced by scientific research. It is widely 
acknowledged, however, that much research that is highly relevant to policy 
- on topics ranging from health to defence, from engineering to education - 
often fails to find its way into the decision-making process. At first sight this 
seems to make little sense, defying the best efforts of many people who seek 
to foster a more productive relationship between science and policy. 
In this essay, I argue that part of the problem of bringing research evidence 
to bear on policymaking is that a critical element of the science advisory 
system in the UK is poorly understood and systematically overlooked. At the 
root of this is the fact that the government (i.e. the executive branch of the 
UK’s democracy) is only one part of the policymaking apparatus; policies 
are also debated and scrutinised in Parliament by more than a thousand 
MPs and Peers. These elected and appointed custodians of scrutiny and law-
making receive a significant amount of science advice from parliamentary 
staff and elsewhere. Acknowledging the role of science advice in Parliament 
is critical to developing a comprehensive understanding of the relationship 
between science and policy, and to helping to ensure that research evidence 
makes a proper contribution to policymaking.
Government and Parliament have differing roles. Government focuses on 
the details of policy design and implementation; Parliament focuses on 
oversight and scrutiny. Science advice has a place in both, but because the 
role of Parliament differs from that of government, so does the nature of its 
science advice.
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Science advice in government
In the UK, ministers appoint very few political staff, and are instead 
supported by a large, permanent and politically independent civil service. 
The civil service is organised into departments, each of which is tightly 
hierarchical, reporting to a permanent secretary who runs the department 
for a secretary of state. Only high-level policy decisions are taken by 
ministers; the bulk of policy detail is designed and implemented by the civil 
service, of which science advisers are a part.
In this context, science advisers are often required not only to provide 
information and analysis on scientific issues, but also to support one policy 
over another. Although it might be unusual for them to be proactive in 
making recommendations, challenging policy proposals is a routine part 
of the job. There are many - several hundred - science advisers across the 
various departments. Some have broad remits (e.g. home affairs or the 
environment), though more usually science advisers specialise in narrower 
policy areas (e.g. technologies to support the delivery of immigration 
policy or forestry policy). Either way, the role of science advisers is largely 
formalised into the highly structured system of policy formulation and 
implementation in the civil service.
Research evidence is fed into the civil service via a number of routes, 
including the professional and learned societies, lobbyists for business 
and charity sectors, and many well-established formal mechanisms. Large 
statutory bodies, such as the Food Standards Agency and NICE, provide 
evidence-based advice in support of policy recommendations and decisions 
in specific fields. Smaller scientific advisory committees (SACs), made up of 
independent scientists who give their time freely, provide advice on a range 
of matters. Some SACs are departmental (e.g. to the Home Office or Defra), 
while others are subject-specific (e.g. the Expert Committee on Pesticide 
Residues on Food); some are ad hoc (e.g. the Ad Hoc Nuclear Research and 
Development Advisory Board) and others are statutory (e.g. the Advisory 
Council on the Misuse of Drugs). 
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Science advice in Parliament
Parliament, by contrast, is made up of an enormous range of political 
views, policy positions and priorities. The parties exert some control, but 
the culture within Parliament is far less hierarchical than the civil service. 
There are 650 MPs in the House of Commons, and 400 to 500 Peers 
who regularly attend the House of Lords, participating in debates and 
contributing to the dozens of select committees and public bill committees 
that scrutinise the work of government and amend bills. This debating and 
scrutiny work is supported on the one hand by political staff (each member 
having one or two researchers, usually early in their careers) and on the 
other by permanent, politically independent parliamentary staff (including 
administrators and management, known as ‘clerks’). These staff number 
only a few thousand - in proportion to the parliamentarians they support, a 
vastly smaller resource than the civil servants who support government.
These differences are reflected in a contrasting style of science advice. 
Parliamentary science advisers provide advice not for the benefit of a single 
minister, but to hundreds of MPs and Peers whose political affiliations 
are myriad. The advice, while thorough in its analysis and rigorous in the 
communication of research evidence, is given in the context of a wide range 
of possible policy options, not just the ones that the government advocates. 
To ensure that the advice is not only independent, but is also seen to be 
independent, it must always stop short of making policy recommendations. 
The fact that parliamentary work is about debate and scrutiny, rather than 
policymaking per se, also affects the nature of science advice. For debate, 
advice must touch on those issues that are relevant across a wide range of 
political views. For scrutiny, it needs to equip Members with the tools and 
information to be able to ask searching and forensic questions.
Research evidence is fed into Parliament by the same sources that seek 
to influence government, but through different routes. Compared to the 
structured hierarchical system of government, Parliament has many ‘moving 
targets’. There are important individuals such as those that chair select 
committees, but lobbyists also work through informal networks, groups 
and committees of which there are more than 600, ranging from large 
groups active in high-profile and broad policy spaces (such as the All Party 
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Parliamentary Climate Change Group and the Associate Parliamentary 
Health Group) to those whose subject coverage is narrower (such as the 
All Party Parliamentary Hepatology Group and All Party Parliamentary Zoos 
and Aquariums Group).
The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 
The role of the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) is to 
support the use of research evidence in parliamentary debate and scrutiny 
in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, providing advice 
on issues as diverse as energy, the environment, health and infrastructure. 
It does so through its POST notes (four-page briefs, downloaded over a 
million times each year) and its regular events, in which leading researchers 
discuss scientific and technological developments with a parliamentary 
audience. 
Through these activities and others, POST not only provides information, 
but builds capacity within Parliament to handle scientific concepts and 
appreciate the impact of new technologies on society. Its science advisers 
spend approximately 15 per cent of their time working with select 
committees to feed research evidence into scrutiny activities. Importantly, 
POST also builds connections between Parliament and the research 
community; every time it produces a POST note, approximately 15 new 
connections are made between Parliament and researchers, and hundreds of 
such connections are made annually.
As already noted, there are relatively few staff in Parliament, and this 
applies to science advisers too. POST is staffed by a director, six science 
advisers, two administrators, and a number of early-career researchers who 
each spend three months at POST writing briefing papers and organising 
seminars. By comparison, POST’s closest equivalent in government, the 
Government Office for Science, is seven or eight times bigger. The House 
of Commons Library has a science and environment section, and also some 
statisticians and social scientists; and various select committees in both 
the Commons and the Lords have their own specialists as well as part time 
specialists recruited for specific inquiries. All told, parliamentary science 
advisers (depending on how you define them) number between 20 and 
40. Because there are so few, the range of topics on which each of them 
provides advice is typically wider than in government.
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More analysis required
Parliamentary science advice is, as I have argued, distinctively different in 
character from advice in government; but not only is it represented by many 
fewer advisers, it is also systematically overlooked and misunderstood by 
the research community. At the broadest level, the process and practice of 
science advice in Parliament is poorly studied. It would be of immense value 
- not least to the practitioners themselves - to have a better understanding 
of how science is used in parliamentary debate, a keener appreciation of 
how parliamentarians and researchers interact, and a rigorous assessment 
of what methods of science advice have the greatest impact in different 
policy areas. 
A further observation relates to the progress of the science and society 
agenda in the past decade. While the research community has learned not 
simply to lecture the public, but to engage with it, the same lesson has 
not been learned when it comes to engaging with policy. All too often, 
researchers consider that politicians just need to be ‘put straight’ on 
the science, when in fact a process of engagement would be much more 
productive. This is particularly true in Parliament, where decision makers 
are more politically varied and autonomous than in government. 
The research community should give serious thought to how best to engage 
with politicians. Training programmes for academics on the practical 
realities of politics and policy, and how to engage with both, would be 
a major step forward. Within this, there is a specific need for a better 
understanding of the way that research evidence is used in a parliamentary 
context. Those scrutinising government policy need access to research 
evidence, and assistance in interpreting it and in handling inherent 
uncertainties - all the more so because they are usually not expert in the 
particular domain from which relevant evidence is drawn.
Politicians, too, should be provided with opportunities to develop their skills 
in the sourcing, interpretation and use of research evidence, and should 
be incentivised to do so. They could also benefit from enhanced resources, 
with more and better qualified policy staff to help with research and briefing 
(though until we have a clearer understanding of how research evidence is 
used in parliamentary debate, establishing ways to improve it is difficult.)
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My final observation addresses my own community of science advisers. A 
growing body of work exploring their role has predominantly focused on 
government and its agencies, and has been influential in professionalising 
science advice. The Government Science and Engineering network 
exemplifies how the roles of government science advisers have developed 
over the past decade. The same transition has not taken place in Parliament, 
but given the smaller numbers of people involved and the different role 
that science advice plays, a different approach is called for. Improving our 
understanding of the role that research evidence plays in parliamentary 
debate and scrutiny, and of how science advisers influence that role, will be 
critical to the future of high quality scientific advice.
Dr Chris Tyler is director of the Parliamentary Office of Science  
and Technology (@cptyler)
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LETTER FROM AMERICA:  
A MEMO TO SIR MARK WALPORT 
Roger Pielke, Jr.
Congratulations Dr Walport on your appointment as the UK government’s 
Chief Scientific Adviser. You join a select group. Since the position of chief 
science adviser was established in the US in 1957 (see Table 1) and in the 
UK in 1964, less than 30 men (yes, all men) have occupied the position. 
Today across Europe, only Ireland, the Czech Republic and the European 
Commission have formal equivalents, which also exist in Australia, New 
Zealand, and soon perhaps in Japan and at the United Nations.
Table 1: US presidential science advisers,  
 1957 to the present day. 
Shaded names are those who participated in a series of visits hosted by the University of 
Colorado’s Center for Science and Technology Policy Research from 2005 to 2013. Dates in 
parentheses are the year of death.
Eisenhower James R. Killian, Jr. (1988) 1957 - 1959
Eisenhower George B. Kistiakowsky (1982) 1959 - 1961
Kennedy Jerome B. Wiesner (1994) 1961 - 1963
Johnson Jerome B. Wiesner (1994) 1963 - 1964
Johnson Donald F. Hornig (2013) 1964 - 1969
Nixon Lee A. Dubridge (1994) 1969 - 1970
Nixon Edward E. David, Jr. 1970 - 1973
Nixon H. Guyford Stever (2010) 1973 - 1974
Ford H. Guyford Stever (2010) 1974 - 1977
Carter Frank Press 1977 - 1981
Reagan George A. Keyworth II 1981 - 1985
Reagan William R. Graham, Jr. 1986 - 1989
G. H. W. Bush D. Allan Bromley (2005) 1989 - 1993
Clinton John H. Gibbons 1993 - 1998
Clinton Neal Lane 1998 - 2001
G. W. Bush John H. Marburger III (2011) 2001 - 2009
Obama John Holdren 2009 - present
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In the United States, the science adviser is an assistant to the President with 
the formal title of Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, 
one of the many groups that sit in the Executive Office of the President. The 
OSTP was created in 1976, but the formal designation of science adviser 
dates from 1957, and informally from even earlier. All US science advisers 
(except notably the first, James Killian, who had a background in public 
administration) have been trained in some area of physics, reflecting the 
Cold War origins of the position and its historical connection to defence 
issues.
Since 2005, the Center for Science and Technology Policy Research at 
the University of Colorado has brought to our campus six former science 
advisers, spanning the administrations of John F. Kennedy to Bill Clinton, 
as well as the sitting advisers under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack 
Obama.
In this note, I distill what I consider to be the most relevant insights from 
their experiences, viewed through the lens of academic research on science 
and technology policy, to suggest five important lessons for any prospective 
chief scientific adviser.
Lesson 1. Science advisers are not superheroes
The US science adviser carries the weight of a mythology of extraordinary 
access to the President and of a portfolio which spans government. A 2013 
profile of Anne Glover, science adviser to the European Commission, looked 
with envy across the Atlantic:
  John Holdren [is] the latest in a long list of éminence grises tapped to 
advise US presidents. At the annual meeting of [the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science] in Boston last month, Glover says that 
Holdren told her that he was in and out of Barack Obama’s office up to four 
times a day in the run-up to important decisions.” 1
The reality of the position is more prosaic and less glamorous than this 
(perhaps apocryphal) anecdote would suggest. The science adviser has 
never been all that central to presidential decision making. The position 
was created as part of President Eisenhower’s response to the Soviet launch 
of Sputnik, with the appointment of James Killian. One historian of the 
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period commented that President Eisenhower “saw more scientists in 
the two weeks following Sputnik than he had seen in the year before.”2 
Eisenhower contributed to the creation of a mythology when he said that 
Killian “would enjoy wide latitude in action and guaranteed access to 
information in every corner of government.”3 
But actions can speak louder than words. Eisenhower rushed Killian’s 
swearing in ceremony to depart for a golf vacation in Augusta, Georgia. 
He also left office with a warning that “public policy could itself become 
the captive of a scientific-technological elite.”4 Yet as the realities of 
politics became apparent, Killian’s successors began to look back at what 
they perceived to be a golden age of science advice. Jerome Weiser, who 
followed as President Kennedy’s science adviser, characterised Killian as 
an adviser who “rapidly became involved in matters of the greatest 
national importance involving education, defense, disarmament, 
space, and international cooperation.”5 Recalling his term a decade later 
under President Nixon, Ed David observed that “The old style science 
adviser, the distinguished person whom the president looked upon as 
his house intellectual, to be listened to on the complex and new issues…
is not likely to recur soon.”6 
The idea that science advisers can carry the authority of science as a 
counterbalance to the messiness of politics runs deep in the expectations of 
many for the position. Such expectations come from politicians (reflected, 
for example, in the recent UK House of Lords report on chief scientific 
advisers7) as well as from the science community (reflected, for example, in 
the recent book The Geek Manifesto, which calls for a greater authority of 
scientists in decision making.8)
Despite such expectations, the science adviser is an adviser just like 
any other in government, with a limited portfolio of responsibilities and 
expectations for accountability. An experience of the EU’s Anne Glover that 
is instructive occurred after she claimed in public that genetically modified 
foods were no riskier than their conventional counterparts. The ensuing 
controversy resulted in a soft rebuke from José Manuel Barroso, president 
of the European Commission, to whom she reports:
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  The CSA reports directly to the President of the Commission and has the 
task to provide independent expert advice to the President on any aspect 
of science, technology and innovation…The CSA has a purely advisory 
function and no role in defining Commission policies. Therefore, her views 
do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission.”9 
Science advisers are not superheroes with special access and supra-political 
authority. Making effective use of the position within government requires 
the scientific community to realistically calibrate their expectations for the 
role. 
Lesson 2. ‘Science advice’ is a misnomer
These days, science advice and science communication are all the rage. 
Unfortunately, such discussions often fall prey to the so-called ‘deficit 
model’ of the relationship between science and decision making.10 In its 
most basic form, the deficit model recommends the following logic to a 
would-be science communicator: once you come to understand the facts as 
I understand them, then you will come to share my policy preferences, if not 
my values.
Under such a model of interaction the emphasis is on sharing (or more 
commonly, arguing about) scientific facts or understanding outside of any 
political context. We have learned, repeatedly and sometimes at a high 
price, that efforts to separate science and politics in such a manner may 
diminish the role of evidence in policymaking, and can contribute to the 
pathological politicisation of science. Fortunately, many in the science 
policy community, both academics and practitioners, now recognise the 
pitfalls of the deficit model and have moved beyond it.
For instance, we asked Donald Hornig, who was science adviser to 
Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, to describe an instance 
when he was asked by the President to “arbitrate on some scientific 
question or to provide some scientific advice on an issue that he was 
handling.” Hornig replied that he knew “of no example of being called to 
arbitrate a scientific question.”11 
“
126  CREDIBILITY ACROSS CULTURES
The actual (as opposed to mythologised) history of the US science 
adviser position helps to place the role in a more realistic perspective. 
James Killian, often held up as the most successful postholder, was not 
even a trained scientist, having earned a Bachelor’s degree in public 
administration. So if the science adviser is not actually advising on science 
what is he doing? The science adviser is part of government, and in the US 
is a presidential appointee, and as such is a political adviser. It just happens 
that the portfolio of responsibilities of the science adviser includes matters 
of policy for science, including government-wide R&D budgets, and science 
for policy, on topics as varied as food safety and terrorism.
Lesson 3. Political advice from a science adviser can take 
multiple forms
The science adviser is not unique in government in having specialised 
expertise or post-secondary education. Almost by definition, governing in 
the 21st century requires sophisticated expertise. Energy, food, conflict, 
economics, crime, education, environment, terrorism - the list of complex 
issues dealt with by governments that require the input and advice of 
experts knows no bound. In one sense, the phrase ‘science advice’ may 
already be redundant. 
The idea of a science adviser serving as a ‘house intellectual’ is no longer a 
realistic expectation, if it ever was. Compare the perspective of William T. 
Golden, writing of the federal government in 1950: “As to how many top 
echelon or key scientists there are...it would be difficult to decide where 
to draw the line. However, it appears that the number is probably 
somewhere between 20 and 200.”12 In 2004, the US Governmental 
Accountability Office found that across government there were 948 advisory 
committees with 62,497 members. President Obama famously stacked his 
first term Cabinet with a science ‘dream team’, prompting the head of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science to comment, “We 
have never had quite this array of scientists in federal government 
leadership positions.”13 
The rise of expertise in government means that the role of the science 
adviser has been constrained to a few areas, simply because governments 
are chock full of experts, agencies and advisory mechanisms. In our review, 
we characterised a set of specialised roles unique to the position of science 
adviser as follows:14 
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Budget champion. The science adviser is a co-ordinator, and at times, 
a champion for research and development funding across the federal 
government. The scientific community may look to the science adviser as its 
‘chief lobbyist’ for greater public support. All of the science advisers that we 
spoke with expressed caution about taking on this role, as it risks eroding 
the adviser’s authority in government. Nonetheless, it seems clear that 
many in the scientific community view the position in exactly this fashion, 
particularly when the size of the federal R&D budget is commonly invoked 
as a metric of science policy success. 
Issue expert. The science adviser has a unique ability to assemble 
expertise to address specialised or cross-cutting policy issues. When a top 
scientist in academia or industry receives a call from the President’s science 
adviser, it is certain to be returned. This power to convene can quickly 
bring together top experts to consider issues of national importance. For 
example, John Marburger, President George W. Bush’s science adviser, 
described how his office was asked at short notice to prepare a briefing 
for the President on earthquakes and tsunamis after the 2005 Sumatran 
earthquake that killed almost 300,000 people. 
Options Czar. The science adviser may also serve as what I have called an 
“honest broker of policy options”, helping the President or Prime Minister 
to understand the scope of available choice on a particular topic. Given 
the practical realities of high-level decision making, it might be difficult 
to imagine a President like George W. Bush, who relied on a close circle 
of political advisers, using a science adviser in this manner, but it is less 
difficult to envision a President like Bill Clinton doing so. 
Institution builder. A fourth role is to oversee the institutionalisation of 
scientific advice across government. The provision of useful advice requires 
a commitment from policymakers to the use of evidence, but also to the 
creation and maintenance of strong institutions. The science adviser has a 
crucial role to ensure institutional integrity by providing advice on advice.
Lesson 4. Institutions matter 
Professor David Nutt, chair of the UK’s Advisory Committee on the 
Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) was famously relieved of his duties by the Home 
Secretary to whom he reported, following public comments that were 
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perceived to be at odds with government policy. What was rather lost 
in the fierce debate that followed was the importance of the underlying 
institutional arrangement for advice.15 Independence is not enough. The 
specific work of the advisory body matters a great deal as well. Consider the 
following three recent situations:
Earlier this year, the Greek government brought charges against Andreas 
Georgiou, the head of its independent statistical agency Elstat, and two 
of his colleagues for allegedly overstating the country’s debt in 2009. The 
debt calculations were a critical input to characterising the magnitude of 
the nation’s financial crisis and the subsequent responses by the EU and the 
IMF. For his part, Mr Georgiou complained: “I am being prosecuted for not 
cooking the books.” By contrast, Greek politicians argued that the statistical 
agency was “too focused on the numbers and not enough on serving the 
country and the government.”16 
Last year in L’Aquila, Italy, six scientists and one government member of 
the Italian National Commission for the Forecast and Prevention of Major 
Risks were sentenced to six years in prison for misleading the public 
about earthquake risks. At an ill-timed press conference held prior to the 
devastating 2009 earthquake, which killed 297 people, local residents were 
reassured by the experts that they should enjoy a glass of Montepulciano 
instead of worrying about earthquakes.17 
In the United States, in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, New 
Jersey Governor Chris Christie issued an executive order classifying the 
storm as a ‘post-tropical cyclone’ rather than a hurricane, preempting the 
scientific evaluation of the National Weather Service. Whether Sandy was 
judged a hurricane or not makes a big difference in insurance payouts to 
individual homeowners. If a hurricane, the payouts would be much smaller. 
In a letter to the Weather Service, New York Senator Chuck Schumer 
reminded the agency that its scientific judgments could cost his constituents 
a lot of money.18 
Each of these seemingly different cases has a common characteristic, which 
they share in turn with the sacking of David Nutt. An institution - Elstat 
in Greece, the Major Risks Commission in Italy, the US National Weather 
Service and the UK’s ACMD - was tasked with rendering expert judgment 
as an input to policymaking. In each case, that input was thwarted in some 
way.
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Ironically, Elstat was created in 2010 to improve the provision of statistical 
data to Greek politicians. Prior to that, “the practice was for the finance 
ministry’s general accounts office to collude with the Bank of Greece to 
come up with deficit and debt figures ignoring surveys carried out by 
the statistical service,” as one economist told the Financial Times.
In Italy, the earthquake experts stand accused of colluding with politicians 
to convey a message of complacency to the public via a ‘media operation.’ 
The message being sent was motivated, at least in part, by the experts’ 
desire to discredit an amateur earthquake forecaster who had heightened 
public alarm by predicting a forthcoming big earthquake.
Dozens of US states have defined a tiered ‘hurricane deductible’ for 
insurance payouts, several of which rely on scientific judgments of the 
National Weather Service, an agency that was never established for such 
a purpose. Given the political pressure, it was no surprise that Sandy 
was ultimately not classified as a hurricane in the agency’s final storm 
characterisation.
The challenges of utilising expertise in politics know no national boundaries 
and can be found across the political spectrum. Calls to cleanly separate 
science and politics fail to recognise that the challenge actually lies in 
their integration via institutions. If an advisory body exists to answer 
narrow technical questions put forward by policymakers, then this needs 
to be made clear via its terms of reference, and a formal process needs 
to be created to elicit questions from policymakers. An example of such 
a committee is the UK Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), which is 
mandated to answer only specific questions, according to a well-established 
set of methods and protocols.19 It provides non-binding recommendations 
which government can adopt or ignore as it chooses. While the MAC’s 
advice has been hotly debated in recent years, there have been no 
challenges to its legitimacy of the sort that plagued the ACMD.
A different type of advice focuses on policy options. Sometimes decision 
makers want to know what options for action are available to them. As 
Lord May, former UK government chief scientific adviser, explains: “The 
role of the scientist is not to determine which risks are worth taking, 
or deciding what choices we should take, but the scientist must be 
involved in indicating what the possible choices, constraints and 
possibilities are … The role of the scientist is not to decide between the 
possibilities but to determine what the possibilities are.”20 
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Such honest brokering of policy options is sorely needed in a world where 
experts readily self-segregate themselves according to their political 
preferences, leaving few options for comparative policy advice. An expert 
body that clarifies, or even expands, the scope of choice will necessarily 
be comprised of a wider range of expertise than a panel of scientists who 
arbitrate scientific questions. Economists and other social scientists will 
almost certainly be necessary, as, in many cases, will broader forms of 
public engagement.
Rather than answering specific technical questions, or recommending a 
specific course of action to meet a narrow goal, an ‘honest broker’ provides 
multiple possible options to meet a specified goal, or options conditional 
on goals. One example of an honest broker is the US Office of Technology 
Assessment, terminated in the early 1990s, which would often produce 
reports with options for action rather than advocating specific policies. 
Other examples include the red team/blue team adversarial model used by 
the military, the German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment and some 
of the projects of the UK Foresight Programme. A key role for government 
science advisers in future will be to set up and evaluate such institutions, 
which are able to provide more systematic advice about how to provide 
useful advice.
Lesson 5. Politics is more difficult than physics
When Albert Einstein was asked why it was that we could discover how 
to split the atom but had difficulty in overseeing atomic technology, he 
famously replied, “That is simple my friend: because politics is more 
difficult than physics.” 
I was reminded of this phrase when we interviewed Ed David, President 
Nixon’s science adviser. Not only did Nixon demand that David terminate 
all federal funding to MIT as retribution for campus protests against the 
Vietnam War, but he eventually terminated the science adviser position 
altogether, prompting its resurrection via Congressional legislation. Before 
that however, Nixon had another interaction with experts which reveals 
that while the laws of physics are unbendable, politics can be even less 
accommodating. David explained that in 1972, Nixon’s White House was 
considering cancelling the Apollo 17 mission to the moon.
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  That reason was essentially political…Apollo 17 was slated to launch 
about a month before the election day, early in November 1972. The big 
worry by the political forces in the White House was that if there was 
an accident on Apollo 17, it would bear heavily on the election outcome 
negatively. I suggested that Apollo be postponed, however, until December 
after the election…This shows you how science hangs by a string in such 
situations.”21
David explained to us that NASA at first resisted the schedule change, 
claiming that they would have difficulty keeping their staff in peak form 
during the delay. Based on the President’s unyielding political agenda, 
David gave them a choice that they could not refuse: launch in December, 
or not at all. NASA quickly saw the merits of his perspective and adapted its 
mission planning. 
Despite such political realities, scientists at times argue that science should 
carry overriding political authority and legitimacy. Of course, science does 
carry authority, which is one reason why it is so often invoked in political 
debates. However, care must be taken not to place science or scientific 
institutions in a situation of direct confrontation with political forces, as 
politics will almost always win out.
For instance, the 2012 House of Lords report on chief scientific 
advisers at times leans too heavily on the capacity of science’s ‘essential 
characteristics’ to check the excesses of politics.22 The report recommends 
that scientific advisers sit outside the Civil Service, but have direct access 
to ministers at the prompting of the adviser; have a reserved seat on 
departmental boards; be allocated their own ‘ring-fenced’ budget; and have 
a say in how departmental funds for science are allocated. 
However, the notion of a completely independent scientific adviser proved 
problematic when the Lords’ report sought to grapple with situations when 
a science adviser disagreed with a ministerial policy decision. The proper 
answer to this question is the same as for any government employee - either 
quietly accept the decision, seek change from within, speak out and suffer 
the consequences, or perhaps resign. When science advisers see their 
role change from providing advice to playing a formal role in the making 
of decisions, the science adviser is no longer an independent adviser, but 
has entered the democratic process as an unaccountable decision maker. 
Following the Lords’ advice would lead to more cases like that of David 
Nutt, rather than fewer.
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Einstein was right: politics is more difficult than physics. Securing effective 
science advice depends upon creating effective institutions with clear 
mandates that integrate expertise into decision making. Democracy is best 
served by recognising that advisers advise and decision makers decide. 
Parting thoughts
Writing in 1963, the philosopher Stephen Toulmin warned that, “Unless 
decisions about science policy are to be left to be made by éminences 
grises, we shall need a corresponding body of independent informed 
opinions about the natural history of science…research on the 
intellectual foundation of scientific policy.”23 The good news for science 
advisers in the 21st century is that there exists a rich and growing field of 
research on practical questions that lie at the intersection of expertise and 
decision making.
The UK has more than its fair share of this expertise, which I encourage you 
to take full advantage of during your tenure. These experts can provide you 
with much useful advice on advice. Just as there are calls for policymaking 
across government to be more evidence-based, so too should science and 
technology policy. 
Good luck!
Roger Pielke Jr. is professor of environmental studies in the Center 
for Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Colorado 
and author of ‘The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy 
and Politics’ (@RogerPielkeJr)
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THE CROWDED CHASM: SCIENCE IN 
THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT 
Paul Harris
The lead-up to the last federal election was a time of unusually high drama 
for the Australian government. Just two months ahead of the poll, the Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd stood down after losing the support of his party, and 
was replaced by his deputy Julia Gillard, who became the nation’s first 
female Prime Minister. Bitter debate raged about the science and politics 
of climate change, with Rudd having retreated from a planned emissions 
trading scheme. And an ambitious public service reform agenda, driven by 
Rudd and the Secretary of his Department, Terry Moran, was parked while 
the focus shifted to campaigning and voting.
In this context, the Australian Academy of Science issued its science policy 
election statement in August 2010. Among its priorities was an emphasis on 
the importance of science in government policy. According to the Academy:
  Relatively few Australian politicians or public service leaders have had 
formal training or background in science. This potentially compromises 
the proper consideration of scientific evidence as a normal part of 
administrative and planning practice.”1
First among the subsequent recommendations was an insistence that all 
major government departments should appoint a senior scientific adviser - 
an extension of what has come to be known by shorthand in Australia as the 
‘UK model’ for scientific advice.
Quite how such a specific change might help to address perceived problems 
in the relationship between science, policy and politics, and contribute 
to the broader aims of public service reform, has never been spelled out. 
But since 2010, a great deal of attention, both in the research and policy 
communities, has been focused on the place of science in government in 
Australia. 
Whether or not the Australian government needs a UK-style network of 
chief scientific advisers is one question. But a series of deeper questions is 
now being actively discussed. What is the actual problem that needs to be 
“
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solved? What do we need, and what do we already have, to link science and 
policy? What is the right mix of disciplines and perspectives? And, in a time 
of tight government budgets, what is actually affordable? Addressing these 
questions has the potential to lead to a better discussion about the place of 
science in the Australian government.
Australia’s Chief Scientist
The Australian government does in fact have a Chief Scientist. The role was 
created in 1989, and its last few occupants have from time to time been 
caught up in larger political debates - for example attracting criticism for 
close links to industry and support of GM crops. On forming a government 
in 2007, the Labor Party changed the role from a part-time to full-time 
appointment, stressing the importance of science to the government and 
to society. However Professor Penny Sackett resigned from the position in 
early 2011, telling a Senate Committee hearing that she had not been asked 
to brief Prime Minister Gillard once.2 
Professor Ian Chubb was appointed to the role in April 2011 and 
immediately set out an ambitious agenda. A neuroscientist by background, 
he had studied at Oxford before taking on senior roles in Australian 
universities, culminating in a decade as Vice-Chancellor of the Australian 
National University. In his first speech to the National Press Club in June 
2011, he said: “As Chief Scientist, I will speak up and be an advocate 
for science. I know that some of my work won’t be visible… but I’ll be 
around.”3 
He has indeed. As Chief Scientist, Chubb has widened the scope of the work 
of his office, been a visible contributor to public debate, and assumed a 
central role in science policy within government. After opining early in his 
term that “this is not the office of the chief climate change scientist”, he 
has sought to broaden his role, and driven a strong “policy for science” 
agenda. His office has led significant initiatives examining the health of 
Australian science, and the state of mathematics, science and engineering 
education, which led to a $50 million funding injection in the 2012 federal 
budget. He has also taken the lead role in a new Australian Research 
Committee (ARCom), designed to improve coordination across government 
and inform the new National Research Investment Plan and the setting of 
strategic national research priorities.
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Chubb has also spoken publicly about the importance of the role of science 
in policy, and of “evidence-based policy development”. His office plays 
a role in coordinating and brokering scientific advice and expertise at 
the request of ministers and government departments. In his Press Club 
address, he said: “Part of my responsibility is to ensure that the science 
is available… My goal is to ensure they [politicians] have no excuses 
for not having the relevant scientific advice in front of them.”4 
But as Chief Scientist, Chubb has not advocated for a network of chief 
scientific advisers in every government department. Chief scientists 
in different countries clearly see their roles differently and prioritise 
accordingly. In late 2012, Chubb and his New Zealand counterpart Sir 
Peter Gluckman met with members of their staff to compare notes.5 But it 
remains to be seen if any more structured international network is formed.
Perceived gaps between expertise and policy 
Meanwhile, broader debate has continued about perceived problems with 
the integration of scientific advice and expertise with public policy, both 
in the research community and in government. Around the same time 
that Chubb was speaking to the National Press Club in 2011, Professor 
Peter Shergold - previous head of the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, and now Chancellor of the University of Western Sydney - wrote 
an influential article that summed up his frustration at the ‘chasm’ between 
research expertise and policymaking:
“Universities, then, are doing the research. Governments, and their 
public services, want the evidence. Why is it so difficult to get these 
two worlds to meet at an intersection of knowledge that can influence 
in significant ways the making of public policy? Why does Australia’s 
large public investment in research and development contribute so 
little to addressing the political response to the nation’s economic and 
social challenges?”6 
This frustration at the perceived gap between research and policy also finds 
expression in the work of Shergold’s successor, Terry Moran, and the review 
of government administration and subsequent public service reform agenda 
that he helped to deliver. 
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In May 2010, Prime Minister Rudd had accepted all of the recommendations 
contained in the report Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for the Reform of 
Australian Government Administration.7 He said: “We are committed to 
building an Australian Public Service with a culture of independence, 
excellence and innovation - in policy advice and service delivery.” The 
recommendations cover issues such as closer relationships between federal, 
state and local governments, a focus on skills through better workforce 
development and capability planning, and ‘open government.’ A senior 
leadership forum for the public service - the APS200 - was created, to 
bring together 200 of the nation’s top government officials and strengthen 
a culture of leadership. Finally, there was a clear focus on strengthening 
strategic policy capability across government through enhanced 
‘relationships with academia and research institutions.’ 
The APS200 report
APS200 project teams - bringing together senior staff from a range of 
departments and agencies - were assembled to work on a handful of cross-
cutting issues of importance to the government and the reform agenda. 
One of these projects, which began in 2011, was focused on The Place of 
Science in Policy Development in the Public Service.8 
The final report of this project was launched in September 2012. It 
states that the project set out to “systematically review the ways in 
which scientific evidence is used to inform policy development in 
the Australian Public Service (APS)”, with the aim of achieving “better 
government outcomes through facilitating the effective use of scientific 
input in policy development in the public service.” 
The context and rationale for this is two-fold. The report describes the 
ways in which the APS is “increasingly tasked with solving complex 
policy problems that require significant input from science” and the 
aim of the public service reform agenda to strengthen a ‘rigorous, evidence-
based approach.’ At the same time, the Australian government spends 
approximately $9 billion per annum in science, research and innovation 
programs, and: 
 …has an interest in harnessing this investment… ensuring that interactions 
between the science community and policymakers operate effectively to 
support the transfer of scientific research into policy and decision-making.”
“
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The APS200 report identifies five issues or barriers to more effective 
interaction: timeliness; cultural differences; relationships; timeframes; and 
access. It then offers recommendations that government departments and 
agencies can implement to overcome these challenges. These include:
•	A more systematic and ‘joined-up’ approach across departments and 
government as a whole.
•	A clearer articulation of government’s science needs through strategic 
national priority-setting.
•	Human capability development in both the research and policy 
communities, with researchers rewarded for engagement with 
government.
•	Reviewing and enhancing existing ‘science liaison functions’ and 
science advisory mechanisms within government.
•	Strategies for knowledge and data management to improve access for 
policymakers to publicly-funded research data.
The APS200 report, with its clear recommendations and network of 
engaged senior public servants across government, provides a strong 
platform for future work, addressing problems that prevent science from 
assuming its proper place in policy. But what exactly are these problems?
Issues such as differing timeframes, cultures, expectations, rewards and 
motivation are worthy of attention in seeking to more effectively connect 
science and policy, and are mirrored in other studies and contexts. Yet at a 
deeper level, the report shows that concerns about a gaping chasm between 
the worlds of research and government are misplaced. If there is a chasm 
between science and policy in the Australian government, it is an awfully 
crowded one. 
Although there is not yet any systematic collection of data across 
government about exactly what ‘liaison functions’ and ‘science advisory 
mechanisms’ exist, the report clearly shows that there is a lot going on. It 
is not yet properly quantified, but a significant portion of the government’s 
$9 billion annual investment can be mapped to activity that contributes to 
the provision of information and science advice directly to government. The 
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report lists 15 government science agencies and numerous programs. One 
senior official, interviewed as part of the project, commented that there was 
“no sense that my department lacks access to technical expertise.”
And despite the lack of a central push from Professor Chubb, there is 
already more than one chief scientist in the Australian government. With 
only a little bit of investigation, it is possible to find staff with that title in 
government agencies in areas as diverse as defence, geoscience, food safety, 
agriculture and Antarctic science. During the visit of Sir John Beddington to 
Australia in October 2012, the government also announced the creation of 
a new chief scientist post in its Department of Education, Employment and 
Workplace Relations, with a particular focus on the social sciences.9 But 
perhaps most striking has been the growing number of new chief economist 
positions in the APS, most recently in resource and energy economics, 
immigration and in the heart of science policy itself in the Department of 
Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education. 
Institutions over individuals
So whatever the problem, it seems that drawing attention to the ‘gap’ 
between science and policy, or calling for the adoption in Australia of the 
‘UK model’ of CSAs is unlikely to be the solution. There are plenty of people 
in the Australian government with ‘chief’ titles, and while there is not yet a 
network to coordinate or bring them all together, science is not without a 
role or authority in the work of government. 
The challenge is institutional rather than individual. The APS200 report 
makes a case for a clearer, more coordinated and more concerted approach 
to evaluate - and improve where possible - the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of what we already have. As in other countries, science in 
policy in the Australian government is not a blank sheet of paper. There 
is useful knowledge from both theory and practice that can be brought to 
bear. 
Here the report provides another useful reference point, in the way it takes 
an admittedly simplified policy cycle model and sets out a typology of 
science, advice and expertise that might be most effective at different stages 
of that cycle. Evoking Roger Pielke Jr.’s matrix from The Honest Broker,10 
the APS200 report points to a possible way to flip this around from the 
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point of view of policymakers. This is the kind of framework that can assist 
researchers to better understand the workings of government.
By starting with desired outcomes instead of inputs, investments can be 
better planned, performance can be better managed and success better 
evaluated. The case study in the APS200 report of Australia’s National 
Environmental Research Program highlights how, with thoughtful program 
management, it is possible to deliver high-quality science and useful 
knowledge, tools and information to policymakers, from a relatively small 
budget. 
In seeking to improve science policy, more attention is needed not on 
‘science for policy’ or ‘policy for science’ alone, but on the two-way links 
between them both. As Andrew Campbell, former head of Land & Water 
Australia, says - if you want to improve the connection between science 
and policy, it is important to ‘fund the arrows’ not just the boxes.11 A 
more coordinated and systematic approach to this across the Australian 
government - with a focus on mechanisms and institutions, not just 
individuals - is a good start. 
The persistence of politics
This is work that should continue. But those calling for more science in 
policy should remember that it will not ‘solve’ complex policy issues, 
or make the politics go away. Even when science plays a central role in 
policymaking, there is always more involved. 
The debate in late 2012 about whether or not a fishing supertrawler should 
be permitted to operate in Australian waters is an example of this. The week 
before the APS200 report was launched, Australia’s environment minister 
had banned the ship from fishing until an expert panel could further 
investigate its potential impacts. Science had - and continues to have - a 
central role in government decision-making about the large freezer trawler. 
But equally, concerns about overfishing, by-catch, jobs, foreign investment, 
tourism and recreation all played a role, as did a grassroots internet 
campaign organised by the not-for-profit advocacy organisation ‘Get Up!’.
One leading scientist involved in the debate referred to the minister’s 
decision as “a slap in the face for science.”12 But to characterise the issue 
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in this way hinders rather than helps. Science does not have a single face, 
and is not separate and superior to all other sources of information and 
advice that policymakers must take into account. 
In 2013, as we look towards another general election in Australia, science 
remains central to many important national debates. But focusing on the 
‘chasm’ between science and policy, or on an ‘evidence-based’ approach to 
the exclusion of all others will not help. We know some things about how 
to make better use of what we already have, and if we can put these into 
practice, and avoid pejorative rhetoric, there is great potential to enhance 
the role of science in the Australian government. 
Paul Harris is deputy director of the HC Coombs Policy Forum in the 
Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University and 
leads the Forum’s Science, Technology and Public Policy programme
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LESSONS FROM THE IPCC:  
DO SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENTS NEED  
TO BE CONSENSUAL TO BE  
AUTHORITATIVE? 
Mike Hulme
One of the common public expectations of science is that it speaks 
authoritatively about the way the physical world works and thereby what the 
physical consequences of different human actions and policy interventions 
are likely to be. Science and scientists are believed to offer something 
different to public life compared to that offered by politicians, journalists, 
lawyers, priests or celebrities. But what is meant by ‘authoritative’? And 
how does scientific practice best earn and maintain its authority in the 
face of public challenge and scepticism? In these few remarks, I want to 
explore one important dimension of scientific authority-building, namely 
the interplay between the ideas of consensus and dissensus. And I want to 
do this using the example of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (the IPCC). The question I wish to answer can be put simply: 
does the pronouncement of a scientific consensus on an issue such as 
climate change increase or weaken the authority of science? And for whom 
exactly are such pronouncements effective - scientists, different publics, 
policymakers, politicians?
Claiming consensus
The IPCC has made a very specific claim regarding its consensus-making 
character, as too have many commentators outside the IPCC - whether 
politicians, lobbyists, advocates or critics. In the foreword to the Working 
Group I report on the physical science of climate change in the 1st IPCC 
Assessment, published in 1990, the Co-Chair Sir John Houghton wrote “… 
peer review has helped ensure a high degree of consensus amongst 
authors and reviewers regarding the results presented.”1 From the 
very beginning then, the IPCC has sought and rhetorically delivered a 
consensus on climate science. Thus we see in November 2007, just ahead 
of the publication of the IPCC’s 4th Assessment Synthesis Report, the IPCC 
promoting the authority-making nature of its consensus processes: “2,500+ 
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scientific expert reviewers; 800+ contributing authors; and 450+ 
lead authors; from 130+ countries; 6 years work; 4 volumes; 1 report. 
The core findings of the three volumes integrated in the most policy-
relevant scientific document on climate change for the years to come.” 
The sheer weight of expertise compressed into one report is itself a claim to 
authority.
This association between consensus and authority is then exploited, not 
surprisingly, by social and political actors outside the IPCC. The fallacy, 
pushed particularly by some of the climate change campaigning NGOs 
from the early 1990s onwards, is that the stronger the climate consensus, 
the easier it is for lobbyists to use science to advance their own goals and 
objectives. The front page headline from The Guardian newspaper on 
27 January 2007, just before the IPCC’s 4th Assessment Working Group I 
report was released in February, reflects this: “UN’s vast report will end 
the scientific argument. Now will the world act?” Or again we can see 
political actors picking up cues about consensus equating to authority, as 
in this example from Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. In a speech on 
6 November 2009, just before COP15 in Copenhagen, Rudd announced: 
“This is the conclusion of 4,000 scientists appointed by governments 
from virtually every country in the world … Attempts by politicians 
in this country and others to present what is an overwhelming global 
scientific consensus as little more than an unfolding debate … are 
nothing short of intellectually dishonest. They are a political attempt to 
subvert what is now a longstanding scientific consensus.”
Is scientific consensus needed?
But is the IPCC right to be aiming for a scientific consensus and are its 
promoters right to be proclaiming IPCC consensus as an end to argument? 
Or to ask the question more generally, when seeking to be authoritative on 
complex issues of public policy importance should scientific assessments be 
issuing consensus statements?
In his exploration of political theory, Jon Elster, the Norwegian social 
theorist, remarked: “I would in fact tend to have more confidence in the 
outcome of a democratic decision if there was a minority that voted 
against it, than if it was unanimous”.2 If this is true of a democracy, then 
could it also be true of science? Would non-scientists have more confidence 
in climate science if there was a minority view - for example about the 
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evidence of attribution or change to human influences or about future 
climate risks - that was officially recognised by the IPCC, rather than the 
existing mode of climate science being presented as an all-encompassing 
consensus? In the article in which Elster is quoted, philosopher of science 
John Beatty and political theorist Alfred Moore develop exactly this 
argument, and I believe it applies well to the case of climate change and the 
IPCC.3 
In favour of consensus
The argument in favour of consensus as authoritative is that it reflects what 
science supposedly is uniquely disposed to be good at: applying rules of 
reasoning and inference which lead unambiguously and universally from 
evidence to conclusion. The same evidence presented to the same disciplined 
mind leads to precisely the same conclusion. In this view, a lack of consensus 
would undermine the authority of science because it might suggest either that 
conflicting conclusions had been reached prematurely or that personal or 
cultural biases and values had protruded into the reasoning process.
This is the position that seems to be implicitly assumed by many protagonists 
in the climate change debate, whether they be mainstream or critical voices. 
It was the view expressed by Sir John Houghton for example in the foreword 
cited above. His comments on consensus were immediately preceded by the 
observation that a minority of scientific opinion had been excluded from the 
report and that the resulting consensus therefore underwrote its authority: 
“Although … there is a minority of opinions which we have not been 
able to accommodate, the peer review has helped ensure a high degree 
of consensus amongst authors and reviewers regarding the results 
presented. Thus the Assessment is an authoritative statement of the 
views of the international scientific community at this time”.4 
It is also the view of many critics of the scientific mainstream who assert 
that science properly conducted - through unbiased reasoning processes 
- should lead to unanimous consent. By pointing out the mere existence 
of minority dissenting positions outside the IPCC’s statements, ipso facto 
they undermine the authority of science in the eyes of the public. This of 
course reflects a very particular (purist) view of scientific knowledge which 
scholars such as Bruno Latour have described as the ‘modernist illusion of 
science.’5 And yet it is one that offers a wide variety of protagonists a useful 
defence against cultural relativists. 
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Against consensus
But the argument against consensus as authoritative, at least in the context 
of wicked problems like climate change and at least in the way in which the 
IPCC has promoted it, seems to me to be compelling. Let me mention just 
three aspects of this argument (although Beatty and Moore expound others 
too).
First is an argument by analogy. Majority rule works very effectively in 
maintaining authority in social institutions such as parliaments and the 
courts, which involve voting MPs and juries. Consensus is not required 
for a ruling or judgement to carry authority in wider public settings. And 
whatever differences we might insist on between the nature of scientific 
enquiry and political (or jury) debate, we must recognise that scientific 
assessments such as the IPCC are established explicitly as social (i.e., 
deliberative) institutions which scrutinise evidence.6 There are many other 
dimensions to the making of authoritative and trustworthy institutions 
than unanimity amongst members; for example, fair and agreed procedure, 
respect for dissent, acceptance of outcomes. Maybe the IPCC’s authority - 
in the eyes of critics and publics, if not also in the eyes of politicians - would 
therefore be enhanced if it acted on its own rules for minority reporting in 
the Summary for Policymakers (which it never has). 
Second, the requirement of consensus is pernicious - in order to protect the 
authority of the group it encourages agreement in a group of experts where 
there is none. Maybe the IPCC should more openly embrace the idea of expert 
elicitation, or even expert voting as has been suggested by David Guston: 
“A scientific body that does not partake in … a politics of transparent 
social choice - one that hides both its substantive disagreements and its 
disciplinary and sectoral interests beneath a cloak of consensus - is not 
a fully democratic one.”7 For example, such an approach to disagreement 
could usefully have been applied to the case of the sea-level rise controversy 
in the IPCC’s 4th Assessment Report.8 It makes disagreements explicit and 
better reflects the quasi-rationality of scientific deliberation. Another example 
of how this might strengthen authority would be the case of the IUCN’s Polar 
Bear Specialist Group and the embrace of expert elicitation.9 
And, third, the presence of officially sanctioned - even welcomed! - 
credible minority views, thereby revealing the extent of dissensus, actually 
enhances the authority of science. It shows that it is ‘OK to disagree’ and 
thus indicates that the deliberative procedures of a body like the IPCC 
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are fair and accommodating to the full range of accredited views. For 
science to be authoritative, it should therefore welcome - indeed seek out 
- its critics (see the attempts to do this, only partially successful, in the 
case of the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science 
and Technology for Development).10 In the case of large international 
assessments like the IPCC, and the newly constituted Intergovernmental 
Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, the process should not 
just allow minority reporting in its rules of procedure, but ensure that 
minority reporting is actively facilitated. As Dan Sarewitz has argued: 
“Science would provide better value to politics if it articulated the 
broadest set of plausible interpretations, options and perspectives, 
imagined by the best experts, rather than forcing convergence to an 
allegedly unified voice.”11 
Climategate, consensus and the weakening of authority
The single-minded drive for an exclusionary consensus was the true tragedy 
of Climategate. Not that the emails from the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) 
revealed any fundamental faking of substantive data or fraudulent practice, 
but that they showed a scientific culture which was closed to criticism and 
which was resistant to the open sharing of data. When these practices 
were publicly exposed, the tenacity of scientists’ defence of in-group/out-
group boundaries paradoxically weakened the public authority of climate 
science rather than strengthened it. The outcome was the exact opposite 
of what climate scientists in CRU and elsewhere thought they were doing. 
As a consequence, climate scientists handed the scientifically-credentialed 
critics of climate science an easy target - exclusionary practices which run 
counter to the nature of open debate and criticism. And this in turn handed 
to politically-credentialed critics of mainstream climate policies a powerful 
diversionary strategy. It opened the way to convert the agonistic spaces 
of legitimate and healthy democratic argument about climate policies into 
distracting - yet attention-grabbing and entertaining - arguments about the 
authority of science.
The drive for consensus within the IPCC process, and its subsequent public 
marketing, has becomes a source of scientific weakness rather than of 
scientific strength in the turbulent social discourses on climate change. 
By refusing to embrace and legitimise minority reporting, the IPCC has 
opened the way for powerful counter rhetoric to emerge around the 
idea of consensus, as illustrated by these two examples: Robert Carter’s 
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2010 book Climate: the counter consensus and Donna Laframboise’s 
blog No frakking consensus, with the strapline: “Climate skepticism 
is free speech. Alternative points-of-view deserve to be heard.”12 
The relationship between scientific evidence and public policymaking is 
sufficiently underdetermined to warrant large-scale assessments such as 
the IPCC finding multiple ways of accommodating dissenting or minority 
positions. They would be the more authoritative for doing so.
Mike Hulme is professor of climate change at the University of East 
Anglia and author of ‘Why We Disagree About Climate Change’ 
(@3SResearchGroup)
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SCIENCE ADVICE AT THE  
GLOBAL SCALE 
Bob Watson
Human activities are altering the Earth system and impacting the 
environment at local, regional and global scales in ways that threaten 
human wellbeing and development. Changes in the Earth’s climate and loss 
of biodiversity are undermining poverty alleviation, and food, water, energy 
and human security. At the Rio+20 summit, governments agreed to develop 
a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which would complement 
the Millennium Development Goals, and integrate environment and 
development goals for all nations. The challenge of achieving a transition 
to global sustainability is urgent given the potentially catastrophic and 
irreversible implications of failing to do so. Harnessing human knowledge 
and ingenuity is necessary if we are to rise to this challenge in a cost-
effective and socially acceptable manner. 
Informed policy formulation, whether at the national, regional or global 
scale, requires state-of-the-art multidisciplinary knowledge. Relevant 
knowledge can inform policy through research programmes and 
assessments that involve decision makers and stakeholders throughout their 
design and delivery. 
New comprehensive multidisciplinary natural and social scientific 
programmes are needed. At the international level, there is an urgent need 
to build on the successes of the International Council for Science’s Global 
Environmental Change (GEC) programmes by implementing the ‘Future 
Earth’ programme. 
Changing models of assessment
New assessment processes are also needed to inform policy at the global 
scale. These should be owned by relevant decision-makers, and include 
indigenous and traditional knowledge. To be effective, assessments should 
assess the consequences of action and inaction and the complementary 
roles of technologies, policies and behaviour change. They need to be 
credible, transparent, legitimate, policy-relevant but not policy prescriptive, 
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peer-reviewed, and involve the best experts from all stakeholder groups in 
their individual capacity. Assessments should provide decision-makers with 
a consensus view of the evidence in a digestible form, including what is 
known, unknown and uncertain.
Both research programmes and assessments should be underpinned by an 
understanding of the needs of society, decision-makers and the political 
context of decision-making. Consequently, it is crucial that decision-makers 
(governments, private sector, NGOs, media and civil society) are involved in 
the co-design, co-production and co-delivery of research programmes and 
assessments.
The science-policy interface for issues related to sustainable development, 
which has been well supported through a host of assessments, most 
notably the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, is currently being 
strengthened in a number of ways: through the development of the Future 
Earth programme; the establishment of the Intergovernmental Platform 
for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES); and the formation of a 
Science Advisory Board reporting to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. In this essay, I will examine each of these in turn.
Future Earth 
Future Earth is a ten-year, multidisciplinary and integrated research 
programme whose scientific excellence will provide the knowledge required 
for societies to face the challenges posed by global environmental change 
and to identify opportunities for a transition to global sustainability.1 It 
will support science of the highest quality, integrate the natural and social 
sciences, as well as engineering, the humanities and law. Its research will 
be solution-oriented and co-designed and co-produced by academics, 
governments, business and civil society.
Future Earth will address issues critical to poverty alleviation and 
development such as food, water, energy and human security, governance, 
tipping points, the economic implications of inaction and action, natural 
capital, technological transformations (including to a low-carbon economy), 
the sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity, lifestyles, ethics and 
values.
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The research and other activities (including workshops, communications, 
capacity building and education) of Future Earth will be co-designed and 
co-produced by the broad community of researchers (natural sciences, 
social and economic sciences, engineering and humanities), in partnership 
with the users of knowledge (including governments, business and civil 
society) in order to close the gap between environmental research, policies 
and practices. Future Earth aims to deliver a step-change in making 
research more useful and accessible for decision-makers by, inter alia, 
communicating uncertainty, developing useful tools for applying knowledge, 
respecting and including local and traditional knowledge, and supporting 
innovation.
The conceptual framework for Future Earth (see Figure 1) will guide 
the formulation of its research themes. It illustrates the links between 
the drivers of change, the resultant environmental changes and their 
interactions, human wellbeing and the pathways to sustainability. The 
framework explicitly recognises that humanity is an integral part of the 
dynamics and interactions of the Earth System. It also encompasses the 
cross-scale spatial and temporal dimensions of the social-environment 
interactions and their implications for global sustainability.
Future Earth has identified three major research challenges: (i) 
understanding how planet Earth is changing due to natural phenomena 
and human activities; (ii) quantifying the impacts of human activities and 
environmental change on human well-being, peoples and societies; and (iii) 
developing solution-oriented science that enables societal transitions to 
global sustainability.
Given the major research challenges, and consistent with the conceptual 
framework, Future Earth will build upon and integrate the existing Global 
Environment Change Programmes: the World Climate Research Programme 
(WCRP), the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP), the 
International Human Dimensions Programme (IHDP), Diversitas, and the 
Earth System Partnership Programmes (ESSP). It will create, in partnership 
with governments, business and civil society, a set of solution-oriented 
research activities that are more integrated and international than current 
activities.
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Figure 1: Schematic of the Future Earth conceptual framework
The organisational structure of Future Earth embraces the concepts of co-
design and co-production. The Governing Council and its subsidiary bodies 
will, as appropriate, involve representatives from the full range of relevant 
stakeholder communities (research institutions and universities, science-
policy activities such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and the Intergovernmental Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES), funders (government and private foundations), 
governments (national and regional), international organisations (e.g. UN 
organisations and programmes), development bodies (e.g. World Bank), 
business and industry, civil society, and the media). 
The Governing Council is the ultimate decision-making body and 
responsible for setting the strategic direction for Future Earth. The science 
committee will provide scientific guidance, ensuring quality and develop and 
suggest new projects. The engagement committee will provide leadership 
and strategic guidance on involving stakeholders throughout the entire 
process from identifying research priorities, co-designing research projects 
to disseminating results, and ensuring that Future Earth produces the 
knowledge society needs. 
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The Intergovernmental Platform for Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services 
IPBES was established in Panama in April 2012 as a new independent 
international scientific body, following in the footsteps of the IPCC. The 
platform will seek to provide robust scientific understanding of the influence 
of human activities on biodiversity and ecosystem functions and services, 
with a focus on their implications for long-term human wellbeing and 
sustainable development. 
IPBES will be relevant to a wide range of stakeholders, including 
governments (including through biodiversity and ecosystem services 
related Conventions, UN bodies, and intergovernmental organisations), the 
international scientific community, non-governmental organisations, civil 
society, private sector, indigenous people, farmer’s associations, potential 
donors, and the media.
Its Plenary, comprising government representatives (currently over 100) 
and observers, is the decision-making body of the Platform. Its Bureau, 
comprising ten members (two from each UN region) is responsible for 
overseeing administrative functions. Its Multidisciplinary Expert Panel 
(MEP), comprising 25 members (five from each UN region), is responsible 
for overseeing the scientific and technical functions. Bureau members are 
observers of the MEP, as are the chairs of scientific bodies to biodiversity-
related conventions and the IPCC.
Germany has been selected to host the secretariat of the Platform in Bonn. 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is providing the 
interim secretariat and will administer the secretariat once established. The 
first plenary meeting of the Platform took place in Bonn in January 2013, 
and the second plenary meeting is anticipated in late 2013 or early 2014. 
A number of issues were successfully resolved at the January meeting, 
including: the election of the chair, vice-chairs and other members of the 
Bureau, and members of the interim multi-disciplinary expert panel (MEP); 
key rules of procedure; the inter-sessional work program; and the budget. 
Dr Zakri of Malaysia will chair for the first three years. The governance and 
management of the IPBES has been designed to take on board lessons from 
the IPCC.
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Potential assessment activities include: regular multidisciplinary 
assessments at regional (including sub-regional) and global scales; thematic 
assessments on policy-relevant issues; technical support and capacity 
building for national assessment activities; developing common frameworks 
and tools for assessments; and maintaining a catalogue of assessments.
Potential activities to support the policy process include: an overview 
of policy-relevant knowledge, tools and methodologies; partnerships to 
develop priority tools and approaches; promotion of effective tools through 
communication and capacity building; and policy-relevant (e.g. sector-
specific) knowledge syntheses.
Potential capacity-building activities include: maintaining a list of capacity-
building needs; specific workshops and training on assessment approaches; 
increasing access to data, information and knowledge for use in assessment; 
scholarships, fellowship programmes, mentoring; peer to peer exchange 
visits; and regional hubs supporting assessment and peer learning.
Potential activities in catalysing knowledge generation include: identifying 
and communicating gaps in knowledge - including from assessments; 
convening research and donor communities to agree on policy-relevant 
research priorities; and supporting peer learning and networks to 
strengthen generation of policy-relevant research.
A number of issues are still outstanding including European Union 
membership, the relationship of IPBES with the UN, and a detailed work 
programme. By learning from the experience of previous assessment 
processes, IPBES aims to deliver knowledge assessments relevant to 
decision makers at local, regional and global scales.
A Science Advisory Board to the United Nations 
Prior to the Rio+20 summit, the UN Secretary-General requested that 
the Director-General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova, convene a small ad hoc 
group of senior UN officials and representatives of major scientific bodies 
to consider recommendation 51 of the UN Secretary-General’s High-level 
Panel on Global Sustainability:
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  Governments and the scientific community should take practical steps, 
including through the launching of a major global scientific initiative, to 
strengthen the interface between policy and science. This should include the 
preparation of regular assessments and digests of the science around such 
concepts as ‘planetary boundaries’, ‘tipping points’ and ‘environmental 
thresholds’ in the context of sustainable development…In addition, the 
Secretary-General should consider naming a chief scientific adviser 
or establishing a scientific advisory board with diverse knowledge and 
experience to advise him or her and other organs of the United Nations.”2
The ad hoc group recognised that full implementation of recommendation 
51 presented a strategic opportunity to realise a sustainable world 
where decision-making is informed by the best available knowledge; co-
designed, co-produced and co-delivered by relevant stakeholders. They 
also recognised that implementation of recommendation 51 should aim at 
integrating the economic, social and environmental pillars of sustainable 
development at the science-policy interface.
One of the recommendations of the ad hoc group was that a Science 
Advisory Board (SAB) be established to advise the UN Secretary-General 
and other organs of the UN system. The UN Secretary-General accepted 
this recommendation and subsequently requested the Director-General 
of UNESCO to establish and chair a Scientific Advisory Board. Its terms 
are still being formulated, but it is likely that its central functions will be 
to provide advice on science, technology and innovation for sustainable 
development. 
The SAB will bring together in a coherent manner the collective capacity of 
all relevant scientific fields, with due regard to social and ethical dimensions 
of sustainable development. The fields will span a broad spectrum, from 
the basic sciences, through engineering and technology, social sciences and 
human humanities, ethics, health, economic, behavioural and agricultural 
sciences, in addition to the environmental sciences. The overall goal is to 
strengthen the science-policy interface in order to ensure that the best 
scientific knowledge is reflected in high-level policy discussions.
“
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Visions, institutions and actions
As noted in a recent paper by a group of Blue Planet laureates,3 our shared 
goal must be to have a world without poverty; a world that is equitable; a 
world that respects human rights; a world with increased and improved 
ethical behaviour regarding poverty and natural resources; a world that 
is environmentally, socially and economically sustainable. While this is 
achievable, current systems are deeply flawed and current pathways will not 
lead us there. 
There is a need to address the population issue, break the link between 
production, consumption and environmental destruction, recognise the 
limitations of GDP as a measure of economic growth, address the serious 
shortcomings of the decision-making processes, and empower grass roots 
efforts. All of these challenges demand an increase in investments in 
education, research and systematic assessments of knowledge.
If we are to achieve a transition to global sustainability, the time to act is 
now, given the inertia in socio-economic systems, and the adverse effects 
of climate change and loss of biodiversity, which cannot be reversed for 
centuries or are irreversible. We already know enough to act. Failure to do 
so will impoverish current and future generations.
Sir Bob Watson is strategic director of the Tyndall Centre, University 
of East Anglia and was chief scientific adviser to the UK Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs from 2007 to 2012
Endnotes 
1. Griggs, D. et al. (2013) Policy: Sustainable development goals for people and planet 
‘Nature.’ 495, pp.305-307.
2. United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability (2012) 
‘Resilient People, Resilient Planet: A future worth choosing.’ New York: United Nations.
3. Brundtland, G.H., et al. (2012) ‘Environment and Development Challenges: The 
Imperative to Act.’ Blue Planet Synthesis paper for UNEP. Tokyo: The Asahi Glass 
Foundation. See http://www.af-info.or.jp/en/bpplaureates/doc/2012jp_fp_en.pdf
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR  
SCIENTIFIC ADVICE IN WHITEHALL
Edited by Robert Doubleday and James Wilsdon
Scientific advice has never been in greater demand; nor has it been 
more contested. From climate change to cyber-security, poverty 
to pandemics, food technologies to fracking, the questions being 
asked of scientists, engineers, social scientists and other experts by 
policymakers, the media and the public continue to multiply. At the 
same time, in the wake of the financial crisis and controversies such 
as ‘Climategate’, the authority and legitimacy of those same experts 
is under greater scrutiny. 
To mark the transition in April 2013 to Sir Mark Walport as the UK’s chief 
scientific adviser, this collection brings together new essays by more than 
20 leading thinkers and practitioners, including Sir John Beddington, 
Sheila Jasanoff, Geoff Mulgan, Roger Pielke Jr., Jill Rutter, Mike 
Hulme and Sir Bob Watson.
In the context of the UK government agenda for Whitehall reform, and a 
growing emphasis on the use of evidence in policy, these contributors chart 
future directions for the politics and practice of scientific advice. 
This project is a collaborative initiative of five partners: University of 
Cambridge’s Centre for Science and Policy; Science Policy Research Unit 
(SPRU) and ESRC STEPS Centre at the University of Sussex; Alliance for 
Useful Evidence; Institute for Government; and Sciencewise.
